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The Opening Address at the ATRS 2003 Conference, Toulouse, France
BY
Professor Tae Hoon Oum,
President, Air Transport Research Society, and
UPS Foundation Chair in Transport and Logistics,
University of British Columbia, Canada
July 11,2003
Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen! It gives me a great pleasure to welcome all
of you to the ATRS World Conference being hosted jointly by Groupe ESC (Toulouse
Business School) and the ENAC (Ecole Nationale de Aviation Civile).
Today and tomorrow, in addition to the Opening and the Closing Plenary sessions, 112
papers will be presented on virtually all aspects of air transport and related topics.
2003 is a particularly challenging year to air transport policy makers, aviation executives
and researchers as most of the major network airlines are experiencing unprecedented
level of financial difficulties in the 100-year history of aviation. But I am reminded of
Mr. Georges Clemencau, the French Leader during the first World War. He said “our
country advances ONLY through crisis and in tragedy”. Likewise, I am confident to
predict that air transport industry will also advance through these crises. Airlines are
succeeding in restructuring their service networks, and streamlining their operations to an
unprecedented level, and start to listen to what their customers and markets are telling
them more closely. Most major network carriers in the United States and Canada have
achieved a unit cost reduction of about 25% via their recent restructuring efforts. They
will be coming out of these crises with resounding success in order to serve the rising
demands for efficient and cost effective services. Now, 1believe it is turn for the airports
and air traffic control systems to do a restructuring comparable to what airlines have been
doing in recent years. In this regard, I am particularly happy to see many papers and
presentations in this conference are focusing the airports and air traffic control systems.

As a final note, on behalf of the ATRS, 1 would like to express sincere appreciation to
Mr. Herve Passeron, Director of Groupe ESC-Toulouse, and Mr. Ghard Rozenknop,
Director of the ENAC, and above all, Professor Sveinn Gudmundsson for their
tremendous efforts to organize this conference so successfully. I also like to express our
appreciation to AirBus Industries, City of Toulouse, Toulouse Chamber of Commerce,
Aeroport Toulouse-Blagnac, and EQUIS for their active participation in this program and
for their financial supports.

1 look forward to a stimulating conference in the next couple of days.
Thank you very much.

The Air Transport Research Society (ATRS)
World Conference
July 10-12,2003 Toulouse, France
THECONFERENCE
The ATRS held its World Conference in
Toulouse, France, in July 2003.
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The yield of “migration”

‘Ethnic’ air transport as an overlooked customer segment
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Abstract
Following worker migration, mainly to Northern America and Western Europe, several
cultural and ethnic communities live far away fkom their country of origin, they may still
consider their home country. In order to stay connected with the wider family life in their
country of origin, e.g. to take part in religious and other festive celebrations, these migrants
need to return regularly. Since the geographical distance is rather important, air travel is
mostly the preferred choice because of convenience. Nevertheless these customers are not
necessarily specifically addressed by the airlines. This article focuses on the potential
impact of airline marketing and service strategies for these ethnic groups. An explorative
field study is used to assess research questions. The results indicate that ethnic transport
customers show specific expectations in terms of marketing, ticket pricing and senice for
airline policies. Furthermore the generation changes start to impact this customer segment
leading to alter the key issues.
Some suggestions for airline policies are made. Regardless of different views of customer
orientation and corporate policy airlines are not sure to share a lucrative and growing
market in the near future any longer, when certain key issues are not carefully addressed.

INTRODUCTION

Migration and “ethnic” travel
Since centuries the Western hemisphere (North America and Europe) is subject to waves of
immigration from all over the world due to various reasons. Despite the political, social or
economic motives of emigrants for leaving their country of origin, there have been many policies
set up by industrialized countries to attract certain categories of migrant workers to settle with
their immediate families. Immigration as well as worker migration (“guest workers”) compensate
the consistently low birth rates and increased longevity in virtually all industrialized countries of
Northern America and Western Europe, which will even need larger waves of immigrants just to
keep their current ratio of workers to retirees.
Following such worker migration, several cultural and ethnic communities live far away from
their country of origin they may still consider their home country. Even for immigrants who
intend to remain in the host country and eventually take the host country’s nationality, the links
with the culture and the country of origin may.stil1be important.
In order to stay connected with the wider cultural and family life in their country of origin, e.g. to
take part in religious and other festive celebrations, these migrants wish and need to return
regularly. Since the geographical distance is rather important, air travel is mostly the preferred
choice because of convenience. This forged a cyclical as well as seasonal movement of migrants
between the country of residence and their respective countries of origin labeled as “ethnic”
travel.

Historically the “ethnic” traffic was developed after former colonies became independent, for
example with the creation of special fares reserved to migrant workers from the Maghreb
2

countries (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) living in France. Later, those special fares converted to
“resident” fares (Heguy, 2002: 33). These fares are often priced with less than 40 % to the
standard fare and linked to certain advantageous conditions like a longer validity with three
months instead of the normal one, possible modifications of the ticket without penalty and also a
hgher luggage allowance of 30 kg.
In France, initially those tickets were only distributed through certain selected agencies of the
national flag carriers of the migrants’ home countries or a few other specialized agencies,
therefore not necessarily easily available across the whole country. All resident migrants who
wished were not always able to obtain these special tickets because of certain quotas as well as a
distribution system that was mostly organized and only available in important migrant residence
areas, e.g. certain suburban areas of Paris. In addition and despite the comfortable return on
ethnic travel fares for the national flag carriers, these customers are not necessarily specifically
addressed by the airlines. With deregulation, privatization as well as the overall increased
competition by private airlines, h s market seems to loose its exclusivity for the (former) national
flag carriers and the specialized agencies. With the example of Portugal as a member of the
European Union (EU), those special resident fares had to be abandoned since they were inhibiting
the fiee movement of people as one of the four principles of the EU Single Market. The
introduction of yield management put pressure on fares that were, in the past, regarded as special
for migrant residents compared to the full standard fare, nevertheless still providing a high return
for the airline.
The erosion of margins and change of the market raise questions for the concerned airlines,
particularly fiom the marketing and service point of view. That means for the airline marketing to
work on communication, e.g. specific advertising as well as sponsorship of “ethnic” events with
public visibility among potential clients. A desired service constitutes the pre-assignments of
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seats for families traveling together instantly upon their reservation. The national flag carriers are
definitely concerned since they may loose profitable business, as are those private airlines who
have discovered this market providing at least high load factors during certain periods of the year.

One particularity of ethnic travel is its periodicity, most of the demand occurs mainly once during
the summer vacation, when migrant workers return to their countries of origin for the annual
family meeting. The major share of the ethnic travel business is realized during the summer
vacation as well as for Christmas and Easter and has shown continuous growth without the
downturn following recent crises for business of leisure air travel. The market of ethnic travel
therefore seems to be less sensitive to international crises compared to other business and leisure
travel.
Another particularity concerns the need for flexible tickets by these customers, very often
requested with an open return, since they do not know exactly in advance when they can travel
and return, mostly due to family reasons as well as work considerations. Such flexibility has
justified high fares and therefore a higher profit opportunity for the airline.
The clients also show a general tendency to high Zoyalg and habits to deal with the same travel
agent or national flag carrier agency for years to obtain their tickets. This is very often due to
traditional behavior dealing with a personally known vendor of the national flag carrier or a
specialized agent, as most business is done by phone or face-to-face.
Nevertheless, the customer becomes more price conscious and with the mergence of private
competition, as well as charter and low cost carriers, the initial, relatively high fares for this
customer segment are under great pressure.

4

Generation change

Another pressure on this customer segment comes from generation change of immigrant residents
who have lived for a long time in the industrialized host countries. Migrants of the first
generation tend to keep very close ties with their wider family and fiends who remained in their
country of origin, and the above-mentioned particular features apply. Since the different waves of
immigration after World War I1 to Western Europe and France have settled since more than a

-generation and finally established their center of life in the host country, the question is raised
how generation change will impact on ethnic travel. Does the second and third generation of
immigrants still exhibit similar needs compared to the initial ethnic travel features with periodical
and flexible travel requirements? Do they continue to show loyalty to the national flag carriers
and specialized agencies to obtain their tickets or is the growing competition easily entering into

this customer segment?
Is the business still dealt with over the phone and face-to-face or is the Internet with e-marketing
and e-ticketing a media with increased acceptance? This is definitely a decisive shift for
upcoming generations that are used to computers, since selling over the Internet and e-ticketing
also provides very often interesting bargains with cheaper prices for air travel tickets since
airlines save on agency services.
In summary this leads to two important questions from the airline’s point of view:

1. Is there and what is the best way to deal with ethnic travel customers?

2. Can one of the highest yields of this particular market be maintained in the future?

5

Our research questions address two main issues for consideration by airlines since it is important
to know what do these customers want (Holden, 1997) and how to improve the business to a winwin situation where both sides, the customer and the airline, perceive a fair benefit out of the
transaction.
In the following sections we detail the methods applied for the empirical field study and data
collection leading to first results for the sample of migrants traveling fiom and back to France.

We then discuss the implications of the findings for future research and practice.

METHODS

Research design

In order to answer our research questions we chose to obtain data throughout field case studies of
airlines that are significantly concerned by an important market of ethnic travel.
Our study is still on an explorative level and we chose the country of France as a start and first
sample area, where a considerable amount of migrants fiom other European countries as well as
A h c a have chosen to live and work since several generations. With regards to the structure of
immigration to France, with particularly large numbers coming from Portugal as well as Northern
Afiica, we underline that the historical colonial links of the latter counties with France enhance
the movement of migration until today. Only three nationalities (Portuguese, Algerians and
Moroccans) combine close to 50 % of all foreigners living in France (INSEE, 2003; see Table 1).

This figure may be even bigger with regards to the country of origin of all French mhabitants.
Since are not accounted for in these figures the residents who have chosen to obtain the
nationality of the host country through naturalization and who are therefore no longer shown in

the demographic statistics of the non-French nationals.
6

Table 1 :

-

FRANCE Demographic data
Foreigners with selected nationalities according to the last national census

1999
in %

in ‘000

Total Population of France
of which
Total foreign population

58 513,7

3 258,s

100

Total Europeans
of which
Portuguese
ltalians
Spanish

1 333,3

40,9

555,4
200,6
160.2

17,O
62
479

Total Africans
of which
Moroccans
Algerians
Tunisians

1 417.8

43,5

506,3
475,2
153,6

15,s
14,6
4,7

source: Tableau B.03-1, INSEE (2003)

Research instruments

To start our field study, we conducted interviews and field observations with managers of airlines
facing this type of “ethnic” transport requests as well as with users and potential clients for such
transport offer. The interviews where either dealt with face-to-face or over the phone and
followed a semi-directive approach in order to explore and find out about the issues of ethnic
travel with a first focus on France.

7

Sample
The airlines included in our study are mostly national flag carriers since the privatization is rather
slow in the countries of Northern Afiica. Only Algeria has seen the emergence of a private rival
carrier Khalifa Airways confronting the national airline Algeria Airways so far on certain
standard flight connections, otherwise there are national charter companies set up more in
complementation to the national flag carrier like Morocco Airways and Nouvel Air Tunisie.
Nevertheless, there are other regional and international airlines that serve certain destinations of
ethnic travel with regular scheduled flights, therefore adding to the competition on certain routes
with the (formerly exclusive) national flag carriers of the country of origin, like, e.g. Mondair and
Air Atlas Express (both Moroccan) operating to Maghreb destinations, mainly from and to Paris.
(Other examples: Air France: Paris-Casablanca; Air Litoral: .Montpellier-Casablanca; TAP Air
Portugal for Portuguese destinations; Air FranceDelta Airlines and American Airlines: ParisMiami/Point-&Pitre - Port-au-Prince as well as Air Canada with Paris-Montreal- Port-au-Prince
for the Haitian community.)

Our corporate interviewees hold positions of Marketing Director and Vice President and
represent their respective companies in France. Through the corporate interviewees we also got
access to clients with particular emphasis to the segment of ethnic travel requests.

Measures
Through the interviews with marketing representatives as well as customers we wanted to know
whether there is still reason for offering ethnic travel fares and services and about eventual
generation change of second and third generation immigrants and their present expectations upon
airlines compared to the initial ethnic travel features with periodical and flexible travel
requirements. From the airline point of view the generation change was mainly measured by age
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group estimation of customers booking their tickets. A second question for inquiry concerned the
customer loyalty to the national flag carriers and specialized agencies to obtain the tickets as well
as the status of growing competition from other airlines. A thrrd part of our inquiry went into the
media means customers prefer to use, either by personal face-to face contact in an airline or travel
agency, over the telephone or electronically via the Internet.
In addition to the field interviews, we conducted participant observation and research on
documents eventually made available by the airlines. With regards to the highly competitive
environment, the airlines are unfortunately very reluctant to disclose more precise statistics on the
business with amount and yields of ethnic traffic, since they consider this information as very
strategic.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS OF FIELD STUDY

Explorative study
The results of our explorative field study for France indicate that ethnic transport customers show
specific expectations in terms of marketing, ticket pricing and service for airline policies.
Furthermore the generation changes start to impact this customer segment leading to alter the key
issues.
We identified five mayor criteria that appear to be important to ethnic travel customers and
influence their choice of the airline and the travel agent:

1 . Price; the clients expect this price to be only slightly above the latest fixed date and nonchangeable travel ticket (APEX). With the increased use of Internet particularly by the
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younger generation, customers have a more informed overview about ticket pricing
among competing airlines for selected destinations. Communication and associated
marketing make improved service better visible to clients in order to justify higher fares.

2. Flexibility of travel with an open return and possible changes of the ticket at any time (if
possible without penalty or increased fare) is very important to ethnic travel customers as
well as longer validity dates for the return with more than a month. These provisions are
more difficult to provide for a low fare since the requested flexibility has its price.

3. A more important luggage allowance included in the ticket price, as ethnic travelers go
for a long (annual) vacation to their home countries and have to bring a considerable
amount of gifts for the larger family and fiends.
4. Direct point-to-point service to desired destinations versus the hub and spoke system.

Customers do not wish to spend a lot of time traveling with multiple connections, since
they want to benefit the most out of their vacation time with their loved ones in the
country of origin.

5. Other service expectations like the pre-assignment of seats for the whole family traveling
together upon booking. This also helps a very smooth processing of all passengers at
check-in and limits last-minute trouble for changing seats by the ground staff.

With regards to the increased competition fiom other airlines that sell available seats to ethnic
travel destinations at very competitive prices, it is crucial to know what the customer really wants
for attracting and retaining the ethnic traveler.
Ethnic transport is relatively insensitive to crises affecting international air travel in the business
and leisure segments, therefore is represents a customer segment with more stable returns
sustaining the high interest for airlines. To support this argument, we used the travel statistics of
10

airlines and airports looking at the amount of ethnic travel passengers as measurement for certain
destinations. We compared the amount of travel for those selected ethnic travel destinations
before and after September ll* 2001 as well as during the crisis in Iraq and did not find a
significant decrease of passengers after those events. This confirms that ethnic transport is
definitely crisis resistant compared to other business or leisure travel, since the ethnic passengers

do not postpone their family travel.

Customers of Maghreb origin also show loyalty to the airline local office or travel agency, where
they used to buy their tickets; therefore private competition has a harder stand and seemed to be
less fierce. Nevertheless, this is changing with the new, younger generations and increased use of
the Internet, notably because price is an important issue. Particularly the younger customers will
shop for the best price and use the comparative Internet-based travel services for obtaining best
bargains. Travel agencies who offer tourism travel packages with airfare, hotel and car hire, etc.
combined, normally only available for tourists, also offer exceeding seats with very cheap fares
on charter flights for citizens with the nationality of the destination country completing their
loads. This occurs despite the problematic issue of lower landing fees and taxes for chartered
tourism, initially destined to non-nationals of the destination country, adding to the rivalry of
regular and charter airlines as well as travel agents chartering planes of a regular carrier. On top
of possible derogation by the civil aviation authorities of the destination country, this concern
becomes less and less a problem since more migrants acquire the citizenship of their host country
and therefore are able to display the different passport needed to count them as “tourist” to the
destination country entitled to benefit fiom cheaper charter flight fares. These bi-national
migrants are therefore more and more able to pick the best fares between regular Apex and
charter flights for the desired destinations. Notwithstanding, this alters the former client loyalty
11

and put pressure on competition, since very cheap fares were initially not part of the ethnic travel
contingent.
Despite the still most important amount of ethnic travel business that is dealt with by phone,
another impact for change is the increasing use of electronic means to get information and to
book and buy airfares over the Internet not only for cheaper fares, but also as a fast and
convenient way. If, in the past, the social interaction with the personal travel agent or airline
representative was important and linked to maintaining customer loyalty, today it is more the
competitive pricing and frequency to a choice of destinations that creates (not only) ethnic travel
business. Nevertheless, the ethnic travel market for the Maghreb has no e-ticketing yet; so far
mainly reserved for regular business passengers on the concerned destinations.

70 % of all ethnic travelers are in the age group 35-65 years, mainly representing the experienced
migrant working population; the other 30 % comprise the younger generation and the major share
of accompanying children.

Since the e b c traffic is a cyclical as well as seasonal movement of migrants between the
country of residence and their respective countries of origin, mainly during the three months of

summer ( 5 3 0 % of the business is realized during this period), this puts more stress on regular
carriers with regards to their capacities as well as landing fees and taxes compared to charter
companies, who can “pick the sultanas” of the high peak of traffic during specified periods.

Also because of the periodical, but not very fiequent travel needs of the ethnic traveler, who goes
on the plane for this type of travel mostly once a year, present frequent flyer programs offered by
airlines are of no interest. The amount of travel per individual will never be sufficient to obtain
any benefit out of such a program.
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With regards to the ticket reservation and purchase of tickets and communication channel use, the
phone is definitely the mean used by 98% of all customers, despite some students and a few other
young people using the Internet for getting information, but who are not necessarily buying over

this channel (this represents only about 2 % of ethnic travel sales). Concerning the distribution
network, the major share of sales is dealt with through affiliated travel agents to the airlines (7075%), hgher in Paris than elsewhere in France because of a strong independent agency network,
and less than a third directly through the airline representative offices (25-30%),more important
I

for non-Parisian sales.
Most ethnic clients reserve over the phone and pick up the ticket at the agency before they travel,
very few tickets are either send by postal mail or made directly available to the customer at the

I
I

airport the day of travel. This latter service represents definitely a client-fhendly opportunity

1

I
I

particularly for migrants who do not live very close to a travel agency or airline representative
office.

I
I
I

I

I

Discussion
The market of the airline industry is generally divided into two segments, the business traveler
and the leisure traveler. Nevertheless, some airlines have to consider the ethnic traveler as a third

I
I

I

category giving way for a tri-partite segmentation. This stems mainly from national flag carriers
of emigrant countries and certain colonial patterns. Interestingly is occurs that this ethnic

I
I

segmentation was initially not proactively developed by the airlines, but resulted out of the
demand of the customers. Finally, the air carriers did not at all anticipate this travel flow but have

I

been followers of a self-emerging market!
We observe indeed that ethnic air transport concerns a particular segment of airline customers
who have specific expectations towards the carrier or travel agent for their transport needs still
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providing a high yield to the service provider. Airline marketing and service strategies should
therefore answer the question of how to address these customers with regards to maintaining an
interesting yield as well as a future market itself.
Speaking the language of the customer was definitely an issue for migrants, who did not
necessarily have learnt the language of the host country (house wives, grandparents...), but will

be out leveled by the upcoming generations, who tend to be better integrated into the host
country, also from a linguistic point of view.
Furthermore the generation changes start to impact this customer segment leading to alter the key
issues. With regards to the importance of price and keeping in mind that the fare represents still

an important budget for the ethnic traveler, clients tend to show more and more hopping behavior
for the best fare changing their agent easily. This means a significant downturn in customer
loyalty, particularly for the national flag carriers. In addition, the ethnic travel fare will only
survive when the customer and the airline perceive a fair benefit out of the transaction.

The upcoming generations of former immigrints, who settled in the industrialized countries, live
now much better integrated than their parents and grandparents in the host country. Very often,
they even chose to adopt the nationality of the host country and get naturalized. Th~sputs another
threat to the segment of ethnic travel: Since they do no longer have the strong ties like their
ancestors to the initial country of origin, it means that ethnic travel seems to have no bright
future. Furthermore, immigrants from the more senior generations mostly stemmed from more
rural areas, where employment as well as economic development was scarce and made often the
reasons for leaving their country of birth. However, the present young migrants or children of
migrants have no longer the desire to return to the countryside, often regarded as lagging behind
areas, during their annual vacation, despite existing wider family ties. With the generation change
14
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we observe an altering travel behavior where people go back to the countries of their parents or
grandparents mainly for very special occasions (weddings, etc.) but no longer for the annual
family vacation.

Ethnic transport has the strong preference for travel date flexibility, particularly with regards to
the return and mostly because of family reasons. As a consequence, the ethnic traveler prefers to
purchase a ticket with an open return to avoid ticket changes that may incur penalties and/or
increased fares. Since Apex tickets have fixed travel dates and are non-refundable, they are not
always prefened despite the importance of price for the ethnic traveler, since the return dates has
to be irrevocably fixed upon bookmg.

The luggage allowance is another critical factor where ethnic travelers have specific expectations.
The mostly European system with a weight limit per passenger of 20-25 kg but no piece
restriction stands in front of the American system where airlines generally allow two pieces of
luggage with a maximum weight up to 55 lbs each. l k s is close to the double allowed by
European airlines and the ethnic traveler may need even more. Southern Europe and Northern
Afiica as the countries on both sides of the Mediterranean have a culture of sharing in common,
which explains the large amount of gifts brought back to the home country by the ethnic traveler
and the definite need for higher luggage allowances!

Another critical factor concerns the service frequencies and destinations offered by the airline for
the ethnic traveler. This schedule convenience may attract or divert ethnic clients from the choice
of a specific carrier, if the competition has a better point-to-point offer. It appears that the
importance of direct destination service may lead to new entrants into markets initially served by
15

the national flag carriers with a hub-and-spoke or connecting travel route only (e.g.: Paris-Fes
directly instead of Paris-Casablanca-Fes). Charter, regional or low cost airlines can obtain a
substantial share of the market with such direct point-to-point offer and are able of “sultana
picking” with offering service on high yield routes only compared to national flag carriers who
serve a wider network. The domestic network and schedule convenience of these national carriers
is another argument for the ethnic traveler to board a connecting flight or to prefer a direct pointto-point eventually offered by a different carrier. This fosters the well thought organization of
domestic connections in the countries of origin of the ethnic passenger as an issue of the hub-andspoke system in general.
Since the ethnic travel market has no e-ticketing yet because it seems having cultural difficulties
to get accepted by customers of this category so far, other requested service examples include the
availability of the ticket ,at the airport the day of departure for customers who live in more rural
areas of France away from the travel agencies or airline representative offices. This avoids
unnecessary commuting of clients to obtain their ticket before the day of travel.

With regards to frequent flyer programs for the ethnic traveler, we could imagine the possible
grouping of fiequent flyer points and miles for one individual cumulating the advantages of the
whole family in order to get at least one possible advantage in the framework of a frequent flyer
program. This is also a very strategic question for the airline, keeping in mind that most frequent
flyer schemes are loss-makers for the companies (see: Chin, 2002; Kearney, 1989; Whyte, 2002).
It will be interesting to see what will be the position adopted by airlines with regards to the ethnic
travel segment, notably the (former) flag carriers as well as other private, charter, and low cost
competitors.
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Limitations and Future Directions for research and practice
Our study emerged from a practical business problem and perspective with a specific concern
faced by many airlines concerned by e h c traffic. We tried to answer the questions of what is
the best way to deal with the ethnic travel customers and whether the high yields of t h s market
can be maintained in the future. To find answers to our research questions we decided to start the
exploration in France as a country with a particular history of migration due to the colonial past

as well as the present migration features.
We wanted to illustrate the weight and opportunities of ethnic travel for certain carriers and areas
of Europe as well as the world, nevertheless not very often distinguished as a segment requesting
specific management efforts despite its high yield. First results of our interviews and observations
are still on an explorative level.

With regards to the fierce competition for the airline customer we were not always able to access
more precise quantitative data from the different airlines in order to standardize and make them
comparable. Furthermore, additional and more quantitative data over a longer time frame is
needed to display the evolution of ethnic air travel. Future research could also compare migration
flows in different parts of the world and identify whether there is a similar pattern for all ethnic
travel or differences according to particular groups of migrants as well as their countries of
residence.

Regarding generation change and the future of ethnic transport the question can be raised about
the country migrants coming upon retirement age and will live and enjoy their pension. Do they
either return to their country of origin or will they finally settle and integrate the country of
residence after their working life? Where will their children live, study and work? We see
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interesting scenarios for the f h r e of ethnic traffic with regards to volume, destinations and
range.

CONCLUSION

With regards to our explorative study, it seems that ethnic air transport is an often overlooked
customer segment without particular consideration for marketing policies to be adapted to a
distinguished target group of passengers.

Our suggestions for airline policies concern the review of marketing and service for this specific
customer segment of ethruc travelers, because, looking at certain migration flows, it represents a
significant business with a high yield for airlines. The concerned airlines should therefore take
into account the specific expectations and needs of these ethnic travel passengers as well as the
possible evolution of this segment. Airlines could take a more proactive stance for the ethnic
customer segment with more adapted marketing and management lead by a customer driven
strategy. The ethnic traveler expects to be treated as a special category of passenger, notably in
terms of pricing, flexibility, destination choice and schedule convenience, luggage allowance and
other services. Otherwise airlines will not benefit fiom and keep the hgh yields this market
provides at present and may do in the future. This means revising the former bi-partite
segmentation and marketing strategy for business and leisure to give way to a tri-partite
segmentation including the ethnic travelers and also offering those an adapted marketing mix.
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Abstract

This presentation offers a methodology for the construction of a simulation of consumer
decisions within the context of the air-travel market. The simulation's primary strength is
in the provision of individually structured decision making possibilities across many
consumers. The methodology enables the synthetic generation of a profile for each
individual consumer thereby providing a rich and adaptive consumer base from which to
generate a market. By this method the calculated utility of a product in the market can be
shown to be different per individual decision-maker. The methodology is well grounded
but commercially successful application depends on the efficacy of the available data.
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1. Introduction

The analysis and forecasting of air-travel demand is a key component of the revenue
maximisation methodologies used by most of the airlines in the world today.
Understanding the nature of the demand on the routes that an airline services allows the
airline to set fares and capacity in line with the airline’s expectations on those routes.
While the understanding of air-travel demand has traditionally relied on econometric
modelling based on historical data, this paper suggests an alternative approach. That
approach is to simulate consumers in an air-travel market and their interactions with the
choice set presented when they seek to travel on a particular route.
Critically, this paper should be considered as work in progress since the methodology
suggested is still at an early stage of development. The key outcomes of this paper are
the presentation of a suggested methodology for microsimulation of consumers in the airtravel market and recognition of the key obstacles in the development of such a
simulation. As will be seen, the most notable obstacle, as in many other applied
approaches, is in the efficacy of the data that is used in the simulation.
An air-travel market is particularly well suited to a simulation approach because of the

wealth of information that is held by airlines and because of the differentiated consumer
types that exist within the market. Traditional approaches have focused on estimating
models of demand and using those models as a basis for forecasts. The simulation
approach, on the other hand, constructs a model of consumer interactions with the
product based on real world data. This approach produces a higher degree of flexibility
in the response of the consumer to changes in the choices and the attributes of those

choices.
The upcoming section of this paper provides a background on consumers in the air-travel
market and the nature of their choice decisions. This is followed by an outline of the
suggested methodology for the creation of a simulation of a market such as the air-travel
market. The fourth section identifies the data requirements for a commercially successful
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run of the simulator while the final section presents the conclusions and outlines our
direction of research.
2. Background

The approach of simulating the demand for air-travel across many consumers has the key
benefit of allowing a closer examination of a sub-set's behaviour from within the overall
population base. In an industry where price discrimination between consumers has been
a central element of revenue maximisation strategies, a clearer picture of the behaviour of
these differenr Sub-sets and even hdividuais wii'niil those subsets c i a be CGiiSideied
quite useful (see Gale and Holmes, 1993, and Belobaba and Weatherford, 1996 for
analyses of the role of price discrimination in revenue maximisation strategies).
Airlines normally discriminate between at least two types of consumers - the leisure
traveller and the business traveller. By setting high prices with high flexibility, airlines
have normally been able to proficiently target the business consumer, while setting lower
prices and reducing the flexibility (through, for instance, stay requirements or in-advance
purchase requirements) has been an effective approach for targeting the leisure consumer.
Although there is a range of other consumer types (retirement travel, student travel, etc)
and other ticket types, the key underlying point is that the airline recognises the different
consumer types and attempts to maximise its revenue through specific targeting.
A more detailed understanding of the value of the microsimulation approach with

synthesised consumers can be gained through initially evaluating the choice decision and
utility fimction of the air-travel consumer. A consumer (n) in the air-travel market will
that contains each of the travel alternatives and choose
normally face a choice set (C,,)
that alternative (i) that maximises their utility (U):
P(i j C,)= Pr(Lri, 1 Lrj,,),YJE C,,

Equation 1
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By expanding the utility functions such that the problem becomes a random utility model
(with error E ) and including the attributes of the tickets (x), price @) and the budget
constraint (m)explicitly, the following utility function is presented for a particular

A consumer will choose the alternative from the choice set that maximises their utility

and will be observed to do so probabilistically. While the model can be expanded to
include a number of other complexities, for the purposes of this exposition, the simplicity
of this model is useful enough2. In the event that detailed information on the consumer

and their tastes is available, it is possible to assess the likelihood of a particular choice
being made. Normally, the information to hand is of a more aggregate level where an
assessment might be made at the consumer sub-set level or, more likely, at the population
level. This usually means that the discrete choice model is aggregated such that a
representative consumer is used to evaluate the choice.
Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1996) provide a useful explanation of the aggregation
of consumer choice. The utility function is modified slightly for alternative i in a

consumer's choice-set to:

U,= m - pi + xi + e ,

Equation 3

Here, instead of using E, e is used. In this case, the subtle but important difference is that
e is used to describe the valuation that that particular consumer places on the alternative i

and consequently move from a random utility function to a deterministic utility function.

'

For further elaboration on the random utility model and discrete choice theory, see Ben-Akiva and
Lerman ( 1 985) or Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1 996). Domencich and McFadden (1975) also serves as
a useful reference on probabilistic choice theory in a travel demand setting.
2

Battersby (2002) examines the nature of the capacity constraint in the consumer's choice and incorporates
a further level of probability that accounts for the probability of ticket availability.

I
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Each consumer will hold a set of valuations, el ...en, across the entire choice set, C,,. In
the population of consumers, the valuations of the population are distributed over R"
according to the density function:
Equation 4

such that:

The market segment of i then, is:

It is at this market segment level that standard approaches normally provide a model of
demand. The distribution of the market segment is known and it may be apparent that a
particular consumer falls within a particular market segment. The determinism
associated with equation 3, however, is not known and the consumer behaviour is
inferred from the less precise distribution of the market segment being evaluated.
The critical advantage of the microsimulation approach, then, is that it allows the analyst
to synthetically construct deterministic choice probabilities. By constructing the
consumer base from the bottom up so that synthetic individual deterministic consumer
utilities are known, the distribution of equation 6 can be narrowed to the observation of
an individual consumer if it so desired. The analyst can then evaluate, to the level of the

synthetic individual consumer, the nature of the choice that is made in the simulation.

It is also possible that the set of valuations may determine a consumer type if there is more than one
consumer that holds the same set of valuations.
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3. Methodolow for the development of a simulated air-travel market

Information systems in general require a formal specification to enable the translation of
logical and mathematical constructs to functional applications. This methodology is the
outcome of analysis work performed to enable a viable implementation of the concepts
discussed in a computer-based simulation. Only domain concepts (those relating to a
logical solution to any recognised problem) are discussed here. System architecture
concerns, while highly relevant to any implementation, are disregarded in this discussion.
The overarching goal of this simulation is flexibility. The ultimate outcome of the
development of the simulation technique will be built on the requirements of:
1. A strong and usehl binding with the established econometric science,

2. The clean and non-biased subsumption of real-world data and observations, and
3. An incremental, continuous refinement and extension of the ecoriomic models.

This paper focuses on three core elements of these requirements. They are:
1. The event-utility dichotomy,

2. Discretionary attributes of the products or choice alternatives, and
3. The synthesising of individual consumers.
3. I The event-utility dichotomy

The first key concept that facilitates much of the analytical work is what the system
internally recognises as the event-utility dichotomy. Utility is used in the economic sense
such that a consumer will always make the decision that maximises their expected utility.
The simulation is therefore able to state categorically that for any decision that it
generates,the utility is maximised. Conversely, this enables the analyst to make the
observation that, "in any case, all you need to do is to calculate the expected utility for all
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possible decisions, and then the consumer will pick the one with the highest result for
their individual utility function."
While this is logical reasoning, to calculate the expected utility for all possible decisions
raises some problems in practice. Chief among these is the omniscience required to truly
know what an individual consumer's utility function is. Also problematic is acquiring the
knowledge of what all possible decisions may be. The simulation adopts the approach
that for any given possible transaction, the origin, or zero point, is specified as "do
nothing", that is do not buy, sell, investigate, or otherwise participate in the market. For
. .

the vast mdjuriry of possible pair'iiigs of tGiijilmeis :O pr~ductsiit m y .;~rticu!a: time, the
calculated utility is then presumed to be negative and the consumer will "do nothing" in
the market for that product at that time.
The simulation, then, changes the nature of the statement such that "a consumer will
decide between all viable decisions so as to maximise their utility". This is substantially
different &om the statement, "a consumer will decide between investigated decisions so
as to maximise their utility" which may be untrue; a consumer may well investigate and
increase their market information as part of the transaction cost. So, to identify those
situations where any decision other than "do nothing" might occur, the simulation refers
to these periods as "events". The consumer may elect to "do nothing" in response to an
event, but the simulation does not calculate the consumer's aggregate responses to "nonevents". The onus is then on the analyst to decide what may constitute an event. In this
case, they are:
1. The need or opportunity to travel is suddenly realised by the consumer

2. Travel product awareness, via either advertising or osmosis, is learnt.

To establish a watershed, a consumer discovering a need to visit a destination to which

the loss in their expected uti!ity may be reduced by flying is an event of the first type. A
consumer learning of a discount rail ticket to a destination that they would normally have
chosen to fly to is an event of the second type.
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3.2 Discretionary attributes

The second key concept is that of discretionary attributes. The system does not attempt
to model all possible distinguishing features of every simulated entity in advance.
Instead, the core concepts of entity, relationship and attribute are established. Two
entities may be connected via a relationship, and attributes are applied to entities and
relationships. In this manner some requisite flexibility is gained.
These core concepts are identified using an object modelling approach, but more
correctly describe a meta-model rather than a single logical model. They are chosen to
minimise complexity while providing full coverage of useful implementation concepts.
Note that the meta-model at this point is quite similar to the representation of data in a
typical relational database.
An entity is then further subdivided into person and organisation to distinguish between

those decision-makers who are individuals and those who are legal entities with formal
management processes that may affect a large number of people. Typical and therefore
universal attributes of established organisations are turnover and profit. For a simulated
person their total income is also always measured, and their home address is always
known.
To cope with an increasingly less rigid workforce, jobs and other employment types are

modelled via the relationships of the person entity to their employers or clients. This
allows a more accurate representation of a person's role as a producer in the economy and
also provides valuable inferred data about the flexibility of their attendance at company
premises, for example.
This flexibility provides the facility to expand the simulation's access to real-world data
easily. It also allows the system to address new economic concepts when required,
without reworking functioning simulated systems. However, it can create difficulties in
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establishing utility functions where attributes may apply to one entity and not another.
For this reason any component of the utility fimction is expected to still approximate the
population's mean if all components utilising unknown attributes are taken to equal zero
in quantitative contexts. This merely requires careful assembly of new utility function
components.
Attributes may be either real numbers or text. In the case of text components, a
vocabulary is constructed and extended when necessary. This enables the descriptive
segmentation of the consumer base by their pre-established identification with a
p.tic~!arsub-set. Note that some of these attributes may be derived from others for

simpler use.
3.3 Synthetic Consumers

The third key concept is that of synthetic consumers. The simulation is equipped to
model information derived entirely from real-world data, but this is not feasible over a
lengthy period, nor is the data always available to precisely model every desired attribute
as surveyed or observed. The system aims to provide precise results to economic stimuli
and not accurate consumer profiles for simulated areas. Thus, the consumers can be
entirely fictional and the simulation is still intended to produce 'real' results.
This enables the simulation to provide feedback about existing economic systems in both
its construction and execution phases. Indeed, establishing which relationships and
attributes are crucial to observe similar results in the simulated system can provide
valuable, albeit qualitative, information to the analyst constructing the simulation.
It must be stressed that although the simulated entities, relationships and attributes may
be entirely fabricated, they should always be derived from relevant statistical information
available if a commercial outcome is sought. It is then only a question at which level of
aggregation the simulation's data matches the real world data. It is also vitally important
that analysts constructing the simulation are equipped to refine the fabrication
mechanisms to produce statistically valid results for a comprehensive testing regime. It is

B. BATTERSBY AND G. PEACOCK
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perfectly accurate to view this approach as concurrent testing and construction ad
infinitum.
The strength of the simulation is in its capacity to quantitatively describe the reasons for
any particular decision made by a consumer. The individual utility function for any
purchase is accessible, and complex 'what-if?' scenarios are relatively easy to create.
This is one immediate benefit of modelling each consumer decision individually.
Another valuable benefit of this methodology is that the simulation can provide better
insights into structural changes in a community. Traditional econometric methods are
perhaps better equipped to assess precisely the interdependence of variables, but this
ability to fabricate a core mechanism - the individual utility function - provides a deeper
and richer consumer base. Each consumer will act independently of their aggregated
origin, and behave as one would expect them to behave.
Adopting these three concepts - the event-utility dichotomy, discretionary attributes, and
synthetic consumers - enables a strength of microsimulation that may reward the
investment in such a deep structure. The targeted areas in which this simulation aims to
provide results that are demonstrably an improvement over traditional econometric
models are small, but high-yield areas for modem airlines. Primary among these is a
powerfbl model of how market information affects any individual's perceived utility for
any product.
The most problematic of the simulation's weaknesses is its dependence on comprehensive
information. Aside from the usual difficulties encountered with synthesis, the simulation
is demonstrably dependent on a high degree of accuracy in household distribution of
income and assets, the nature of work, and the distribution of market information.
Although these are common concerns to most analytical methods that predict consumer
behaviour, in this case the simulation may not be just quantitatively but structurally
inconsistent in modelling the utility mechanisms for an individual.

B.BATTERSBY AND G.PEACOCK

4. Data requirements for a commercial application of the simulator

To develop commercial simulations of this nature, information is desired that is not only
disaggregated for any particular attribute of the individual, but also correlated in regard
to these attributes. For instance, information regarding household income is readily
available and, should this be the only attribute of interest, sufficiently disaggregated for
construction of synthetic income earners. The same may be true of the industry of
employment for individuals by age category. But the information in regard to both these
attributes is not normally correlated; there is no way to estimate what the mean income
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category.
It is highly recommended that commercial simulations of this type utilise datasets where
information, in regard to consumer attributes, is not aggregated at all. The synthesising
process should receive information about each individual household. This assertion is
consistent with emerging best practise in regard to the customer analytics processes used
by marketing teams in large organisations. It is demonstrable in a sufficiently large
number of cases, that the aggregate data may hide critical information about attribute
correlation. These relationships are comparatively easily discovered if the original
dataset is queried in the correct manner.
This approach differs from traditional analytical techniques in that a hypothesis about the
attribute correlations is often developed late, whereas aggregated approaches are required
to present all investigated relationships as presuppositions. For a highly complex, fluid
and adaptive system this is obviously beyond any known capability.
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5. Conclusions and Future Directions

While the data available in the public domain is insufficient to construct a simulator
useful for commercial decisions, a non-commercial simulator is feasible and may be
useful in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. An airline wishing to
build a valuable forecasting tool will need to carefully consider the cost and legality of
obtaining and developing strongly correlated data. In all likelihood an airline will already
have available the most valuable of all sales prediction tools, past sales records. In many
airlines, these may also be combined with valuable consumer information contained in
frequent flier records. These will often be disaggregated for each consumer, but the key
factor is ensuring that external attributes for each individual are correlated directly.
In Australia at least, privacy constraints prohibit the use of individual consumer data
without consent. Nevertheless, this research sets the foundation for the development of a
market analysis. Indeed, a simulated consumer base with imperfect data is already being
constructed for certain routes in New South Wales, Australia, based on this methodology.
This approach offers the attractive outcome of providing information on the choice
behaviour of individual consumers in an air-travel market. Through this simulation
methodology, an airline may be able to formulate strategies for targeting more refined
market segments and examine the simulated outcome of that specific targeting. The
ability to reconstruct and simulate market segments and then examine the behaviour of
those segments is clearly one of the key strengths of this approach.

L
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Abstract

Incheon I n t e r n t i o ~ lAnport have been in constant efforts to establish hub airport in
Northeast Asia since its opening of 2001 and is in process to build a variety of infrastructure.
To be a hub airport, the airport access problem causin some trouble from opening the airport
is one of the certainly solved problems. Right now 8ere isn’t any other access road except
Yeonyuk Bridge to go Incheon airport. Therefore if the situation such as large traffic accidents
or heavy snow ha pens the airport access would be limited and it would result in a lot of loss.
This study identi es best set of explanatory variables to explain in mode choice, using the
observation of trip making behavior in Incheon International Auport. Logit h e is used
explain the choice behavior between car and bus. The different models are compared; usin
the variables of different components of travel time and costs, and attitudinal variable, seconcf,
total travel time and costs and income level, and finally, components of travel time and cost
only. All models are proven to be statistically significant for overall explanatory power.

E
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1. Introduction

Incheon mort that had finished the huge construction for nearly 8 ears and opened started
with declarin to be a hub airport of the northeast region. However, ere are a lot of works to
be solved fort I lcheon airport m order to be a hub airport.

ti

To be a hub airport, the airport access problem causin some trouble fkom opening the airport
is one of the certainly solved problems. Right now &ere isn't any other access road except
Yeonyuk Bridge to go Incheon airport. Therefore if the situation such as large traffic accidents
snow happens the airport access would be limited and it would result in a lot of loss.
Or
It coul cause Incheon airport to lose competition power because of the vulnerability of the
airport access even though the new airport constructed spendin huge cost. In addition, the
road access using only access means, Yeonyuk Bridge has had to 1 fee problems from opening
the airport and not yet analyzed them precisely.
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The choice of the access means for going Incheon airport is such land trans ortation as car,
taxi,and bus until now in spite of o erating Incheon auport 2 years. Current y it is necessary

P

to analyze and estimate positively g e change of the access transportation, which has already
had many problems before o ening the airport. As a matter of fact, the access analysis of the
Incheon q o r t performed or the traffic forecast before opening the airport. However, it
didn't after openmg the airport.

P

This research analyzes and compares the access traffic of the Incheon airport throu hout the
variety of methods regarding the traffic means choice behavior analysis using tra c means
choice theory. This analysis compares the forecast degree of each model using the means
choice model mainly applyin transport engineering and shows the means choice model for
the airport access. Usin bok discriminant analysis and logit discriminant analysis as the
means choice model ana yzes the difference of two models.
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2. Survey the access situation of the Incheon airport
Incheon airport is located more 3 0 h west from Seoul than Gimpo airport. It is essential for
the success of the airport operation that the accesses to the airport make conveniently and
easily since the airport is located awa from 55km at the center of Seoul. It forecasted using
cars is rapidly decreased and using a us is increased because the access cost of the Incheon
airport in the early time of opening the airport is much more ex ensive than that of~Gimpo
airport. Unlike the early forecast, however, the access mode of e Incheon airport has been
varied such as cars, taxi, bus and limousine.
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Fig. 1 Access of Incheon Auport
As Fi .1 shows, Incheon ex ressway is limited entrance and exit except the Nooji IC and the
north cheon IC to obtain e punctuality of the passengers.
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It is made 6-8 lines and the total length is 40.22km (Banghwa Brid e
Incheon airport).
The entrance gates of the expressway are five gates; the north road I connecting Jayoo road
and Gang pun buk road at the northwest region of Seoul such as Eunpung, Mapo, 881C
connecting the Olym ic road nearby Gangnam, Sucho, Youngdungpo, Gim o airport IC at the
area of west Seoul, kooji IC connecting .the outer cycle expressway at &e area of ~ i m p o
Bucheon, Sihung, and Ilsan, the north Incheon IC at the area of east Inchon and west Incheon:
It is planned that the exclusive train Connecting between the Incheon airport and the Seoul
station will be constructed in 2005 and also the second Yeonyuk bridge will be built at the
Incheon Songdo new city to v
the airport access at the south region of the metropolitan
city. With considering the eary construction investment, the toll fee of the Incheon
expressway is fixed as follows.
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Table 1. The toll fee of Incheon Airport(Expressway only)
Toll

Object vehicles

Classification
(won)
~

SmallCar

4,900

Vehicles less than 800cc

Medium Car

6,100

Car, van below 16 persons, Truck less than 2.5ton

Large Car

10,400

Heavy Car

1

13,500

Car, bus above 17 persons, Truck over 2.5 t and less than lOtoa

1

Truck over 10 ton

3. The theory study over the airport access mode choice

The study over the a' ort access mode choice is performed a lot both internationally and
domestically. The stu y regarding Gimpo airport access mode choice before building the
Incheon airport and recently the study of the access mode choice in the Incheon airport are
performed. These study analyzed factors, which are considered when the access mode is
selected. Ashford(l995) chose the three factors such as cost, corpfort, convenience. In
addition, as cTable 2> shows, it is considered not only the service level of the mode but also
the relative level over other modes when the access mode is selected using the factors.

7

Table 2. The priority ranking over choosing the access mode
Ranking
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8

Contents
Easy baggage handling
Connection convenience
Transit hours
Traffic means comfort
using parking lot
Transfer convenience
Transit hours
Delay & congestion

H.W shiriner and L.A. Hoel(l999) conducted the survey regarding the access services over
111 airports. In accordance with this survey there is no interrelation between the access and
the airport size and the bi gest problem is the congestion of the terminal curbside. Also it
analyzed no interrelation %etween the possibilities of using public transportahon and the
a' ort size [reference 11. However, the ossibilities of using public transportation is clearly
s e r e n t according to the a' ort size antall
orts including the large q o r t s is available a
bus while the airports i n c l u z g the medium
small airports show the load factors of 60%.
This study method about the access in the
ortation field started from establishing the
relating model between land use and transit 111 1 50s and Hamen( 1959) designed the access

3
transg
4

index for forecastin population spatial distribute. This model is amended and added a variety
of types so that is eveloped gravity model, Lowy model, Wilson’s entropy maximum model
and so on.

B

The access ability in the transportation field is used the base of the moving ability from one
point to other pomt. After that, it has been used the variable of transit demand forecast model
and studied the base on the behavior of the
the a’ ort access mode choice analysis is
the b x v i o r theories. This individual
to the mass of data so that it has the
data. These kinds of models are discriminant model,
and demerits are below.
3.1 Discriminant Analysis

Discriminant Analysis is used to classify cases into the values of a categorical d endent,
usuall a dichotom. If discriminant function analysis is effective for a set of %ita, the
classi cation table of correct and incorrect estimates will yield a high percentage correct.
Assuming a multivariate normal distribution of quantitative variables within each level of
classification variable, a parametric method generates a linear discriminant function and
composed as below

i

The numeric value of the discriminant function is different for each subject, and the treatment
subgroup determined from discriminant analysis may or may not be the same as the actual
treatment subgroup. The more subjects with the same classified and actual treatment
subgroup, the better the effect of separation. Taking into consideration the effect of all
quantitative variables, this discriminant function produces the statistical decision for guessing
to which subgroup of classificationvariable each subject belongs.
The performance of discriminant analysis can be evaluated by estimating the error rate
(probability of misclassification).
3.2 Logit Analysis

The logit model is one of the most widely used discrete choice models in econometrics for
three main reasons. First, it is easy to estimate due to the functional form of the logistic
distribution. Second, it can be motivated as a model of choice between alternatives with
random utilities, where the randomness comes fi-om independent draws from an Weibull
distribution. Third, it gives rise to a linear log-odds ratio which leads to a simple interpretation
of the parameters.
When considering mode is 2(ex, car and bus), Generic logit model is follow;

Pc = exp(u)

1+ exp(U)

Pc =

( Pc : C Mode select probability)

1
( PB:B Mode select probability)
1+ exp(U )

The logit formulation is not a complex mathematical function nor is the utility h c t i o n it
employs. The difficul in developing a logit model is encountered in estimating the
considerable number o parameters for variables in the utili function. The estimation is
accomplished using one or another multivariate statistical ana ysis program to optimize the
accuracy of estimates of coefficients of several independent variables.
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3.3 Pobit Analysis

The probit model is a popular device for explaining binary choice decisions in econometrics.
It has been used to describe choices such as labor force participation, travel mode, home
ownership and type of education.

cexp(--r*)dt
1
Pc = @(U)= J27c
2
1
1
exp(-- t )dt
Pc =I-Pc =J27cc 2
The lo it and the probit models are quite corn arable, therefore the choice between the two is
of mat%ematical convenience and ready availa ility of computer programmes. Where the logit
model is based on a logistic cumulative distribution function, the probit is based on a normal
cumulative distribution function. The probit model is mainly used where the utility theory, or
rational choice perspective on behavior is used. In numerous applications, it is found the when
the independence of the utilities is assumed, then there is not much difference between the
result.
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Fig. 2 The comparison between Logit model and Probit model

4. Model Presumption and Analysis
4.1 Data Entry Characteristics

The data used in this study is selected from Incheon Aqort-related data of s y e y for the
status of City Air Terminal User (Korea of Transport Institute, Korea Civil Aviation
Development Association), which was performed twice times, through July and August, 2002.
The analysis of the survey is achieved through analyzing 201 questionnaires, executed and
collected four times, twice in weekday, the others in weekend

- Analysis Specification
=

vital statistics: gender, age, job, the number of car owned and ventilation capacity, the
location of departure
survey of terminal use status: frequency of domestic airtrip, frequency of international
airtrip, The purpose of terminal use, transportation mode used, time taken
surve of favorites: favorite access mode, consideration for favorite access mode selection,
an0t ier favorite access mode and consideration when in case of change of access mode

The surveys was paralleled with two surveys; one is the survey for Revealed Preference(RP)
the characteristics of social, economic aspects and passa e of Incheon airport
E t h e r is for Stated preference(SP) which graps the change of avorites according to
the virtual change of specific transportation variables.
Among 201 surveyed for Incheon Axport users, 62% was men and the rest 38% was women
by gender, 60% was 20-30ies by age. 80% was taken by answerers below twice by annual
frequency of domestic and international air trip. The purposes of terminal use headed by
abroad travel, followed by abroad work, welcome and send-off, airport work, and commuters.
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The most favorite mode for airport users was airport limousine by 50%, followed by car,
Express bus and taxi.The reason airport limousine took high portion of a ort users was that
it was answered airport limousine, throu h bus, suburban bus, and local us all together as
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Fig. 3 The chart about the access mode of Incheon m o r t
To the uestion asking consideration for selection of Incheon Axport access mode,,the
accessibi 'ty and punctuality are positioned most high, as below Fig 4. At the survey for user's
favorites according to arranged to open rail and the 2nd girder bridge, the airport bus is most
highly, on the other hand, the rail ,relatively low as Fi 5. This was result from combinating
ort limousine and through bus as one, airport bus, w%
ch respondent
l
were not conscious of
1 erence between two transportation modes.
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In Fig 6 , after opening rail and 2ndgirder bridge, the most considerable factor for access mode
is transmission, followed by fare and time taken.
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Fig 4. Considerations over choosing the access mode of Incheon A q o r t
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Fig 6. The priority ranking over considerationswhile choosing the transportation mode
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As seen in favorites surveys, the favorite transportation modes are bus, followed by car, rail,
and taxi one by one. As seen from this result, the access to Incheon Auport can be analyzed
by grouping as car and bus.

The selection for access mode to Incheon airport is largely two-grouped as car(private
carttaxi), bus(airport 1imousinetExpress bus) and difference is analyzed after seeing
discriminant analysis and logic analysis.
4.2 discriminant analysis for access mode selection

The discriminant analysis was erformed with locating selection for access mode to Incheon
airportas subordinating varia les and age, income, fiequency of domestic air travel,
fiequency of international air travel, cost expended, and time taken as independent variables.

E

The selection variables to Incheon airport access are set as car and bus; the latter is made of
Express bus and limousine bus and the former, taxi and car, which were distinct as separate
selection groups. The verification for homogeneity between two groups are known by willcs'
h and stat~sticsamounts through it.
Table 3. Verifying the homogeneous quality of group average of discriminate analysis

I

I
I

Variables
Age(X1)
Income(X2)
Domestic fiequency(X3)
Intemational frequency(X4)
Cost(X5)
Time(X6)

I

Wilks?,
0.962

I

0.949
0.943
0.939

1
1

0.378
0.784

I
I

F
7.881
10.796
11.982
12.845

1

327.799
54.727

1
1

1
1

meaningfulprobability
.005

.001
.001
,

.ooo
.ooo
.ooo

I

I

I

I

The Fisher's first discriminate function which deciding distinction grades of each groups to
the level of meaningfulnessof each variables, is as below.
Yc=-21.078+2.025X,+o.598X , +0.317X,+3.304X,+7.512X5+4.180X,
Yc =-13.609+2.088 X,+O.571 X , +0. 184X, +2.652 X , +1.671 X5+1.103X 6
Seen from this discriminate function, the higher the fie uency of domestic or international air
trip, the more favor car; the more spend the trip cost an time, the more favor car.

2

This can be intuited by the size of parameters of each independent variables, also can be

achieved the fact that both bus and car are more sensitive to cost than time because the
arameter of time is larger than that of cost. Seen from Fig 6 result, transfer and cost are
rarger selection facts than routes, frequency, and time in choosing transportation modes, and
fiom the larger two facts; the cost are more effectible than transfer.
As a result of discriminating, the group chose car appeared to all selecting cars. In case of bus,
otherwise, the discriminmt credibility was 95.8% that fiom 142 who chose bus, 136 selected
bus. So the whole discriminant credibility was 97% and can be perceived that the discriminant
formula classifies the target group in a pertinent way.

Table 4. The estimation results of discriminate analysis

r

I
I'

~~

Frequency

!1

%

,

~~

7

prediction group
0
1
59
0
I
6
136
100
0
4.2
95.8

0

1
0
1

'

Total
59
142
100
100

4.3 Logistics analysis for access mode selection

When it com ared with
suppose the &ctional
as non-linear rather
the standards can be
made of two

discriminant anal sis
les and independent varia les
of supposition because
one. The logisbcs discriminant is
it can be defined below.

l

To calculate of each group's ex post facto probabilities, the logistics discriminant analysis
use a Logit transformation which transfomng subordinate variables of disperse type into Sshape curve which dispaly a probabilities of certain case.

r
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This stud is applied a Logit discriminant model usin Limde v7.0. Seen from below Table,
as a resu t of analysis, it was selected as a meaning 1 vanab es at meaningful level of 0.01
and the statistical value of the variables are shown below.

Table 5. The results of analyzing Logit model
constant

I

tcost
ttime

I,

i
I

5.229
-.680E-03
0.fil

1

1.855
.171E-03
.291E-01

~

I
I

I

2.819
-3.978
3.798

I

I

.0048
.ooo1
.ooo 1

I

I
I

note) tcost : trip cost, ttime : trip time

From this result, it can be achieved that it is higher the passage cost, the more inclined to
select car than bus and it takes more time, to select mass transportation mode, a bus. The
logistics discriminant model is as below and the classification rate is seen as below table 6.
1
-exp(5.229-0.0068~cost+0.11Ittime)

'(4

q2

I

Survey
1
Frequency

I

0

I
I

1

58

1

1

~~

0

1

1
~~

YO

98.3

1

0.01

I

Total

I

59

141
~

0

1
,

142

j

~~

1.7

100

99.9

100

note) 0 : car 1: bus

Though had a little difference, the redicted result fiom lo it discrimination model has
strengfh in classifying selection begavioraccurately than &scrimination and the right
classification mte come to nearly 99%.
5. Conclusion

Comparing logit discriminant model and discrimination model, the former has strength in
putting its theolo ical base on behavioral theory. Therefore, it is judged that lo it
discrimination mo el is more desirable when setting up the access mode selection model or
incheon airport. Though analysis result had not been analyzed b Probit model, it is judged
much supenor tool to predict selection of three transportationmo es as other.
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All the independent variables, however, which being statistical meaningful at results fiom
discriminant, are rejected in logit discriminant model. The independent variables are
composed of nominal measures, it is not be seen these variables follow regular distribution.
Therefore, it is judged that the logit discriminant model, which can mitigate the supposition of
regular distribution of independent variables, is logically reasonable than discriminant model.
On a conclusion, for a logit discriminat model, there is theological merit with superiority or

equivalent in aspect of statistics and data explanation. As increasing the number of variables,
the credibility of its credibility are decreaslng due to its corelationship and are not getting
distinct in the capacity expression of selecbon behavior. So it is necessary to vary the
explanatory variables so that mode selection behavior can be explained with a little data.
Because the data on passage distance and passage time were drawn fiom surve responses,
and not a accurate sum, so it can be said t h s study has an analytical limitation. his study is
said to be substantially worthwhile as anal sis for understanding the henomenon of
transportation mode selection by users after Inc eon airport's opening. In the ture, to extend
this study and induce more accurate result, it is need to expand the analysis according to the
procedures used in this study throu h executing actual survey on selecting access modes,
subdividing the access mode and ana yze including future expanded access modes.
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Abstract

With a scenario of a strong aviation business growth of around 4,7 % p.a. in the next thirty years passenger volumes will multiply by a factor of at least two-and-a-half until the year 2020 [ 11 and almost
quadruple ten years later. To cope with such a high demand requires new aircraft configurations to
ensure and improve operational efficiency, productivity and customer value in a highly competitive
market environment. A promising future aircraft configuration for this purpose is the blended wing
body (BWB)with a reasonable chance to enter the market by 2030. The early stage of development of
this configuration leaves many open questions, especially with regard to the aircraft’s cabin. As interface between the passenger, the airline and the manufacturer it will be in the future an even greater
contributor to the competitiveness of an aircraft than it already is today. The following process addresses the importance of this primary aircraft system and develops key requirements and first concepts for future B W B cabins.
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The strong influence of unpredictable factors on the development of future concepts for BWB cabins
implies the methodology of scenario techniques. The scenario process performed at TU Miinchen together with Airbus Deutschland GmbH, DaimlerChrysler Society and Technology Research Group
( R E M ) and i D S , industrial Design Studio, comprises the development of three different scenarios,
the implication of specific requirements and the realization of preliminary cabin concepts. To cover a
broad range of potential evolutions, the three scenarios chosen evolved in a generous, innovative and a
conservative development of future BWB cabins. On the basis of current cabin standards of the A380,
new standards for the BWB cabin designs were quantitatively derived for each scenario as well as this
was done qualitatively for a portfolio of essential new technologies, which are formulated as technology recommendations for the aircraft. According to these inputs, 2D cabin layouts and specific system
solutions have been developed and sketched to visualize the concepts. In a final step, specific requirements have been evaluated in all scenarios to identi@ their compatibility in the respective future
environments.
Keywords: Blended Wing Body, aircraft design, cabin development, cabin design
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Introduction
With a scenario of a strong growth of the aviation business in the next h t y years passenger
volumes will multiply by a factor of almost
four. Taking into account that capacity in the
air and at major hub airports already is evolving as a limiting factor and that airline efficiencies will have to improve from nowadays levels, aircraft with higher productivity yields
may play a m j o r role in the future of the aviation system. This could lead to a concentration
of large passenger flows through hub airports
with little available capacity, demanding for
larger and operational cheaper aircraft to address this market environment.
The conventional aircraft configurationis
reaching its optimum and even scaling effects
with bigger &lanes do not provide the potential for leap improvements. Though claiming
superior economics over current large airplanes,
the introduction of the Megaliner A380 seems
to be the upper limit of size for conventional
airplanes and is a probable transition to a next
generation of aircraft, which combine extremely low fuel burn with high capacity, high
environmental compatibility, low operating
costs and operational flexibility for airlines
(figure 1).
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Besides a number of aircraft configurations
being investigated to comply with the strict
requirements, the Blended Wing Body (BWB)
is closest to a realization, being discussed by
both large aircraft manufacturers. As a compromise between the aerodynamicallyhigh
performing flying wing and the evolutionary
optimized conventional airplane it offers significant advantages for operators, which is especially true for larger sized aircraft.

As the foreseeable entry into service of this
type of aircrafi is some time into the future,
derivation and assessment of requirements reflecting market demands is difficult. This is
explicitly the fact for the cabin of the aircraft,
as it embodies the direct interface between the
operator, customer and manufacturer in a competition driven environment. The importance of
an early view on different cabin development
paths by derivation of basic cabin requirements
in the young stages of BWB development can
be underlined with the broad variety of different BWB designs currently developed at aircraft manufacturers, scientific institutes and
universities.
However, to maintain competitive advantage it
is vital for new aircraft characterized by a long
iife and prociucic cycle io be as ak-active as possible over a maximum period of time. Therefore, the identification of robust cabin requirements becomes eminently essential as it determines the main portion of cabin development
at the start of the aircraft program and will
have major influence on the potential to adapt
to modified customer requirements later on in
the product life cycle.
Approach and Aim
The large number of unpredictable factors ffom
various environments like the socio-economic,
the air transport related, political or technological area has a great impact with considerable uncertainty on the design process. The
geometric spacious room inside the BWB fuselage with unknown varieties for new cabin solutions describes a completely different type of
product, for which a classical design approach
is not convenient any more. This leaves even
more uncertainties for the derivation of BWB
cabin requirements. Therefore, scenario techniques are applied as proposed by [2] to work
out a qualitative set of comprehensive future
product environments which drive the development of the BWB cabin.
The aim of the process has been to derive hard
figures for key cabin parameters like seat pitch
or number of galleys on the one hand and soft
qualities regarding incorporated technology
and process profiles on the other. With this
approach, the aircraft manufacturer is capable
of evaluating basic cabin design variants and
options to be prepared for different customer
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requirements and challenges coming from the
operator. This is vital from a technological as
well as marketing (offer to airlines) point of
view. As a consequence, there have been made
no restrictions regarding structural layout of
the BWB,for example the concepts of single
pressure, double hull or load supporting elements for the inner structure.
The BWB aircraft is an Airbus designed configuration with the performance displayed in
figure 1. The usable cabin area is geometrically
given and constant (no scaling) for all scenarios. Figure 2 shows the sigtllficant difference
with a conventional fuselage.

Figore 2: 3 W B Coi fig::rz,lon

1;

Developed scenarios
The analysis comprises the development of
three different scenarios to cover a relevant
range of potential evolutions. The following
general assumptions accompany all scenarios,
as they characterize the development of the air
transport system until 2030, which jus^ the
introduction of BWBs [4].
0
Global economic growth of over 3% p.a.
on average
0
Global strong growth of air traffic volume
of over 4.5% p.a. on average
0
Share of hub & spoke connections increases
0
Long haul routes are predominantly served
by very large aircraft
0
Long routes are basically operated by full
service caniers
Parallel to these market conditions, the following factors have been discussed as premises
throughout the entire process:
Importance of flight time gains weight
IT-technology continues to propagate globally into society

Anthropometric dimensions of human beings grow bigger
0
Cabin safety improves
0
Medical care evolves further
The relevant scenarios, all of which have been
treated equally, are presented hereunder.
Scenario: “ChiefPax”
This positive reference scenario describes an
optimistic environment in which political and
socio-cultural stability ensure a steady economic development with a steadily increasing
living standard. Further cornerstones of this
scenario are:
Growing wealth in most of the global regions create passengers with a high demand
for comfort and service. This is addressed
by airlines with an enhanced supply of inflight values, covered by higher air fares.
However, the relative value per price is increasing resulting in profit margins comparable to today’s.
The variety of different nationalities traveling the air and the distinctive individuality
of the passenger as a result of higher living
standards turns religious and cultural identification on board into a key driver.
Conventional aircraft classes are refined
into more and smaller user groups to react
on individual needs. Passenger convenience is realized by both personal assistance by the crew and onboard systems.
Extensive advances in innovative technologies and processes permit a high constructional flexibility to quickly and efficiently
change cabin layouts.
Growing restrictions from environmental
issues and certification are addressed by
new technologies.
Additionally, the awareness for health (e.g.
thromboses issue) is increasing.
B W B airplanes meet the expectations of
airlines and passengers which lead to a
high public perception.
Scenario: “SlowMotions *’
As a projection of today’s trend to rationalization, this slowly developing scenario shows
little motivation to leap innovations, founded
in a deeper society problem affecting airline
strategies as well.
4

Despite economic growth ociety is split
into a small wealthy group and a large
population stratum with a stagnating living
standard. The gap between the (lower)
middle and upper class widens which leads
to social inequities and is especially a phenomenon of the h a d e (USA, Europe, JaPan).
0
Due to the strong competition airlines are
as today under pressure to operate with low
fares and high productivity, leaving small
profit margins per seat sold. Passengers
have not been able to organize themselves
into a powerful entity expressing their
needs towards the airlines, while dragging
certification processes hinder operators to
introduce new standards. The evolution is
moving inert and slowly resulting in conventional cabin designs with few classes.
0
The widespread application of technology
has overtaken many procedures in daily life,
leaving many people, especially older,
overstrained. The development into a two
class society results in a general decline of
educational and intellectual standard. Still
attracted by low ticket prices, this produces
a significant higher number of passengers
requiring support and assistance. The demand for help services is gaining weight,
because the understanding of onboard
processes and technologies is missing
throughout broad parts of the flying society.
0
The B W B convinces airlines, but only has
moderate acceptance fiom the passenger.
Scenario: “FlyingHeavenly Peace Square”
The metaphoric title aims at a specific Asian
market development ascending up to 2030
which is taken as a major driver for this relevant scenario.
0
Economic growth pushes the tiger states to
a similar living standard as in the western
world, leading to a long running boom in
air traffic in and with this region.
0
.4n over the years steady technological emlution leads to a high standard and is the
basis for sophisticatedtechnological sohti0I.S.
0
Airlines face declining profit margins with
a higher demand for in-flight convenience
and can only react with highly operation0
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ally efficient cabin concepts and layouts.
The need for a physical one class layout is
one of the measures taken, evolving from a
gradual transition on the Asian market towards fewer classes, which started with the
advent of high passenger volumes on
shorter hub routes to achieve throughput
and efficiency.
To minimize operational cost, extensive
cabin modifications in the aircraft during
idle periods or even turn-arounds are not
wanted by operators to maintain a simple
and cost-effective structure.
To attract passengers, the cabin design,
functionality and quality is emphasized
along with the impression of the cabin’s
gppezmnce as P premium product. Because
of substantial differences in culture, it is a
priority to address special considerationsto
the development of an adequate traveling
environment.
Ticket price mix and marketing options for
airlines are realized by seat-individual service concepts sold at travel agents, airlines
or operators, in which both the technological facility standard and the in-flight comfort service can be booked.
The awareness for health issues on long
range flights increases throughout society.

B W B Cabin Standards
The derivation of key requirements for cabin
development fiom the specific scenario follows
the methodology as described in the figure 3.
C r - S -

Taking cabin standards displayed in figure 3 of
the A380 as a reference, standards for the
B W B cabin are tailored according to the requirements of the specific scenario. The main
5

geometric standards are class ratios, seat pitch,
seat width, aisle width, toilets/pax, trolleys/pax
and stowage spaces. These are influenced on
the one hand by the relevant characteristics of
the different scenarios, but on the other hand
by general premises having impact on all of the
scenarios as well. These are the continuous
growth of human being's dimensions known as
acceleration [5], enhanced in-flight safety and
medical facilities. Acceleration for instance is
causing an increase in body height of about 1,5
cm in 30 years, justifying a seat pitch gain of
one inch as the operational life of aircraft is
another 30 years from that point on. Thus, only
one inch more pitch already results in a reduction of at least one row in the given BWB aircraft and thus has a direct impact on capacity
and productivity.
For every scenario a set of basic technologies
is identified to establish a general level from
which the different scenario implications develop. The mains can be summarized in the
following list:
0
Communication with broad band internet
0
Wireless blue tooth like support of mobile
equipment (phones, laptops, pagers, etc.)
Online information system (passengers,
cabin systems, stock data) for the crew
0
Intelligent boarding / deboarding systems
optimizing on-board processes
Generation of 2D-Layouts
With these new standards, the number of seats
in the BWB cabin is calculated. The procedure
is shown in figure 4.

the absolute seat area and total cabin area of
nowadays modem in service aircraft (figure 4),
which is typically up to 55%. Subsequently,
with the given fuselage and unaffected by the
need to scale the aircraft for a dedicated number of passengers, aisles, galleys and other remaining surface areas are derived conformable
to scenario needs. Also door positions, sizes
and emergency evacuation paths are planned as
part of the total cabin concept.
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Along with consequent and logical rationales,
the following scenario specific standards for
different cabin and operational concepts have
been found:
Scenario "ChiefPax"
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Firstly, the seat areas within the BWB cabin
are determined according to the given ratio of
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the passenger. An unconventional approach of
a bended main broad aisle (2m) assures a quick
boarding and deboarding in the critical entrance areas. The known approach of a threedivided cabin of main classes with first in the
front is maintained. High service levels are
addressed with additional facilities in the lower
deck compartments with crew rest rooms, fitness children and a social meeting point (with
bar). Assistance for the passenger is obtained
in the front and the middle information desk to
explore the full range of service supply during
flight (i). Two additional service points (s) in
the economy classes underline the higher quality traveling level.
Scenario "SlowMotions"
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Emergency exits are provided all around the
cabin area with wing and aft exits according to
FAR 25.807 of type B dimensions (75 passengers per minute), two type A doors per side in
the front (1 10 passengers per minute) and the
main entrance with a new standard type 0 door
(double Type A with 200 passengers per minute). The design ends up with 730 passengers
in a standard layout. Some artist impressions of
the cabin are elaborated hereunder.
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The development into two classes divides society and thus the treatment of passengers during
flight as well. With declining profit margins,
the inert evolution of new and innovative cabin
ideas the low paying traveler leads to a conventional standard class system. The lack of airline
demand for conversion of cabin elements in or
during aircraft operation entail limited flexibility for cabin elements. Major cabin reconfigurations can only be realized at C or larger
maintenance checks during aircraft overhaul.
The scenario is characterized by the strong
differentiationbetween standards of high revenue first and business and low revenue economy class, which is for example obvious with
the number of galleys and toilets per passenger.
Service as well as supplied technology levels is
significantly down-graded in economy class,
focusing on efficiency and productivity for the
airline. However, the larger share of older,
immobile (wheelchairs) and more weightily
passengers demands larger aisles. The service
concept ensures a convenient and quick operation through an automatic trolley distribution
system with elevators which are integrated in
the emergency stairs leading to the roof. The
highly cost-efficient systems for simple operation limit the comfort of the passenger. On the
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other hand, first and business class have an
optimized traveling environment and high-end
service standards. Sophisticated comfort levels
with on-seat climate, individual ergonomic
adjustable seats, sound and light surround the
high yield passenger which generates the major
part of the airlines’ revenues.
The location of crew rest compartments as well
as the accommodation of trolleys in galleys at
the lower deck realizes more productive seat
area at the main deck.
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The design ends up with 808 passengers in a
standard layout. Some views of the cabin are
sketched hereunder.

Scenario “Flying Heavenly Peace Square

I’

Tn&c 3: 13- Lye.:: L . I I : ~ ~ : C ‘I -R=Si y . y !-:eo\ z.*:
Peace s\2.-<’-

The proposed single class layout has been
worked out along with the demand for high
profitability. Two versions are presented by the
manufacturer to the airline: A standard configuration with larger seat pitch (36”, 768 passengers) and a high density configuration with
reduced 34” pitch and 871 passengers to comply with the greater traffic volume on inner
Asian routes. As the most innovative scenario,
a passenger container system is developed to
achieve short turn-arounds Wgher frequency)
and high operational efficiency. The dashed
line shows the contours of a container, which is
boarded in the airport area, transported to the
aircraft and loaded fiom the tail into it. The
inner service area (dotted line) with galleys and
toilets are built-in elements with a high degree
of automation. Intelligent robot trolleys assist
the crew with cabin operations, for instance,
and take over major parts of the food and beverage service. More toilets, vending machines
and trolley transport systems are installed in
the lower deck. A highly sophisticated virtual
reality head sets environment is adjusting to
the demands of the individual passenger and
succeeds to shorten the subjective flight time.

+

t

+

F‘igcre 12: 2 3 layou: v:ith ernergr:i.-y miis

In case of emergency, in contradiction to current certification rules, wing emergency exits
are blasted away after intelligent hazard detec8

tion systems decided the safest way of evacuation. If necessary, the big tail doors are opened
to quickly leave the plane. Some views of the
cabin are sketched hereunder.
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Evaluation of requirements
The different scenarios developed a range of
specific requirements towards the cabin layout
as well as primary cabin systems. To evaluate
the robustness of these, they have been incorporated in all the three scenarios and controlled
for their fit. The main results of identified robust layout requirements as well as primary
technologies, which have not been discussed
extensively here, are listed below:
Increase in seat pitch despite the fact that
adjustments are a matter of airlines
Broader aisles are required which will define cabin layouts significantly
Development of enhanced boarding and
seat allocation systems with intelligent passenger flow control
Utilization of the lower deck area: a major
success driver, dependent on how strict
regulations towards passengers are in the
future

Wireless communication technologies inside the cabin (passenger on-board system)
Lobbying for enhanced certification rules
Alternative and decentralized on-board
high power generation (e.g. fuel cells) for a
more electrical aircraft configuration
Easy cleaning materials (similar to lotus
flower effect)
Recycling of operating supply items (water,
oil, etc.)
Computer aided direct view video system
(passenger control during take-off and
landing, monitor surveillance by crew)
Intuitive emergency procedures
Intelligent escape slides
Conclusions
With the help of scenario methodologies a consistent and structured approach towards the
derivation of cabin requirements has been
found, adopted and validated through three
scenario specific independent cabin concepts.
The compliance with economic, socio-cultural
and technologic objectives has been a premise
throughout the process, leading to different
cabin layouts and models driving future designs. In a final step, robust requirements have
been formulated by qualitatively evaluating the
scenario fit evolving from the respective future
environments. With the proposed methodology,
strategic recommendations for the aircraft
manufacturer are presented which can be
adopted for other BWB configurations as well.
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FUTURE SCENARIOS FOR THE EUROPEAN m u m 2 INDUSTRY: A
MARKETINGBASED PERSPECTIVE.
By David Jarach’
1. Abstract

The last couple of years have proven to be very tough for the airline industry.
Macroeconomic turmoils, like Sept.1I attacks, consequent economic recession,
the threat of terrorism and the SARS virus have all been having a combined
drastic egect on both volumes and values of trafic performed by the industry.
Microeconomic and industry-related changes, most definitively the dramatic
growth of market power of low-cost carriers, are haloing this condition of
contestability oJ- the airline environment, putting into deep crish incumhenis ’
traditional business models and giving life to liquidity losses, huge deficits and
bankrupts.
In the US market, LCCs have been a reality since the early ‘70sand have been
counterattacked many times, with scarse luck, by incumbent network carriers.
In the European environment, instead, LCCs ’ attack is ji-esher and the ultimate
answers by national carriers are still to be put into practice. The risks of
inaction, however, are probabb stronger than in the US, due to the higher
papentation of the European industry and the States’ ownership of many
cam’ers that still prevent radically invasive market reactions, like mergers.
After an introductory but compulsory parenthesis on the rise of the low-cost
phenomenon in the airline industg this paper aims to analyse the new market
scenario for the airline industry, focusing on the European context.
Furthermore, the paper will analyse the main marketing tactics UE carriers
might adopt to cope with the huge wave of low-cost entities and survive in the
current tough environment.
Key words: airline industry, European airline industry, low-cost carriers, airline
marketing tactics, aviation marketing.
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2. Changing the rules of the game: the new hypercompetitive contest for airlines
and the rise of low-cost carriers.

Since the 70s, traditional market leaders in industry after industry, saddled with
complex, high-cost business models, have been under attack by companies with new,
simpler ways to manage their operations and contain costs. This scenario occurred in
the steel industry, when minimills took on traditional smelters; in automobile
manufacturing, when more standardized Japanese cars won out over customised U. S.
vehicles; in retailing, when superstores overtook conventional grocery stores (Hansson,
Ringbeck and Franke, 2002); and, eventually, in fixed telecommunications.The concept
of value migration best describes the flow of profit and shareholders’ wealth across the
business chessboard. Value leaves economically obsolete designs and flows to reinforce
new business designs, that are capable of creating equal, if not an increasing, utility for
the customer and capture value for the producer. This situation also explains why firms
with similar product or service offerings, as it is in the broad environment of
commodities, can produce significantly variant economic performances. (Slywotzky,
1995).
In the case of airlines, the demise of tight regulation and the consequent rise of
hypercompetition have brought an abrupt end to the age of chivarly for this mature
industry. In other words, within a short amount of time, historical rather than forced
cooperation and chivarly have been cancelled as business pillars. The erosion of
monopolies and oligopolies by means of new start-up value propositions, first in the US
and later in Europe, has dramatically changed the codes of competitive conduct and
radically altered the customer’s perception of the airline service, too. In other words, the
gentility of tacit collusion and avoiding head-on competition, which were tipically
working in the regulated era, are now gone (D’Aveni, 1995), with mature airline service
rapidly moving from value-added experience to pure commodity. This shift in the
definition of competition has been relatively rapid and was largely unexpected even to
the deregulation’s advocates.
Waves of new carriers jumped, and later abandoned, notwithstanding the
political exit bamers that the industry faces, deregulated environments. In the US, first,
and later on alla round the globe, a new category killer entered the market scene. LowCost Carriers (LCCs) provided a new, semplified value proposition to a wider market
potential and rapidly acquired huge numbers of customers. The challenge, from that
time on, would have been for traditional carriers to cope with this apparently perfect and
superior economic travel formula.
2. Traditional airlines vs. Low-cost carriers.

In fact, what has been a tough challenge since the early beginnings for networkbased, traditional operators in the fight with LCCs is basically the confrontation
between two radically different business models. The formers’ one is based on a calm,
oligopolistic market aimed to support the idea of global coverage of the entire world
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arena. The latters’ one, instead, is only apparently focused on a more niche oriented
approach. In fact, it is aimed at getting benefit from offer vacuums and from the service
of “pariah customers”, starting from VFR,ethnic and leisure based movements and later
on climbing up to reach cost-conscious business travellers. Tables 1 and 2 sum up the
main differences in the market approach of network-based and low-cost carriers.

Table I

- The pillars of network-based airlines.

Massive marketing expences
0

(advertising, FFPs,
travel agents’ overrrides, network analysis);
Expensive, fragmented and complex service
catering, lounges,
ground services, etc.);

0(classes of tariffs and service,
Massive use
0
tailored for

of technology (hard tech: aircraft
each route and prescription; soft
tech: CRS legacy systems);

“Ancien-regime” financial targets (in contrast
with macroeconomic shockwaves and lifestyle
0
changes);

Table 2 - The pillars of low-cost airlines.
Minimal marketing expences (word-of-mouth on
comparative advertising, airports’ supports);
Personal, convenient and pleasant service
(reengineering around core benefit, easy price
discrimination);
Judicious use of technology (hard tech: fleet
standardisation; soft tech: Internet and CRS
avoidance);
Structural efficiencies (no overstaffing, high
productivity, no hubbing costs);
Realistic financial targets (based on their own
business model);
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In fact, some of the basic advantages of LCCs are apparently quite obvious and
are certainly all but not industry-specific. For instance, part of a better cost management
process can be easily correlated to the fresh market entry and, thus, to highly efficient
hiring and salary practices for both HQ staffs and crews. Another benefit, most
definitively in the European context, may be linked to some form of comparate
advantages, like in the case of a more favourable fiscal legislation providing tax
incentives for local operators. For instance, Ryanair is registered in Ireland, where
corporate taxes are far more lower than in other countries of the continent, like Belgium.
Eventually, effective B2B tariff negotiations that many LCCs are able to perform’ are
simply a consequence of airports’ vulnerability, due to the absence of a clear airport
marketing activity3 (Jarach, 2002). In fact, in every industry facing power imbalances in
pipeline relationships (Jarach, 2001)’ opportunistic behaviours by channel leaders are in
practice to exploit the power imbalance of the counterpart, typically in the form of huge
discounts.
This said, evidence shows that for some part LCCs’ healthy cost condition could
also be apparently matched by traditional incumbents even through isolated4 tentatives
of xeroxing some of the formers’ elements. For instance, a narrower cost imbalance
could also be obtained by sporadic rather than cosmetic measures, like firing off
personnel and hiring it back at lower salaries, as the Swissair-Swiss conduct docet. Or
through the creation of an Irish subsidiary that is being responsibile for all aircatf
purchases and leasing transactions, for instance. Most of the other elements of the
LCCs’ formula, however, seem to request a much more radically deeper reengineering
of the entire value proposition and are not definitively sensitive only to una-tanturn
actions.
The fact is that you don’t need to be a start-up to build a business model focused
on a previously ignored market, but it helps. Established companies have great
difficulty seeing how unprofitable segments can be served profitably, particularly if
those established companies have been very successful. That’s because their own
success blinds them to opportunities right in front of them, in sort of business myopia.
For example, try to put yourself in the shoes of the executives who ran the dominant
airline of the 1970s and 1980s and watched a struggling Southwest Airlines try to get
off the ground. With the failures of discount carriers People Express and Laker Airways
making headlines, would you have believed that another cut-rate US airline would
survive, much less become the most profitable carrier? (Rosemblum, Tomlison, Scott,
2003).

3. The challenge at our days.

Coming to nowadays situation, world’s major traditional carriers are being faced
with some of the worst rather than hardest and unpredictable challenges in the “rules of

* Frequently in the form of huge subsidies for start-up and expansion of low-cost operations
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This means the absence of a clear airport make$ positioning and, consequently, no airport marketing
plan.
4
This means that these measures are not coordinated and integrated inside a strategic business plan or
reengineering platform.
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the game” of their market environment since the first Wright Brothers’ flight at Kitty
Hawk just 100 years ago. For instance, US carriers alone lost more than $10 billion in
2002, according to the Air Transport Association, up from the $8 billion in the
disastrous year of 2001. While, more generally speaking, worldwide airline losses
topped $50 billion in 2002. These tragic figures necessarily ask for a deep analysis and
request to understand all the real causes, distinguishing the cyclically-correlated from
the structural ones.
The traditional carriers’ business model has been a great success and a major
innovation when looking back at the early OS, but today it is showing to be no more
substainable in the current form. Strictly tied to massive physical fistructures, diverse
and unconsistent fleets of aircraft, legacy information systems and large labor pools,
traditional airlines are today struggling to give even a medium-term perspective to their
existence on the market. Most definitively, what seems today highly debilitating for
traditional carriers is their inability to overcome their cost burdens with boom period
pricing, as they did in the second half of the 1990s. From one side, post-Sept. 11
economic de-facto’ recession and the mherent constant terrorist threat, with the adciing
of the Second Gulf War, are still keeping away vast amount of passengers from
woldwide carriers. From the other side, the recent SARS world health alarm and the
consequent travel warnings and bans by WHO for China, Hong Kong, Singapore and
Taiwan has sinply cancelled for a number of months the Far East arena as an air travel
destination for both business and leisure traffics, with major airlines implementing up to
90% capacity cuts on the previous flown hours to the area. As a parallel consequence,
these macroeconomic events are accelerating the pace of diffusion of videoconferences
as a more than rather perfect substitute of the flight experience. This is another clear
signal that these external shocks won’t be absorbed by camers with the same substantial
inaction performed during the previous cyclical crisis.
On a microeconomic, industry-related focus, instead, this tough airline
environment is proving to be apparently much more healthier for LCCs, that are
dramatically increasing their own market shares on a worldwide basis. What can be
highly surprising for non-industry analysts finds, instead, rather simple, non-technical
explanations. For instance, sales figures6prove that S A R S and threat of terrorism are
still preventing long-haul travels, most definitively in the case of “highly-semibile”,
risky destinations, like China, Canada or the Middle-East. On the contrary, this negative
effect is much less in the case of short-haul flights’, where safer trips are involved and
where tariff stimulation’ may push tourists and business men to abandon personal or
company flight bans.
The impact of both these macro and microeconomic turmoils on technical
indexes for IATA actors has been quite immediate. Traditional carriers are being faced a
significant yield diluition with a steeper-than-forecasted curve, well over the 2-3%
decline recorded on a year-round base in the last decade. This condition finds
Generally speaking, economic macroindicators don’t reflect on a worldwide basis a situation of
recession. However, it’s vastly accepted that the terrorisk attacks create uncertainty conditions for the
market, and this blocks long-term investments.
Provided by IATA and American Express, for instance.
These sales figures don’t contemplate the two weeks immediate post the Twin-Towers’ collapse.
This situation can be easily explained by thinking to the negative demand to price elasticity that now is
starting to affect even business travel, with budget cuts reducing movements or shifting them to LCCs.

’
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quantitatively evidence in the fact that CAS& run well over RASM", this gap already
reaching 2 cents per seat mile at the beginning of 2002 in the US (Hansson, Ringbeck
and Franke, 2002). In a condition of fixed-costs that reach up to 90% of total costs and
with few chances of cutting them in the short period, this revenue-cost imbalance
naturally gives life to huge deficits, liquidity crises, job cuts, network reductions and,
eventually, bankrupts. This was the case in North America for Chapter 11 slings of
USAirways, United Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines and Air Canada. Or in Europe for the
bankruptcy of Swissair and Sabena, where these companies failed and entered again the
arena basically only with a different brand, but taking on the same historical and
structural weaknesses, in what could be described as a sort of European answer to the
US Chapter 11 instrument.
Thus, in order to survive, major airlines have no choice but to change their
course, modifying their rigid business model to better match the challenge by LCCs.
Although making hdamental changes in a long-standing business model is difficulty
and risky, it is not without precedents, like it happened, for instance, in the
manufacturing and fhncial services contexts. And, by far, the risk of inaction is much
more greater than the risk to change and the difficulty to find a new working business
path.
4. The European business case.

In the EU environment, the late '80s airline deregulation process has pushed in
dozens of start-up new entries and, consequently, fierce price competition on many
ruote legs. This condition has progressively pushed many former flag camers into deep
competitive and financial crises, as their cost structures were based on the previous
oligopolistic regime and, thus, no more consistent with new hypercompetitive pattern of
action.
A major difference with the US environment, however, lies in the fact that
Europe hasn't recorded any significant capacity exit from the industry, as the above
described Swissair-Sabena cases clearly evidence. On the contrary, recent announces
once again demonstrate that the "one country, one flag carrier" model is still working,
but no more achievable, especially in the case of small countries with a limited
Origin/Destination demand". No consolidation practices have taken place, if we
exclude some small regionals and the notable exceptions of Ryanair-Buzz and EasyjetGo in the low-cost cluster. According to pure economic figures, no more than 4
nationals and 20 regional carriers should act in the EU environment. Notwithstanding
this, we still have 20 medium-shaped airlines and more than 50 regionals working, a
figure that is continually increasing.

CASM is the acronym for Cost per Average Seat Mile.
RASM is the acronym for Revenue per Average Seat Mile.
II
Swiss, the Switzerland's national carrier, is probably the best example. But the same condition can be
applied also in the case of Holland, Austrai, Portugal and Greece, for instance, where global ambitions of
local carriers have necessarily lowered by the state-of-the-art market conditions.
IO
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This high level of hgmentation, which many times has only an apparent basis
in ASAs' ownership clauses, is reflected in the relatively low market force each major
can deploy in the confrontation with large US trunks and, definitively, with LCCs.
While alliances have been a good solution for entering close markets or partly
increasing revenues, they have actually failed in the goal of reaching a higher cost
efficiency. In this sense, we can say that till now partnerships have only marginally
impacted on the cronical economic and cost vulnerabilities of EU carriers.
This elements help to better explain why LCCs have really boomed for the last
couple of years in the continental context. Recent post-Septl 1 updated statistics reveal
that European LCCs are expected to account for up to 25 percent of the market by 2010,
following the same path of market expansion that is taking part in the USA, where some
analysts predict thet LCCs could reach up to 70% of domestic services. Figure 1 shows
the current and the expected market condition in the European airline industry.

Figure 1 - Projected change in Intra-European Passenger Market Shares, 2000-20iO.

5%

Low-cost airlines

20%
Charter airlines

75%

Network carriers
(intemational/reqional)

Source: AEA, UTA, Mercer
Today, Ryanair, Easyjef Germanwings, Hapag Llyod Express and other
European low-cost entities are abandoning their traditional British focus to explore
other huge continental catchment areas in Gemany, France and Italy. Acting as
flexibile, dynamic and innovative plyers, they are eroding the advantages of network
airlines and making healthy profits. Or,when not yet profitable, they are consolidating
market shares to build a greater critical mass or a slot dominance on key airports'2.
The real strategic ultimate issue for European traditional carriers, however, is
that they are not facing a unique and standardised low-cost business model, as a sort of
l2

As in the Easyjet-Paris Orly tentative, or in the Ryanair-Stansted or Easyjet-Luton cases.
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European adaptation of the original “no-frills” American formula has taken place. Some
LCCs, for instance, are considered pure “Southwest clones” and focus primarily on
VFR and ethnic traffic: Ryanair is the best example. Others, like Easyjet, have had since
the beginning a different focus, aiming at capturing cost-conscious business travellers,
and probably are the real top danger for traditional operators.
In this sense, time for change has come: major caniers have to choose between
one, or a combination, of six possible counterreactive market strategies to cope with
LCCs. These tactics can be equally implemented in all market scenarios where
traditional caniers are being touched by the LC formula. Thus,they can equally work, if
not already in place, in the US, European or Asian environments. The pace of
introduction of these market reactions, however, is much more urgent in Europe, where
the threat is fresher but blocked past conditions have created airline structures that must
compulsorily be changed in the short-time. In other words, this goal has to be rapidly
implemented, if the European industry would really aim to play a role on the world
scenario in the next ten years13.

4. Six market strategies for traditional carriers to counterreact LCCs.

On the basis of what previously said, European traditional airlines have to
choose not only on which part of the battlefield stay, but also which kind of market
tactics use to cope with the New Millenium challenges.
Although some academics predict that there will soon be only low-cost operators
for all markets, even long-haul ones, we don’t believe so. Chances for most of today’s
traditional carriers to survive, however, lie in a rapid adoption of one or a proactive
combination of of the following six counterreactivetactics.

a) Resist. This option is the most conservative a traditional carrier may implement. The
basis for this choice logically lies in the perception that LCCs are simply waving a
fashion-effect and that,sooner or later, they will be abandoned by frustrated passengers
coming back to higher price/comfort combination. As a consequence, a traditional
carrier will continue to replicate its consolidated pattern of offer, eventually modifylng
only its own timetable with the aim of braketing the LC offer, for instance.
As to substain this thought, airline managers frequently come to a comparison
between their own industry and what happened, for instance, some years ago in the
retailing arena. In the latter’s case, hard discounts were experiencing a rapid massive
growth, too. In the long-term, however, their market power was sometimes deeply
marginalised, like it was for the Italian context. In other words, airline managers’ belief
l 3 It’s important to underline that LCCs are beneficial to customers, thanks to their low tariffs. But, at the
same time, their pressure on incumbent traditional players forces naturally the latters to streamline,
abandoning for instance unprofitable routes. This means that competition between system of countries
can be affected, too, not forgetting that carriers are the logical connectors of globalisation drivers and
fluxes for goods and people.
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lies on the basis that passengers are only migrating to LCCs on the basis of a short-term
“cherry-picking” effect, just with the curiosity to try a rather innovative value
proposition, but with no risks of arising loyalty effects to it. According to this thesis,
these kind of customers will, in fact, come back to what basically is believed to a better
service in absolute terms and thus for all markets and people, as no changes in the
lifestyles or in the purchase priorities of the airline service are involved.
Errors lying behind this approach are clear. First, market segmentation
postulates that customers are naturally different in their value perceptions and conceives
that some people could easily become loyal to the “no-fills fo~mula”,if this one better
suits with their perceived value14. Second, huge price gaps provided by direct
competition on the same routes and airports, like in the case of confrontation between a
traditional carrier and hybrid LCCs, will naturally support the choice to switch to the
cheaper alternative. This condition will likely have a broader impact on customers’
travel lifestyles and will progressively marginalise traditional carriers from the profit
zone of the market. The traditional airline will then be forced to change its approach and
pass to the “retrench option“.
In this sense, the only real way to maintain the market status quo for a traditional
carrier is through State supports in the form of subsidies or rigid slot allocations that
prevent LCCs from entering the former’s national skies. The recent slot lottery at Paris
Orly after the bankrupt of Air Lib Express is frequently mentioned by Easyjet as a clear
protectionist attitude by the French authorities to Air France.

b) Adapt. This option is, again, one of the least invasive, either from a political and a
financial point of view. It aims to reach a minor impact on flight operations, but
certainly not a deep reengineering of any structural value-chain processes. In this
condition, airlines will act to adapt their own business model to that of LCCs by means
of a “copy” strategy, with the goal of integrating in its own servuction (Eiglier and
Langeard, 1983) the simplest elements of the latters’ design. The return to point-topoint service ~ O C U S
for
’ ~instance,
,
is applied by the traditional carrier throught lowering
waves-based network interrelations in the fonn of more viable “rolling hub” concepts.
This option is being implemented by American Airlines and is dramatically improving
the company’s productivity levels, while offering at the same time a chance to better
serve lucrative O/Dtraffics and abandon part of uneconomical connecting fluxes.
Moreover, a reduction of in-flight catering fills may have a positive impact not
only in the form of lowering direct costs, but also permitting to leave off galleys fiom
aircraft interiors, with a chance of improving seating figures for the aircraft. This option
is being undergone in Europe by Lufthansa, Alitalia and Swiss’6 and probably offers the
most apparent cost reliefs to tradtional carriers.
l4 The perceived value is the ratio between the benefits a Senice and a brand can better offer to customers
divided for the sacrifices a customer has to substain for entering in possession of this benefit.
Historically, we can say that traditional carriers had been tighly focused on point-to-point traffic.
Deregulation provided the need to develop hub-and-spokes networks.
l6 The three carriers are actually following different approches on this matter. Luftahnsa is cutting
doemstic catering as to lay off galley to obtain a seating improvement. Alitalia recently tied to cut its
domestic catering with the goal of reducing the number of cabin crews, matched with the elimination of
seats as to comply with ICAO rules. Swiss recently decided to suspend free-of-charge catering in
economy class, following a similar approach to that of LCCs.
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c) Retrench. Back in the OS, when facing a calmer market environment and basically
a form of non-price competition, traditional carriers started to increase the scope and
variety of their products by layering on new offerings to serve even larger and more
diverse customer bases. This differentation process faces a natural crisis when markets
become mature and overcapacity forces to act on price cuts to retain demand. In mature
markets simplicity, not complexity seems to pay off when fighting for the supremacy of
its own value proposition.
In this sense, failure in facing the LCCs’ attack and in scouting new anelastic
clusters takes the traditional carrier to retrench. This process is being implemented by
means of job cuts, network streamlinings and capacity reductions. Each one of these
three alternativeshas clear pros, but a number of cons can equally arise.
Job-cutting measures, for instance, dramatically benefit the P L accounts of what
is still a labour-intensive industry. However, the fiequent risk is that they can be really
implemented only after tight confrontations with unions and after a number of strikes
would have significantly damaged the carrier’s image and reputation. This is why,
under a purely fjnancial metric, a long-term relevant benefit has to be actually
discounted by subtracting lost sales and image and reputation damage^'^. By
quantifying all these elements, some of them with clear psycological impact, it looks
like job cuts have fiequently proven to be only a panacea for the carrier, while not
solving structural issues. A “cosmetic” solution to the problem of overstaffing can be
achieved by firing off less unionised categories, like HQ staffs, or by imposing them
corporative salary reductions in exchange for job maintainment. A similar experiment
was conducted by Alitalia case, but this option hasn’t actually proved a real good
bargain for the company’’.
Network streamlining focuses on harvesting losses by cancelling unprofitable
routes. Traditional carriers, when following this approach, usually decide to act first on
long-haul destinations, due to the combination of high operating costs and inefficiences
in their price structure^'^. A narrower scope of action for a traditional airline, however,
impacts dramatically on its own distinctive visibility, as network contraction actually
reduces the hub-based, global carrier’s attractiveness and seriously compromises its
marketing promise of a seamless service to wherever.
Overall or route-focused capacity reduction, instead, may prove to be the best of
the three alternatives. By phasing out current planes and trading them with smaller ones,
airlines can better match demand in off-peak periods or on highly-contestable routes,
this implying simpler yield management practices, too. This option can be implemented
statically by simply exchanging old planes with new smaller ones2’, or dinamically by
combining for every route the capacity of different aircraft of the same family, as it
17
The result can be achieving by using this formula:
Long-term cost benefit = Cost savingfrom salaries - lost sales (t to t + l ) - reputation damages (t + t+I)
- loss of motivation
Unfortunately,however, cost drivers for a carrier lie in the unionised crews, not in the backofice

’*

l9 The current pricing philosophy in the airline business asks carriers to hugely discriminate their own
tariffs as to satisfy all clusters. On long-haul routes, hugely discounted prices are used to attract tourist
traffic. These tariffs, like APEX or PEX, seldom cover the per-capite cost of the flight, especially in the
case of highly inefficient operators.
20
This is currently the case of USAinvays, that is phasing out FlOO and some B737s and substituting
them with smaller RJs fkom Bombardier and Embraer.
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works in the Airbus A318, A319, A320 and A321 case. This tactic would naturally
drive LCCs to become volume leaders on trunk routes, with traditional carriers
abandoning their anacronistic market share targets and refocusing on net present value
upgrades. This approach is being implemented by British Airways, which has been
hardly touched by LCCs after it lost in a couple of years some 15% of the all intraEuropean O D traffic.
d) Fight. The “fight option” asks for the traditional canier to go head-to-head with the
LCC by almost entirely matching its tariffpolicy. Vast amount of managerial literature
illustrates the risks of a price war contest and how this risky decision should be taken
only when a solid cost advantage is detained. This is definitively not the case for all
traditional carriers. These elements help to understand whg’ fare wars usually take
place not only in the first periods of LCCs’ market entry, but also a route-by-route basis
and with the clear aim of avoiding halo consequences on the rest of the traditional
airline’s markets”. However, there’s also empirical evidence of a longer, more subtie,
form of price war between the incumbent and the new entrant. This kind of alternative
works when the traditional canier is strongly attacked by the LCC in the former’s
domestic market. In this case, the “fight option” is also done by means of some indirect
pricing tactics. A typical example is provided by the tactic of increasing commissions
paid by travel agents as to block access to trade and increase the distorsion power the
agent can have on customers’ purchase decisions (Jarach, 2002).
By xeroxing the LCC’s pricing, a traditional operator basically tries to defend its
volume market share and to discourage the new entrant from further invasion plans.
This option seems, however, inconsistent in its own bases, because traditional, high-cost
carriers should target high-yield traffic while not focusing their attention on load factors
only, and consequently on low-yield, ethnic traffic, for instance.
e) Join. The “join option” requests traditional carriers to enter directly the LC cluster
with an identical business design. This can apparently take place in two different ways.
The first one is the creation of a low-cost subsidiary by traditional carriers. This
alternative will prove to pay off its best results if the airline is really able to rigidly split
business traffic and leisure and VFR movements, the former being allocated to the
maintrunk carrier and the latter to the LC subsidiary. Apart from this theorical optimum
goal, this kind of product diversification practically works in the form that the LC
subsidiary becomes responsibile of all highly contestable routes where price cuts can be
substained only by a similar cost structure of that of the attacking LCC.
This case was first provided by the US enviroment in the early OS, with United
giving life to Shuttle, USAinvays creating Metrojet, Continental spin-offing Continental
Lite and Delta with Delta Express23.Recently, European carriers also decided to jump

Back in the O OS, instead, tariff confrontation was performed on a national basis, as the US market has
taught.
22 A typical example is provided by the Delta-AirTran case on some domestic routes out of Atlanta. h
Europe, there is similar evidence on some routes to and from London.
23 Delta Airlines have just starter up a new low-cost subsidiary, called Song. This entity, however, is
much more a JetBlue rather than a Southwest clone, operating from the same markets and targeting costconscious business travellers, most defrnitively women. Delta Express, instead, was the hypercompetitive
21
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in the LC arena, as in the British AirwaydGo, SAS/Snowflakes, KLMBasiq Air cases,
or, indirectly, with Lufthansa and the Germanwings e~perimen?~.Moreover, the
European environment provides evidence of the emergence of charter carriers’ low-cost
subsidiaries, like Hapag Lloyd Express for TUI or MyTravel Lite for MyTravel.
The survival ratio for LC subsidiaries, however, shows that most of them have
actually failedz5.In fact, it proved very difficult to create internally, inside highlyunionised or rather conservative companies, the same entrepreneural spirit and the scope
of salary concessions that are being obtained by genuine LC start-ups. On a broader
view, we can say that mingling complex and simple operations, each of which has
distinct objectives and missions, often increases costs and lowers service standards of
the whole company. Once again, this can be considered not an industry-specific
comment, but a broader-scale evidence.
The second option is provided by the transformation of the whole traditional
carrier into a LCC. This path of action naturally fits better in the case of a regional
carrier, as it was successfully implemented in the case of the British operator FlyBe.
Matters of dimensions and a lower cost-per-seat gap just@ this statement. For instance,
in Italy there’s speculation that Eurofly, a charter camer with a minor stock
participation of Alitalia, is going to undertake a radical change and enter and fight
within the LC arena. Volare, another Italian regional and charter carrier, has also
announced that from 2004 all of its services will be operated by Volareweb.com, the
group’s LC subsidiary.
In the case instead of the transformation of a national full-service operator into a
LCC, as in the case of rumours around SAS, the task for management risks to be
herculean. Unions and employess will be unwilling to accept a salary reduction, unless
eventually in the form of an ESOP26program. But the passage in LC arena means that
the traditional carrier will automatically leave most of its own operated long-haul
network, too. This decision will crash against Governments’ will to maintain an
international visibily, with a participation in an umbrella alliance highly preferred to the
probably much more revenue-generating LC option. Thus, many incumbent airlines will
find really complex this transformation, with price-cutting measures becoming a shortterm implementation and drastic cost reduction only a far mirage. No surprise that in the
European low-cost environment we still find a lot of stuck-in-the-middle “low-fares,
high-cost” airlines, like Meridiana in Italy, or the defunct Air Lib and Air Lib Express
in France.
f) Ally. This could really become the next fiontieer for the whole airline business. Till

now, we have basically assisted, fiom one side, at LCCs’ consolidation practices and,

answer by Delta to the invasion of the Florida market by Southwest, which the former unseuccessfdly
tried to imitate in its own business model.
24

Germanwings is the low-cost subsidiary of Eurowings. Lufthansa has some 25% of Eurowings share,
with an agreement to grow up to 50%.
25
This figure is related to the US market. European LC subsidiaries are very young, so it’s too early to
say that they are still on the market because of different conditions or because time still has to come even
for them.
26
Employee Stock Ownership hograms (ESOP) have been widely used in the ‘90s for obtaining salary
concessions. Today, there is literature that evidences that ESOPs have only created greater governance
problems for their companies.
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from the other side, at alliances as indirect integration practices27for traditional carriers.
Or, eventually, at the very expensive and rather unsuccessful “join option” in the form
of start-up of a LC subsidiary by an established airline.
What we still haven’t seen, however, is some sort of extensive contractual
agreement between a traditional and a LC carrier, the only exception being the limited
route-based, block-space agreement between Virgin Express and Sabena.
The advantages for both actors could be, instead, significant. The low-cost
carrier could more easily grow in its target market. This process could be achieved by
the help, and no more fight, of the home carrier, the latter supporting the former, for
instance, in the PR activity or in the trade and commercial relationships.
The traditional airline could, instead, avoid a bloody fare war, preserving the
value of its own scarse resouces by transferring its own capacity on those routes that
cannot be served by LCCs: like in the case of regional-feeder services and long-haul
routes28.In the highly contestable, trunk medium-haul services its commercial precence
would be garanteed by block-s ace agreements, eventually, interlining those services
.
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Thus, as the process of market growth by LCCs continues, the “ally” option
could be the most efficient and effective answer to cope with the changes of market
boundaries without the need of burning, with apparently any tangible results, large
amounts of cash.
The fact that these alliance patterns are still not in action has not to be only
correlated with the will by LCCs to cheny pick all the possible customers in the
growing phase of their product lifecycle. Once again, egotistic behavious by traditional
carriers’ top managers and their belief that LCCs are simply transitory within the airline
business are the real technical and human explanations for this option not to take-off.
6. Conclusions

The darwinistic process that many industry observers have long predicted for the
world airline industry hasn’t still taken off, most defrntively not in Europe. This aspect,
when dealing with the European environment, is strictly linked with the clear protection
that national countries still provide to their flag carriers, either as shareholders or simply
as a matter of international pride. State aids, in the various forms, are still working, even
~~

” The term “cosmetic” for alliances refers to the fact that the real goal that these agreements should
reach, that is cost reduction, is well far from being achieved. Aspects like aircrafts’ common procuments
or other potential joint purchases (Me, insurance, handling, maintenance) are not touched by alliance
paths. Only the simpler practice of revenue increase, basically through the old-style “code-sharing”
formula, are really being implemented by partners. Once again, the nationalist ego of shareholders and
top managers prevail on a rigid logic of asset maximisation.
Feeder and regional services are typically thin markets, where capacity needed is not that of LCCs for
achieving their break-even load factors. Long-haul services, on the other hand, are immune from LCCs
because on a hours-long flight on-board comfort becomes a primary issue and even conscious passengers
are uwiiiing to trade it for a iow fare. For many routes, moreover, strict bilateral agreenents and singledesignation practices still protect the monopoly of traditional national carriers.
’ 9 Developing an on-line connection in the form of code-sharing between a traditional and a low-cost
operator promises, instead, to be a very risky business. For instance, the superior quality image of the
traditional operator could be diluited by the association with a low-cost operator.
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if they had formally banned since the early ‘90s. It’s certainly true that the conditions
that all airlines has had to cope with for the last 2 years are not only traumatic, but
totally unpredictable. Thus, many liquidity crises can be certainly related, at least partly,
to these factors.
But, if the goal is to exit the current downturn cycle with a probably streamlined
number of actors, but in fact with a stronger European industry, no more time has to be
thrown away in the process of adapting traditional carriers’ business pillars to current
competition patterns. In the same time, the business model innovator will not stay still,
but it will constantly work to figure out how it can do more for its customers. For
example, reducing cost structures and passing on some of the savings to customers.
In this sense, every traditional carrier has to evolve into a new type of airline
capable of being centered around these five pillars of action:

Simple in its value proposition, with service diversity encouraged only when
market needs ask for it, like in the long-haul sector;
Committed in its endless effort of cost reductions, as the only way to survive in
the market, due to yields’ erosions;

Proactive in its continued research of new cluster of demand to match with
existing products;
Consistent in its marketing approach, avoiding the temptation to raise short-term
benefits in the form of lower prices for a lower service, for instance, whist
privileging its own natural long-term view;
Clear, transparent and eflective when dealing with internal customers’
relationships, as a labour-based service practice may only survive thanks to the
consensus of its own employees.
We cannot say if Jan Carlzon’s late ‘80s profecy, stating that only four traditional
carriers would have survived in the New Millenium, is still alive. What is certainly true
is that the European market may sustain a significant number of airlines, as it is today,
only if they are internally consistent with the current scenario and with a clear elective
positioning in mind. Exactly what is today missing to Europe’s traditional carriers.
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Abstract
The proposed paper is a summary of a larger research project that was started in 1998 and
that set out to contribute to the understanding of (a) the factors which shape the
structuring of multilateral, horizontal alliances and (b) the implications for corporate
governance of firms within such an alliancing environment. The paper argues that the
positioning of an airline within an alliance group depends on the airline’s resource
configuration and is furthermore a function of environmental constraints ‘forcing’ certain
types of airlines into certain choices; of conscious, ‘rational’strategy devising; and of the
degree to which alliance membership (or “alliancing” itself) gains institutional
legitimacy. Because the organisational phenomenon under study can be understood as
both a social and a technical phenomenon, the study uses a dual theoretical approach. On
one hand, the positioning of airlines in the alliancing environment is examined using a
resource dependence perspective. Introducing the terms ‘standalone capability’ and
‘specific and unspecific dependence’, the mitigation of power imbalances in a formal
network of firms and the management of interdependencies between partners will be
discussed. It will be suggested that the success of an airline within an alliance group
depends on that airline’s resource configuration and on its ability to position itself in the
alliance network according to that configuration. In addition, it will be suggested that in a
federated environment, partners fare best if they specialise.
The second perspective used is that of institutional theory. Based mainly on the interview
material gathered, the aim is to identify the lines along which alliancing is becoming a
part of actors’ mindset, or the institutionalisation of alliancing. Hence, this part deals with
the ‘invention’ of alliances, in other words, how ‘rationally devised’ structures are enacted
in practice. It introduces a concept called ‘countervailing myths’, which seems to be a
prominent factor in the shaping of the institution ‘alliance’. This second part is based on
extensive interviews with senior management fiom ten different airlines.
The paper concludes with the discussion of a model depicting the factors that influence
the dsvehpment of multilateral alliances between autonomous, but interdependent firms,
accounting for both “centripetal” forces (pushing toward tighter member integration) and
“centrifugal” forces (pushing for looser coupling).

Keywords: Air Transport; Alliances; Resource Dependence; Institutional Theory

Introduction

Airline alliance groups are complex, heterarchical, and dynamic organisations that have
no relevant precedent. Their complexity stems both from the dynamic aspect and from
the fact that they are highly asymmetric and consist of multilateral links between
autonomous or semi-autonomous partners. This means that to some extent, multilateral
alliance groups can indeed be seen as organisations in their own right. However, it can be
assumed that the force which drives, and shapes, such a type of organisation is not -as it
would be in 'classical' organisations- a common purpose. Instead, it is interdependent
needs. This study, then, looks at the multilateral alliance as a system of
interdependencies. This interdependence of needs contains forces which both work
toward greater coherence, or tighter coupling, of organisational actors, but also other
forces which push them apart, and favour loose coupling. This paper is a summary of a
larger research project (Kleymann, 2002) that was started in 1998 and that set out to
contribute to the understanding of (a) the factors which shape the structuring of
multilateral, horizontal alliances, and (b) the implications for corporate governance of
.

firms within such an environment. The study was based on the assumption that the
positioning of an airline within an alliance group depends on the airline's resource
configuration and is furthermore a function of environmental constraints 'forcing' certain
types of airlines into certain choices; of conscious, 'rational' strategy devising; and of the
degree to which alliance membership (or "alliancing" itself) gains institutional
legitimacy.
The study used the inductive theory building method (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Das,

1983; Martin and Turner, 1986; Eisenhardt, 1989; Isabella, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990; Daft
and Buenger, 1991; Burrell and Morgan, 1997; Locke, 2001) to build a mid-range theory
(Pinder and Moore, 1980) of the dynamics of multilateral alliances. It accommodates
research methods such as participant observation, interviews, and the collection of
different types of data over a certain time span, in an attempt to understand the factors
affecting the emergence of this phenomenon.

This paper is structured as follows: First a justification for the use of a dual theoretical
approach is given. Then, the alliancing phenomenon is discussed from a resource
dependence perspective, the first of the two suggested approaches. After that, the
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institutionalist perspective is applied to interview material gathered during the research
process, to help understand the behavioural aspects of alliancing. The third part of this
paper will then combine these two perspectives and try to depict a schema of alliancing
dynamics in the airline industry.

A dual theoretical approach
Alliancing “happens” at several levels; at inter- organisational level, firms position
themselves in networks according to their resources and needs; at the level of interaction
between individuals, airline managers “invent” the alliance group, and it is their
negotiations- and their joint sensemaking of a unique situation- which shapes the alliance

as an organisation. It is suggested here that one potentially rewarding avenue to follow
when trying to comprehend alliancing dynamics is a combination of macro- and microprocessual perspectives. These perspectives need to be conceptually linkable to each
other by meeting the following two core requirements:

1. One core requirement for these perspectives is that they allow the accommodation of
views that go beyond (but do not fully exclude) the ‘classical’ assumptions of
efficiency- seeking, profit- optimising behaviour, both on organisational and on

individual level. The present study assumes that at individual (and micro-processual)
level, what is considered ’rational actions’ is a h c t i o n of ‘local’ rationalities. Thus,
the individuals’ and organisations’ perceptions of what may constitute a ‘rational’
action may indeed vary. At organisational (macro- processual) level, the assumption
is that organisations are evolving, deploying primarily local responses (especially in
the present case of the airline industry where there is no organisational blueprint for
the development of multilateral alliances), and that the primary aims of the
organisation’s responses are not so much directed at profit-maximising goals, but
rather at the preservation of itself, or survival (see e.g. Stacey, 2000; Stacey et al,

2000, pp. 7-8)’. This does not deny the existence of profit- maximising rationales
within a firm.It merely subordinates these rationales to the overarching meta~

1 ’
in

fact, Stacey et a1 separate survival as a final aim from identity preservation ()I... interaction in nature
takesplace notprimarily in order to survive but as the creative expression of identity”).The present study,
in contrast, assumes that identity protection is indeed the primary manifestation of the overall ambition to
survive.
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rationale of identity preservation, and ultimately of survival, both at individual and
organisational level.
2. A second core requirement is that the perspectives used can help to understand the
airline alliance as a "negotiated environment" (Cyert and March, 1992). They thus
need to take into account the environmental uncertainties that drive firms to create
negotiated environments in the first place, but also the uncertainties inherent in the
negotiated environment itself. They also need to take into account the 'negotiation
process' of the environment - this negotiation can be thought of as happening both on
inter-firm as well as on intra-firm &e., individual actor) level. In the words of Doz
and Prahalad (1993): "Formal structure in an organization (organization structure) is

nothing more than a shorthand way of capturing the underlying subprocesses:
managers' mindsets [...I, a consensus on strategy, and power to allocate resources
consistent with strategy." Hence, an attempt must be made to capture the interrelation
between 'negotiation' and structures, and to conceive the organisation as both a
technical and as a social phenomenon (Westney, 1993).

The present study proposes that a fruitful line of inquiry against this background would
be a combination of the resource dependence perspective (RDP) and institutional theory.
Assuming a resource dependence perspective on alliancing is considered useful in that it
(a) allows for environmental uncertainty, (b) can explain managerial preferences in terms
of 'rational' actions aimed at a 'long-term' strategy, while (c) offering a link to other,
more 'local' rationales (for example, seeking legitimacy in front of certain stakeholders).

This link is taken up by the institutional perspective which is useful in that it is informed
by the micro- processual level of sensemaking', sensegiving, and 'local responses'. These
responses, in turn, can be assumed to be shaped or at least influenced by the actors'
perceptions of dependencies (Van de Ven and Walker, 1984). Previously, the conceptual
link between RDP and the institutionalist perspective has mainly been found at the level
of legitimacy: i.e., institutional legitimacy as a resource. This study, however, seeks to
show that there are further links between the two perspectives, especially in the sense that
both institutional processes and resource dependencies can create forces that act on the
2

Weick (1 99536) considers sensemaking to be "the feedstock for institutionalisation".
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alliancing process, both in a positive (tie- strengthening) and in a negative (tie- loosening)
way. Another conceptual link can be found in the mutual reinforcement of these two
types of process. Oliver (1997) has combined the resource- based view with institutional
theory to claim that in order to reach sustainable competitive advantage, a firm must
manage both its resource base and the institutional context in which resource
deployments are made. This study takes up this combination by (1) adding a “dynamic”
view on institutions, i.e. by depicting how institutions emerge, also in function of
resource interdependencies within the firm’s task environment, (2) by illustrating the
mutual bearing strategies of resource deployment and the firm’s institutional context have
on each other, and (3) by showing how the interaction of resource interdependencies and
institutional contexts can shape the way an entire industry evolves.

Empirical Data
Empirical data were gathered fiom several classes of sources to provide various
perspectives on airline alliances. In order to keep the population as homogeneous as
possible, the investigation focused on small- to medium sized, internationally operating
airlines, all of which are involved in alliancing. In order to provide a contrast and to
describe the airlines’ operating environment, additional material on larger, ‘dominant’
airlines was also collected. The sources of empirical data can be classified as follows
a) Press. This includes articles fiom both the specialised aviation press as well as
general newspapers. A total of four airline business-related publications and three
aviation online news services were monitored, covering a time span fiom January
1995 to at least December 2001. In addition, three business oriented general
newspapers’ online archives were examined. The “press” category only includes
material written by third parties (i.e., ‘outsider’ journalists and industry observers).
Press releases and press interviews given by airline executives were grouped under
category (b).
b) Public Relations. This refers to material issued directly by the airlines, and which was
destined to the public and the financial community. It includes press releases,
statements made in annual reports (the annual reports of 14 airlines between 1993 and
2000 were examined), and statements made by airline managers in press interviews.
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c) Senior Management (C.E.O.to Vice-president levels). Total of thirteen interviews
with ten interview partners (one informant was interviewed twice, another three
times). They represented eight different airlines. The interviews lasted between 45
minutes and two hours. The interviews were taped and later transcribed verbatim
(fully or in excerpts); two informants asked not to have their answers tape-recorded,
but notes were taken. The interviews were taken either at the interviewee’s location,
or over the telephone. In addition, a number of informal discussions (not taped) and email exchanges took place with some interview partners from this category.
d) Middle Management and Supervisors. Nine interviews with seven interview partners
(two were interviewed twice), representing three different airlines. Each interview
partner had been or was currently involved in alliance coordination activities with
partner airlines. They lasted fiom 45 minutes to just over two hours. Eight were taped
and excerpts transcribed verbatim; one interview was conducted via electronic mail.
Interviews were held either at a conference venue, or at the interviewee’s workplace.
e) Front-line staff (Ramp Operations, Check-In, Passenger Services). Nine interviews
(all from one &line), lasting around 30 minutes each. They were held at the
interviewee’s workplace. They were tape recorded and excerpts were transcribed
verbatim.
The 26 interview partners (who all had a minimum of five years experience with their
respective company) represent nine different airlines. Eight of these airlines are located in
Europe; one in a relatively wealthy and politically stable country in South America. The
interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way. Interviewees were asked to talk
about the alliance-related events that affected their company and their own work (e.g.

Das, 1983). Since one purpose of the interviews was to filter out key themes, the
interviewer refi-ained fiom addressing any specific topics, and instead asked the
interviewees to elaborate on subjects that they themselves had brought up. In most cases,
the interviews turned into somewhat amicable ‘shop talk’, with interviewees being fairly
relaxed, talkative, and willing to express their own opinions and concerns, albeit
fiequently with the caveat to the interviewer that a certain statement would be “off the
record”. In some cases, the formal interviews led to further correspondence by electronic
mail or follow-up meetings. In the cases where the same person was interviewed more

I
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than once (with a time distance ranging from two weeks to eight months), the second
(and in one case third) interview was aimed at specific questions; that is, the interviewer
asked the informant about specific themes, or recent events in the industry.

Part One: A resource (inter-) dependence perspective on airline alliances

The resource dependence approach can be seen as a development of the broader resourcebased view, which conceptualises the firm as the holder of a set of resources (see e.g.
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Conner, 1991; Grant, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian,
1992; Monteverde, 1997 and especially the recent discussion by Barney, 200 1 and P r i m
and Butler, 2001 ah). Departing from an open-systems view of the organisation (Scott,
199 1), the resource dependence perspective in particular assumes environmental
uncertainty and scarcity of resources and supposes that managerial action is directed at
protecting organisations from dependencies that come about fiom the external
environment. Resources and capabilities thus constitute an important determinant of
direction and possibilities for the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Grant, 1991; Ahuja, 2000).
One of the strengths of the resource dependence perspective is that it can explain
uncertainty management (rather than simply uncertainty avoidance), in organisational
behaviour. In the resource dependence view, firms seek to (a) reduce uncertainty withm
their operating environment and, related to this, (b) minimise their dependence on other

firms, mainly because such a dependence on a specific partner firm would give that firm
power over the focal actor (Spekman and Sawhney, 1992), or at least (c) to modify their
resource dependencies on other firms (Provan, 1982). It is especially the modijication of
dependencies that is of interest in the airline alliance context. It appears that especially
within multilateral alliances, autonomy and dependence are not mutually exclusive; one
fiequently encounters a situation where firms are simultaneously highly autonomous, and
highly dependent on their partners (Dant and Gundlach, 1998), or in fact on the alliance
itself.
The following discussion concentrates on the relation of individual airlines to their
partners and, in the aggregate, to their alliance group. It can be argued that the airline
alliance group constitutes an environment in its own right, an 'immediate' environment, or
"task environment". This task environment buffers the individual airline from the outside
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environment (and fiom direct competition with other airlines or federations), but it also
requires the airline to negotiate its role, position, and power within it. A task environment
that consists of a formally (albeit loosely) structured federation displays a certain degree
of stability, or at least predictability, to the members of that federation. But because this
federation is a structured form, and because it involves symbiotic interdependence, it also
displays hierarchical elements. Thus, issues of domination and power asymmetries as
well as tensions between individual and collective advantages (Jones et al, 1998) are
present and must be negotiated. It is suggested here that the resource dependence
approach offers concepts that are useful for understanding the mechanisms of inter- firm
coordination within multilateral alliance groups, and that it can also help explain the
stability -or lack of stability- of such groups. A further issue that RDP can help
understand is that of firm specialisation. In brief, firms that operate in an unstable
environment need to operate more as generalists, which is inherently inefficient, but will
ensure that they can survive across a greater range of environmental states. On the other
hand, if the operating environment is stable, a firm can afford to specialise: It will operate
more efficiently, and do well, over a very small range of environmental states. Hannan
and Freeman (1977) suggest that one way for firms to be able to afford specialisation
even in inherently unstable environments is to form federations.

Airline resources
Since one primary aim of airline alliances is to seek geographical scope, the core
resources of an airline within an alliancing environment consist what can be called its
'home market'. This refers to the route-system related, technical and nontangible
resources in the set of markets where that particular airline has its hghest operating
density. Exploiting these resources can be seen as the airline's 'raison d'e^tr-e'.The 'home
market' resource base is an aggregate of the two separate criteria used by Weber and
Dinwoodie (2000), namely "Business Strength" and "Market Attractiveness" and can be
classified according to the following criteria:

1. the attractiveness of that resource (e.g. in the airline case, access to a wealthy, high
yield market and / or a central, uncongested hub)
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2. the uniqueness of the resource (e.g. the degree of market dominance in the home
market; "substitutability")

3 . the remoteness of the resource (e.g. the difficulty of market entry ffom the outside. In
the airline case, this refers to cultural remoteness, geographical remoteness,
regulatory barriers and other factors which would render a potential competitor's
establishment in those markets slow and costly; "imitability").

The concept of resource attractiveness is akin to what Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) call
"Resource Importance", and the uniqueness of a resource is closely related to their notion
of "Concentration of Resource Control". Resource uniqueness refers to the asset
specificity of that resource, or how easily that resource can be obtained from another
provider (Auster, 1994). Resource remoteness indicates the contestability of the market,
e.g. how difficult or costly it is for an outsider to start operations in that market if there
are "resource position barriers" (Wernerfelt, 1984). In the airline case, a carrier ideally
obtains a powerful position in the network of airlines if it is dominating an attractive (i.e.,
wealthy, high yield) market which is dzflcult to enterfrom the outside (even in case of a
completely deregulated environment, some locations are just geographically too remote
to be economically 'exploited' by newcomers, or there are cultural barriers).
It appears that that in an alliancing environment, firms which have access to an attractive,
imperfectly substitutable resource can afford to specialise to a greater degree because
they have other partners specifically dependent on them for the provision of a coveted
resource or resource bundle (in the airline case, this is most frequently domination of an
attractive market). An example for such an airline reaping the benefits of specialisation
within an alliancing environment is ANA of Japan. Their value to the STAR alliance
consists in their contribution of the (highly attractive, and "remote" due to hgh entry
barriers) Japanese market. The airline announced in 2002 that they would reduce their
own intercontinental flights, increase codeshares with their partners Lufthansa and United
on intercontinental routes instead, while concentrating more on serving domestic and East
Asian routes.
On the other hand, airlines which do not control such an "exclusive" resource, but which
are based at a central location and which operate more generalist services (for example,
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most large Western European carriers such as British Airways, Lufthansa, KLM or Air
France) tend to position themselves as 'link providers', connecting the specialists' markets
between each others' and to their own route systems. An airline alliance group needs both
types of airlines in order to offer adequate scope benefits to its customers.

The alliancing aptitude
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state that management is continuously engaged in
"negotiating a tradeof between autonomy and survival''. Assuming that managerial
efforts are indeed directed at ensuring their firm's autonomy, but recognising that some
dependencies have to be entered into in order to ensure survival in a hostile and unstable
environment, it is possible to say that a firm seeks to avoid or at least 'manage'
dependencies through what can be called an alliancing aptitude. The alliancing aptitude
of a firm comprises features which

1. give it negotiating clout withm the alliance (once joined) to eliminate or cancel out
asymmetries: "The power of the participant [in a coalition] is a function of the
dependence of others in the organisation on his contributions, activities, capabilities"
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978);
2. allows the firm to enter dependencies which are largely unspecific, and avoid specific

dependencies on other firms;

3. and thus allow it to retain a certain 'Standalone Capability' in case the alliance fails,
loosens or changes shape3.

In the following sections, the term 'environment' will refer primarily to the airline alliance
group itself (i.e., what will be termed 'network' or 'federated environment'). This appears
justified in that the primary environment for an allied airline is indeed the alliance group,
and resource configuration issues are relevant in relation to other network members, both
at the formation and the implementation / management stages of the alliance. The
resources of an airline can be classified into route- system related, technical, and
nontangibles. Route- system related resources are traffic rights, slots at airports, and hub
3

It is important to make this distinction: Most literature paints things in black and white, i.e., alliance
failure or not. In reality, there are many 'shades of grey, each of which demand some response capability.
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location and

-

characteristics.

Technical resources refer to the airline’s operating

infrastructure and include its fleet, IT systems and know- how, and installations at hubs
and outstations. Nontangible resources include the customer basis (e.g. Frequent Flyer top
tier members; corporate accounts), the airline’s overall reputation, and its brand.

Specific and unspecific dependence
Autonomy and dependence are not necessarily mutually exclusive in a partnership,
because there might be dependence in some domains, and autonomy in others. The
alliancing competence can thus be seen as the firm’s capability to manage its
dependencies within an alliance. In this context, it is useful to distinguish between two
different types of dependence, namely specific, and unspecific dependence (Kleymann,

2002). A dependence can be said to be specific if it refers to a firm’s dependence on one
particular resource (and on the partner who controls that resource). That resource can
then be said to be imperfectly substitutable (Morgan and Hunt, 1999) in the sense that a
firm needs access to that resource, and to no other, to perform a certain vital function.
There are two main problems related to entering specific dependencies. The first is that
holding, or controlling access to, resources implies power (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
The power difference between two firms where one is specifically dependent on the other
can possibly lead to an unstable situation in the case of a lack of goal consensus between
partners (Borys and Jemison, 1989). A second problem related to specific dependencies is
that the structural changes a firm makes to accommodate a cooperation with a partner on
which it is specifically dependent represent sunk costs. Once these costs are incurred, the

firm will seek to ‘amortise’ this investment, and is in a way held hostage to the
cooperation.
A different situation occurs if the dependence is unspeciJic. In the case of unspecific

dependence, a firm might still depend on partners for resources, or sheltering from
competition, in the sense that it cannot survive on its own. But it is of less importance
with which partner(s) the firm enters cooperation. In other words, the focal firm does not
depend on any one particular partner; thus, partners (and the resources they control) are
substitutable. The problems associated with a lack of goal consensus between partners
still apply once a cooperation is entered; but in the case of unspecific resource

10

dependence, a firm always retains the option to choose among, and if necessary switch
between, partners. The firm which is unspecifically dependent on cooperation with other
firms is "able to procure valuable resources porn another party without losing control of
one's own resources" (Dasand Teng, 2000a) .

Specific dependence on an alliance
It is important at this point to consider that a firm can in fact be specifically dependent
not only on a partner, but also on an alliance group. If one sees the alliance network as
the firm's immediate 'task environment', it is this environment which needs to be stable
and non- turbulent in order for a firm to reap the important membership benefit of a
chance for what could be called 'carefree specialisation'. Carefree specialisation refers to
a firm's ability to be able to specialise (i.e., concentrate on the provision and exploitation

of core resources) while affording to curtail non- core ones, the maintenance of which
had been hitherto needed in order to provide for the mastering of environmental
uncertainties. The price to be paid for this is specific dependence on the alliance group.
Hence, specialisation involves considerable risk and requires tight integration within the
'protective' alliance environment. There is, however, another type of risk inherent in tight
integration into an alliance, namely "relational risk" (see e.g. Das and Teng 1999; 2000a;
2000b) , or opportunistic behaviour by partners. It has been proposed (Kleymann and
Seristo, 2001) that there are, in addition to contractual stipulations which aim at limiting
opportunistic behaviour by a partner, two interrelated mechanisms in place which can to
some extent mitigate the risk involved at hgh levels of integration, namely trust and
alliance-spec+

investment, or costs sunk into alliance membership. Alliance - specific

investments provide stability in that they somewhat deter partners from opportunistic
behaviour or defection. Generally speaking, in a relationship which involves specific
dependencies and sunk costs, there is greater incentive to cooperate (or dissuasion to
shirk) and thus a greater inherent stability in the federation. This can be illustrated by the
following quote: "We have now nine companies in Star and they have ten diflerent
reservation systems. Building one joint system is expensive and takes time. It could also
make it impossiblefor an airline to leave an alliance (Lufthansa senior executive).
"
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Managing dependencies: The concept of standalone capability
Members of an airline alliance group are required to relinquish some amount of authority
to a joint governing entity, and they frequently came up markets between themselves.

This implies that an airline might have to cease being directly present in one market for
the sake of a partner. If the alliance dissolves, the firms will be weakened at those points
where they were formerly linked to partners. In an extreme case, the alliance members
might operate to a large extent under a joint brand name, thereby sacrificing their own
identity; in case of alliance dissolution, they will find themselves 'crippled', with the need
to rebuild brands. If, say, a European airline that operates transcontinentally cedes a set of
its routes to Asia to one of its Asian alliance partners and the alliance dissolves, that
airline would need to incur the costs and efforts to re-establish itself on that market. This
is one aspect of the opportunity cost related to tight integration into an alliance. Another
example of opportunity cost related to alliancing is members being bound by exclusivity
agreements: In tightly integrated airline alliance groups such as STAR, members are not
very free to design their 'private' alliancing strategy beyond the airline alliance group
itself, or to enter cooperative agreements with airlines outside the alliance group, even
though such a cooperation might make sense for that particular member airline. Instead,
alliance partners are bound to cooperate "exclusively" with partners fiom within their
airline alliance group, with very strict limits set on the nature and extent of cooperation
with outside airlines. This, in turn,has a set of effects on the airline's overall internal
structure: In the event that the alliance fails, or if the airline leaves the airline alliance
group, it may find it has developed structurally too much as an 'alliance member', and
may have lost a certain 'standalone capability'. The concept of standalone capacity is in
fact very important as one of the pillars of airline success in a federated universe. It is
based on the assumption that the firm is compelled to undergo some changes upon
federating with others, but that the internal restructuration of resource configurations to
match the needs of the alliance or a partner is costly to a firm,and detrimental to its
overall flexibility; in the words of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978): "Theprice for inclusion in
any collective structure is the loss of discretion and control over one's activities

[...I

Organizations seek to avoid dependencies and external control, and, at the same time, to
shape their own contexts and retain their autonomy for independent action".
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In an operating environment where federation among organisations is a necessity (such as
the airline industry), the concept of standalone capability does not necessarily imply a

firm's ability to remain outside any federation; instead, it refers to the firm's continued
capability to be a fkee, autonomous agent within its environment. In a network
environment, this means an agent capable of managing its interdependencies. Standalone
capability, thus, refers to the capability of a firm
0

to survive for a certain (albeit limited) amount of time by itself in order to allow
for the possibility of severing ties with existing partners,
to have guarded enough key (or core) resources and capabilities under its own
jurisdiction to make it an attractive partner sought for association with others, and
to maintain sufficient operational flexibility and linkage resources to adjust parts
of its structure to membershp in a new alliance group.

Standalone capability guarantees that a firm maintains a role -and some power- within an
alliance group by guarding its contribution to it, and that it is 'strong' enough to be able to
afford looser coupling- or decoupling- fkom an existing partnership in order to seek a
more optimal arrangement. Conserving standalone capability helps to de-specify the
dependence of the firmon its partner(s) or the alliance group, in that it ensures the firm's
ability to switch partners and buffers its core from shifts and changes within the alliance
group. It is one of the features that a firm that aspires to maintain itself as a separate
entity must most jealously seek to guard. Standalone capability rests on the protection of
a firm's core resources and that firm's capability to interface these core resources with
partners, without harming the core. In the airline case, core resources are likely to be
route system related. Examples include the dominance of a hub airport, and a large share
-if not dominance- of a certain market. Core resources are thus those resources that
provide the 'unique contribution' of that firm to the alliance; they are the resources that
partners seek to obtain from that firm through alliancing with it. The value of a core
resource is a function of (a) internally to the

h:
how many resources that resource can

create (i.e., its value as a "resource- creating resource'' (HAkansson and Snehota, 1995),
and (b) externally: of how many firms are (specifically) dependent on it. These core
resources will provide a basis for existence to an airline if and when a transition phase
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between two alliances occurs, and they also help ensure that new partners can be easily
found. On linking to a new airline alliance group, or integrating tighter into an existing
group, airline management needs to be aware of h s core, which should not be "bent'' too
much to the particular requirements of any one alliance group.
The 'alliancing competence' of an airline can thus be described as
a) the ability to maximally exploit core resources, and to successfully and flexibly build
ties with other firms through linkage resources without harming, or endangering, the
core
b) the ability to make partners specifically dependent on its own core resources, while
striving to enter only unspecific dependencies by itself.
c) The ability to balance benefits from lean, specialist operations on the one hand and
the need for retention of standalone capability on the other.
It was also suggested that while entering specific dependencies with one particular
partner may be dangerous to a firm(unless it acquires equity and/or establishes a joint
venture with that partner), the entering of specific dependencies with a federation, or
alliance group, while still representing a risk, carries certain advantages in terms of
provision of a stable operating environment without the need to seek equity investment in
each or every partner. One crucial requirement for the minimisation of risk related to
investing in specific dependence on an alliance is, however, that all partners involved in
that federation must have entered similar specific dependencies: The federation can only
provide stability (which is what is "bought" with alliance-specific investments) if all
partners are tied to it and are equally deterred from instability- causing behaviour.
In the larger context of corporate governance, the discussion of interdependencies and
standalone capability can be a basis for understanding managerial action, since the ability

of decisionmakers to make a 'choice' depends frequently on how far they could preserve
autonomy in the environment (Child, 1997). A good complement to this structural view is
thus research on the managerial side, to investigate whether there exists some
'countervailing power' to alliance integration in the managerial quest for independence
(Galbraith, 1967; Dant and Gundlach, 1998) and to depict the features of an "alliance
mindset" (Spekman et al, 1998) of key actors as a function of the balancing of standalone
requirements with dependence on an alliance. This issue will be addressed next.
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Part Two: Multilateral alliance building from an institutionalist perspective

This section approaches the behavioural side of multilateral alliancing by taking an
institutionalist perspective. Alliances between airlines are agreements of tight cooperation
between autonomous, but increasingly interdependent, organisational actors. They do not
only strategically concern certain parts of the firms’ overall operation (as would be the
case in a JV), but rather often the entire firm.Hence, they require a considerable amount
of inter-organisational coordination. This coordination, in turn,is made more complex by
the fact that it needs to take place at a multilateral level and that neither a clear hierarchy
nor a ‘blueprint’ for coordination efforts exists. One can say that alliancing is being
‘invented’ by airline managers as they continuously coordinate - and try to reduce the
need to adapt- their resource allocation and decisionmaking. Alexander (1 998) describes
inter-organisational coordination as “aform of social structure: a set of rules and norms

that enables and constrains action, and which is itself continually re-enacted.” This
section investigates to what degree and in what form coordinatipn between airlines
acquires such a social structure (Barley and Tolbert, 1997; Hendry, 2000). In more
detail, the question is how the managers of an airline are building and enacting the
concept of ‘alliancing’. This section aims to shed some light on the processes behnd the
establishment of ‘alliancing’ as an institution, and on the question of what kind of
institution ‘alliancing’ is eventually going to become.

On a fairly general level, Scott (1995) defines institutions this way:
“Institutionsconsist of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various
carriers

-

cultures, structures, and routines- and they operate at multiple levels of

jurisdiction”.In the words of Goodrick and Salancik (1996), institutions can be seen as
“socialfacts”, existing as the “context within which interests operate”. Cultural elements
and cognitive structures that have reached institutional status are assumed to have a
profound impact on organisational behaviour. Other terms used to describe institutions
are “mental template” or “the totem around which the tribe is dancing”. In what is
considered to be one of the seminal articles on the institutionalist perspective, Meyer and
Rowan (1977) explain the way institutions influence organisational practices like this:

I

“Organisations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by
prevailing rationalized concepts of organisational work and institutionalized in society.
Organisations that do so increase their legitimacy and their sursival prospects,
independent of the immediate eficacy of the acquired practices and procedures.‘’A part
of ‘rational’ action might thus well be directed toward, for example, the acquisition or
maintenance of legitimacy. The main argument for institutional theory’s usefulness as
one basis for the examination of the phenomenon under study is the conceptual flexibility
and explanatory power of this theoretical approach. The institutional perspective
accommodates external ‘realities’ -whether or not they are manipulated by actors- as well

as actor’s attempts at rationality, and several degrees of bounded, or ‘local’ rationalities,
such as allegiance to institutions, hypocrisy, myths and re-action on (distorted)
perceptions. Highlighting the value of institutional theory as a complementary approach
to more “technical” perspectives such as RDP,

Bartunek (1984) states that

“Environmentalforces are likely to initiate the change, but the way the environment is
perceived by organisational members aflects the type of change that takes place”. In
other words, finns are “living” in an environment that they themselves have created, and
the way they create it is very much a function of their interpretations and shared
understandings.
Grasping these shared understandings was the target of the round of interviews performed
with airline managers. Following a Grounded Theory approach to data evaluation (see,
for example, Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Martin and Turner, 1986; Strauss and Corbin,

1998; Locke, 2001), in a first round of data sighting the material obtained was checked as
to whether there were any common themes or ‘issues’ that were brought up with a certain
frequency. Concentrating on these “in vivo labels” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), or the
main issues addressed in manager’s discourse, was based on the idea that selectivity is an
essential characteristic of consciousness (Scott, 1995), i.e., the ‘perceived truth’ (or what
one could call ‘para-truth’) is very much a function of selected and re-produced
discourses. Aided by previous participant observation and general knowledge of the
specific industrial context of the airline industry, it was then sought to conceptualise these
issues. From the discourses on alliancing that emerged out of the empirical material
collected, three main thematic groups (reflecting ‘issues’) could be identified, namely
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‘Positive’, ‘Pragmatic’, and ‘Independence’-related discourse. Within each of these
groups, discourses could be classified into a number of sub-themes.

Alliancing discourses in the airline industry

The issues that emerged from the empiria could be grouped into whether they were
‘positive’, ‘pragmatic’, or ‘reluctant’.
‘Positive’ discourse mentioned the benefits of alliancing. This occurred almost
exclusively in media directed toward a stakeholding public (e.g. passengers or investors).
‘Pragmatic’ discourse implied that alliancing as such did no longer require any
justification. Alliance membership was accepted as a “fact of life”, a necessary defensive
move, and it was frequently stressed that the airline had no real choice but to engage in
alliancing. Frequently, interviewees did not stay much on the discussion of whether or
not alliance membership was a god thing, and moved on to discuss the day-to-day
problems of alliancebuilding, such as lengthy meetings, difficulties to reach consensus,
etc. Several middle managers (but interestingly, no senior managers) called for more
authority of the alliance governance structure to resolve these inefficiencies.
The third big block was ‘reluctant’ discourse: Here, the emphasis was on keeping the
influence of alliance membership at arm’s length. The theme of the airline as having a
special culture, and/ or as a national symbol was often mentioned as a justification for
keeping as much independence as possible, and it seems that especially stakeholders and
lower- level employees were rallied around this theme. Further, especially senior
management frequently expressed concerns about their airline losing its independence to
the alliance, and some even admitted that they “avoided” alliance group membership by
operating portfolios of bilateral agreements with various carriers instead.
The following table depicts the distribution of discourses that occurred in the empiria
collected:
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PRAGMATIC

Senior
mt

yes

HEAVY

some

Yes

HEAVY

some

HEAVY

HEAVY

yes

buffering

HEAVY

avoidance

HEAVY

Table 1: Themes in alliancing

‘Countervailing Myths’ in action

If one takes spoken and written discourse as reflecting processes of institutionalisation,

(as e.g. in Johnson et al, 2000; Walgenbach, 2001; Wicks, 2001), it seems that some of
the strategic responses to institutional processes4 that were described by Oliver (1991a)
occur simultaneously in a firm, at least at discursive level and during times of
organisational and institutional change. In the present case, of these four strategies
especially acquiescence (obeying rules and accepting norms) and avoidance (“buffering”;
loosening institutional attachments) seem to be competing reaction schemes. This can be
called the phenomenon of ‘countervailing myths’. On one hand, actors gain legitimacy by
referring to the ‘positive’ myth of alliancing being good for the shareholders, and of
alliancing as improving the competitive advantage of their firm.On the other hand, the
very same actors gain legitimacy in fi-ont of another (e.g. internal) constituency by
~~

The four responses are: Acquiesce, Compromise, Avoid, Defy, Manipulate (Oliver, 1991a)
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referring to the myth of ‘independence’ with which the airline buffers itself from the
alliance. In short, countervailing myths exist because of loose coupling; actors need to be
seen serving (or gaining legitimacy in front of) different constituencies with sometimes
opposing agendas. The “Partisan” and “Independence” themes can be seen as
countervailing forces to the establishment of alliance membership and of the alliance
itself as a strong institution’. This is in line with Bartunek (1984), who found that
changes of interpretative schemes occur in a “dialectic” manner in that there is interaction
between old and new ways of interpreting. Johnson et a1 (2001) call this “competing
institutional templates”. The dialectic concept is indeed useful because it assumes a
process, rather than a static perspective on institutions6. In addition, examining the
dialectic aspect of organisational processes is helpful in investigating an organisational
phenomenon where two somewhat antagonistic social structures (in this case, the
individual airline and the alliance group) both claim allegiance.

In concrete terms, the airline managers’ allegiance is still very much with their own firm.
While the need to form alliances is recognised, and no longer questioned as such, the
“own airline’’ is a very strong institution, and there is a tendency to buffer one’s firm
from overly great influence of the alliance itself, or any partner. While to the outside
world, alliance membership is praised and has a certain legitimacy- giving function
(especially if membership to an alliance group can be considered a “seal of quality” for
an airline), internally, the onus is still very much on preserving one’s firm autonomy as
far as possible. It is to their own, independent airline that managers’ allegiance is
directed. An uncertain alliancing environment is unlikely to change this, but it is
precisely this unwillingness to think in “alliance terms” that creates the instability of the
groups.

Part Three: Combining the two perspectives- the dynamics of multilateral alliancing

This final part will combine the two previously sketched perspectives on alliancing and
describe a framework of the dynamics of multilateral alliancing. This framework takes
i.e., an institution that is an integral part of actor’s mindsets, in contrast to a ‘weak institution, which would only
require lip service, or legitimacy- enhancing behaviour.For a classification of institutions, see Kleymann (2002).
This concept also implies that institutionalisation is not seen as a dichotomous variable but rather that there are
different institutionswhich represent continua (degrees of institutionalisation)and which co- exist and compete for the
allegiance of an actor.
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into account the interaction between behavioural and resource interdependence- related
factors which determine the evolution of multilateral alliances.
The study described in this paper has examined the emerging phenomenon of multilateral
alliances from two complementary angles, namely the resource dependence perspective,
and institutional theory. By taking into account both resource interdependencies and
individual 'sensemaking' and 'sensegiving' as reflected by the discourse of airline
executives involved in alliancing, it was possible to identify an apparently contradictory
requirement for alliancing fiom the firm's point of view: The airline must ally (due to
resource interdependencies), but due to the continued instability of the task environment,
it must also seek to preserve its standalone capability. It must specialise and exploit its

own niche as much as possibie to increase eEciency and io make 0th h i z s speeifiza!!j.
dependent on it. At the same time, it must strive to avoid any specific dependencies itself.
In brief, the task environment of the alliance can still be considered to be relatively
unstable, mainly due to the following dimensions of uncertainty in multilateral alliance
coordination:
0

"Multilateralism": Cooperation between two partners may influence relations with
a third, or the group as a whole.

0

Indeterminacy: The organisation invents itself, on the basis of the local
rationalities of actors who owe allegiance to their firm, but not to any
superstructure.

0

Strong perceived ambiguity: This is related to the previous point. There is no
blueprint of what the alliance group should look like.

0

Resource interdependencies are more difficult to manage due to strong partner
heterogeneity - there are significant power asymmetries and a large diversity as to
resources and policy goals: Some want to dominate the alliance, others seek
membership as a shelter.

The dimensions of uncertainty listed above can be assumed to influence the degree of
integration into an alliance (a superstructure) of individual airlines and thus in the
aggregate, the stability of the alliancing task environment. The following figure to
schematically depict the dynamics of multilateral alliancing:
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3 indicates a negative causal link between two variables

Figure 1: The dynamics of multilateral alliancing as a function of resource
interdependencies and institution - building

The primary assumption is that the stability of the firm's task environment (i.e. the
alliance group, or at least alliancing in case of an airline opting for a portfolio of
bilaterals approach) is influenced by both exogenous and endogenous factors. Exogenous
factors stem fiom the wider environment and include the industry regulation, economic
cycles, prices for fuel and aircraft, etc. The endogenous factors refer to those which are
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residing within the task environment itself, both at firm(for example, the degree of a
firm’s specialisation) and alliance group (for example, interdependencies between firms)
levels. In an uncertain and unstable task environment, firms are pushed toward a
generalist position, in order to be fit across a wider range of environmental variations (in
other words, the environmental stability is positively related to the degree of
specialisation). On the other hand, the instability of the environment paired with industry
characteristics (very capital intensive and at the same time very low margin) establishes
an imperative on firms to be highly efficient (environmental stability is negatively linked
to the need for efficiency). This, in turn,favours specialisation.

Thus, the first ambiguity of airline alliances is that the instability of the environment
both favours and obstructs specidisation. Specidisation is, however, io soiiie extent
unavoidable -it can be said that in an industry where scope benefits are a significant
determinant of competitiveness, every firmis to some extent a specialist. As proposed by
Hannan and Freeman (1977), specialist organisations in an unstable environment tend to
federate with each other. This specialisation in a network of actors can be said to increase
interdependencies between them. Provided- and this is one of the basic assumptions of
the study- that the firm’s primary aim is survival and the preservation of its identity, one
major reaction at individual actor level to the perception of interdependencies is a
reinforcement of myths relating to

‘independence’ and ‘avoidance’ of these

dependencies. This is because allegiance to one’s own firmis a strong, and high-code
institution. The reaction at firm level is to protect the firm’s core resources. This
protection of core resources is tightly related to the

establishment of a standalone

capability, which in turn somewhat reduces the possible degree of specialisation. At the
same time, the protection of core resources also reinforces (and is reinforced by) the
individual actor’s allegiance to the airline’s self- identity. In other words, they tend to
thnk more in favour of their own firm, rather than the alliance. And this, in return,
sanctions core-resource protecting behaviour even more. This loop can be considered a
case of fortress building where institutional forces and resource protection efforts jointly
act to protect the firm from dependencies. Fortress building in itself is caused by
interdependencies; but it is countervailing to them because it aims at reducing the degree
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of integration between organisations. The degree of integration between partners, in turn,
can be expected to significantly influence the stability of the task environment.
The above model depicts the interaction and recurrence of processes that shape the
phenomenon of multilateral alliancing. It illustrates the power play between the two main
forces which determine alliancing: ‘Fortress building’ and ‘Environmental Instability’
and it allows for- and combines- both the behavioural and structural aspects of the
alliancing process. What this rather schematic model does not depict is the distinction
between specific and unspecific dependencies, in other words, what facilitates or
precludes the retention of standalone capability of a firm,and possibly constitutes a
source of power over other firms. Interdependencies can create risk or reduce risk in a
focal airline’s immediate task environment. As explained in part one, they create risk in
case of specific dependencies from one airline’s side on a partner or on an alliance. They
can reduce risk if every other partner also has a specific dependency on that alliance.

This, however, requires the existence of a superstructure at federation level, to which all
partners agreed to submit, and to which they are all equally bound. The dilemma here is
that in the present case of alliancing in the airline industry, the budding of the
superstructure has still not attained the level of a strong (and enforced, or at least
legitimately sponsored) institutionalised norm. This then constitutes the second

ambiguity of alliancing: Partners will all benefit from a stable and predictable task
environment, but each of them is reluctant to contribute to the building of such an
environment. The root of the problem seems to be that local rationales (and -allegiances)
still override any meta- rationale, and there is no hierarchically superior ‘authority’ in
place to impose these meta- rationales, nor is there any “issue sponsor” (Dutton, 1993)
who could legitimately create such an ‘authority’.
It is primarily due to airline managers’ “local allegiances” that at least the medium- term
future, alliance groups between airlines can indeed be considered to be constantly renegotiated environments, and, therefore, somewhat unstable. This means that few, if any,
airlines will be able to reap the full benefits from specialisation within a group, because
they will still need to retain some standalone capability in order to ensure survival in case
the alliance group they belong to collapses, or changes shape. The implication for airline
management is twofold: First, excessive reliance on the future of one’s alliance group
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could prove dangerous, but wise management of interdependencies with partners can
provide a carrier with a reasonably stable operating environment for at least the shorter
term. A cautiously positive approach to alliance group membership appears to be
appropriate. Second, a stable operating environment means, to some larger carriers at
least, influence over smaller competitors through alliancing. This has, for example,
clearly been Lufthansa’s strategy over the past years -tying SAS, Austrian Airlines,
Eurowings and LOT into tight cooperation. To a smaller airline, alliance membership
could then well “clip their wings”, reducing them to feeder status (a fear that was openly
expressed by a senior SAS executive), and in an extreme case jeopardising their
standalone capability. This “gravity pull” of larger carriers will persist, and be a
continuing influence in alliancebuilding. Smaiier carriers must seek to avoid specific
dependencies, and “protect” their core resources so as to retain standalone capability. One
way to achieve this might be by joining an alliance group that is less tightly integrated,
even though this might mean a less stable immediate operating environment. For these
airlines, stabilisation could well be achieved by cooperating with “peers”, partners of
equal size, that cover a complementary geographical network.
The scheme of alliancing dynamics described in this paper does not allow any concrete
prediction of where alliancing will go. But an understanding of the factors which cause
the dynamics (or instability) of multilateral alliances might well help the individual firm
to position itself adequately for such an environment. What can be suggested fiom the
study that was briefly described in the present paper, is that an individual airline’s wellbeing in a “federated environment” will depend on (a) its resource configuration (i.e.
especially route network and hubs), and, related to this, (b) its ability to negotiate
interdependencies with other carriers. Cognitive processes and managerial sensemaking
and sense- giving have been found to be of as much importance to the shaping of
alliancing as resource constraints, and future studies could study the dynamics of alliance
groups as self- organising structures further, by adding a complex systems perspective.
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Abstract

Some countries have recently leviewed how they regulate the pricing of aeronautical services (landing
charges, aircraft parking charges, terminal facility charges etc.) at their principal airports. One major
issue that has emerged from each of these reviews is whether it is preferable to adopt a single-till or
duaLtill approach to pricing aeronautical services. In this paper the arguments for or against each
approach are discussed within the context of reasonableness, implementation, the effects on economic
efficiency and the influence of other policy considerations. The paper also finds that the criteria by
regulators used to decide between different approaches have often been influenced by a range of non
economic factors. The paper suggests a number of alternative approaches to adopting pure duaLtill and
single-till models such as, asset re- valuation, redeking the scope of reguiaied acnviiies, appiyimg
d d t i l l to new investments only, adjusting the allocation of common costs between tills and allowing
airport users to secure a financial stake in the airport. Furthermore, it is also recommended that in
order to reduce uncertainty, the regulatory approach should be specified in the relevant legislation.
Keywords: airport pricing approach; single-till; dual-till; economic regulation

1. Introduction

Airport services consist of the provision of facilities for aircraft landing, taxiing and parking and for
processing passengers as well as retailing, car parking and other commercial functions. These services
are broadly categrised into aeronautical and non-aeronautical (or commercial) (Doganis and Nuutinen,
1983, p. 77). The revenues from aeronautical services (i.e. aeronautical charges) mainly encompass
aircraft landing, parking and passenger charges, while revenues from all other sources are classed as
non-aeronautical. Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom recently reviewed their
approaches to regulating aeronautical charges. The respective regulatory authorities in these countries
have had to address tk issue of whether it is preferable to adopt a single-till or dual-till approach to
detennining the maximum level of aeronautical charges. The main difference between the two
approaches is whether or not they incorporate nonaeronautical profits in calculating the required level
of aeronautical charges. If non-aeronautical profits are taken into account and used to subsidise
aeronautical services, aeronautical charges can be set lower than that receiving no subsidisation from
non-aeronauticaloperation.
For those airports without congestion problems (i.e. demand exceeding supply), adopting a single-till
pricing, which allows for nonaeronautical revenues to subsidise lower aeronautical charges, seems
intuitively reasonable. Over the past two decades, however, a growing number of airports have become
congested. The arguments for maintaining the single-till approach become less clear as demand is
being artificially stimulated over the capacity the airport can accommodate. In order to achieve an
efficient allocation of scarce resources, aeronautical charges should progress toward the marketclearing level to establish equilibrium in the demand and supply of slots. There is also a problem of
establishing a pricing system that incentivises the airport to expand aeronautical capacity (runway,
passenger terminal) when demand approaches or exceeds supply. The single-till principle, which
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incurs financial losses on the provision of aeronautical services, cannot provide the necessary incentive
to increase capital expenditure. With the spread of corporatisation and privatisation and the ensuring
effects on management strategic priorities and goals, airport operators are increasingly demanding the
adoption of the duaktill approach, which would allow for aeronautical charges to recover the costs of
providing aeronautical services. DuaLtill pricing would also allow the airport operator to retain the
profits generated from nonaeronautical services, rather than using them to subsidise lower aeronautical
charges. Airlines, on the other hand, are concerned about the implications of moving toward duaktill
pricing and argue that since they carry passengers who potentially contribute to the airport’s non
aeronautical revenue, they should benefit from this by enjoying bwer aeronautical charges
The single-till and d d t i l l approaches are usually manifested in a price-cap form of economic
regulation. This model exists in, for example, Austria, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom. As
more efforts have been put on consulting the airport operator and users while reviewing price caps and
regulatory regimes, disputes on the choosing between the two approaches have become acute (ACCC,
2001a; ACCC, 2001b; CAA, 2002a; CCUK, 2002). This paper aims to explore these disputes and
provide some insights into the selection of regulatory approach. In the following sections, economic
characteristics of the two pricing approaches are introduced in Section 2. Debates on the single till
versus the dual till are discussed in Section 3. The determining criteria considered by regulators are
inferred in Section 4. Recognising that there are deficiencies in both approaches, Section 5 considers
five alternatives. Section 6 depicts future prospect, and concluding remarks are finally given in Section
7.
2. Economic characteristics of the singletill and duaktill approaches
An important feature of ‘the airport’s operation is the demand complementarity between aeronautical
and non-aeronautical services. Demand for nonaeronautical services (thereinafter nonaeronautical
demand) mainly comes from passengers carried by airlines that generate demand for aeronautical
services (thereinafter aeronautical demand). An increase in the quantity consumed for aeronautical
services will raise the level of non-aeronautical demand (Starkie, 2001). In other words, the quantity of
aeronautical services consumed would largely determine the level of nonaeronautical demand. In
pursuing non-aeronautical profits, airports have incentives to adopt such a pricing policy that creates
and attracts the most airlines using the airport and bringing the most passengers to purchase non
aeronautical goods or services. If any decreases in aeronautical revenue incurred from lower
aeronautical charges can be outweighed by increases in non-aeronautical profits, airports will have an
incentive to adopt a pricing approach that can attract additional traffic and subsequently improve their
overall returns by substituting aeronautical revenue for nonaeronautical revenue. Demand
complementarity between aeronautical and nonaeronautical activities indeed has a considerable impact
on both the airport’s pricing and capacity expansion decisions.

Historically, aeronautical revenue was the primary source of the airport’s income. However, over the
past decade, nonaeronautical revenue has grown dramatically both in proportion and in magnitude.
This is partly because airports (particularly those privatised or corporatised) have incentives to earn
more from nonaeronautical services that are formally outside the scope of economic regulation.
The largest number of airlines using the airport dose not represent that these airlines will bring the most passengers to the
airport, and nor the most passengers using the airport can guarantee that these passengers will spend the most on nonaeronautical services and incur the most non-aeronautical profits to the airport. Actually, there are two factors influencing
the level of non-aeronautical profits: (i) the average number of passengers per aircraft movement, which i l l decide the
total passenger throughput of the airport, and (ii) the number of high-spending passengers, which will finally be reflected
in their consumption of, and the airport’s revenue from,nonaeronautical services.
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Behnke (2000, p. 14) points out that the proportion of nonaeronautical revenue to total revenue for
more than 1,400 airports had grown from about 30% in the late 1980s to over 50% in 1998. ?his
implies that increased non-aeronautical revenues and profits could enable airports to reduce
aeronautical charges and further attract more traffic. Those airlines that are price sensitive to
aeronautical charges ( e g low-cost carriers) may thus be encouraged to use aeronautical services more.
Demand complementarity and the growing significance of nonaeronautical business have given the
background of the single-till approach. Generally speaking, the single till takes not only aeronautical
but also mnaeronautical revenues and costs into consideration to determine aeronautical charges. The
conesponding regulatory asset base (RAB) comprises all airport assets, regardless of their functions or
characteristics. There will be cross-subsidisation of non-aeronautical profits to offset the deficits of
aeronautical services in which lower caps on aeronautical charges are resulted due to the expectation by
regulators of nonaeronautical profits. Incentives for the airport to optimise nonaeronautical profits are
hence lessened. Conversely, the d d t i l l approach separates aeronautical functions from non
aeronautical ones. It determines the level of aeronautical charges by considering aeronautical revenue
and cost oniy, and therefore the corresponding RAE hiicliides iiei6iiiiautid assets d y . %e:e wi!! net
be any cross-subsidisation of nonaeronautical profits to offset aeronautical costs. In other words,
aeronautical charges set by the dual till are probably higher than that determined by the single till.
Economic rents will be transferred from airlines to the airport if switching from a single till to a dual
till, and the ahport will enjoy higher overall returns. Fig. 1 depicts the major difference between the
two approaches.
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Fig. 1 Primary differences between the single-till and duaktill approaches

Pricing approaches play a crucial part in relation to dynamic efficiency, such as providing signals for
capacity expansion. However, cross-subsidisation between two sets of services, as occurred when
adopting a singlatill approach, could blur investment signals for ad confuse decisioBmaking on
developing each set of services. Also, recent studies (Starkie, 1999; Starkie and Yarrow, 2000; Starkie
2001; Reynolds-Feighan and Feighan, 1997; CAA, 2000; PC, 2002) suggest that the single till has
resulted in allocative inefficiencies for capacity constrained airports, because increased non
aeronautical revenue keep aeronautical charges at a low levef and hence excess demand is artificially
stimulated. Under current situations where the commonly used ‘grandfather’ rule and the bilateral
negotiation might not satisfy the requirement of optimising usage of scarce resources, aeronautical
charges are thus advocated being set at such levels that enable scarce capacity to be efficiently
allocated and used. These arguments contribute to the suggestions for reforming the regulatory
approach.
3. Debate on the single-till versus dual-till approach

Recently the UK Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) decided new caps on aeronautical charges for four
largest airports for the next five years from April 2003. In New Zealand, the Commerce Commission
(CCNZ, 2002) has recommended price controls to be applied at Auckland Airport. The Australian
government has, since July 2002, removed direct price regulation from major airports, replacing it by
indirect price monitoring for five years. The issue of opting for a single-till or dual-till approach has
been intensely discussed in the above reviews. Anports generally favour the duaLtill regime, while
airlines argue for the single-till principle. The advantages and disadvantages of each approach have
been raised in ACCC (2001b), CAA (2000), CCUK (2002), CfAR (2001), NECG (2000), Starkie (1999;
2001), Starkie and Yarrow (2000), and Lu and Pagliari (2003). These arguments are classified into
four categories as follows.
3.1 Justice and reasonableness arguments

The single-till approach is generally defended on the basis of demand complementarity. In the non
aeronautical context, for example, airlines lease offices from the airport while passengers purchase
products from retail outlets. One group of users of nonaeronautical services may contribute more to
non-aeronautical revenue than another. According to Graham (2001), leisure travellers on long-haul
international services spend more on nonaeronautical services than business travellers on short-haul
journeys. There is, therefore, a persuasive argument for extending the benefits of lower aeronautical
charges (under the single till) to those airlines that carried passengers who contributed most to non
aeronautical revenue. In other words, if the airport earns more nonaeronautical profits from long-haul
passengers, then a larger proportion of these profits should be used to lower aeronautical charges for
long-haul flights, rather than current ituations where every flight enjoys similar benefits of lower
charges. This proposition would encourage long-haul (international) flights or larger aircraft that
2

For example, if aeronautical assets (runway(s), aprons, piers and aerobridges) at London BAA Airports were to earn an
8.6% real rate of return in 2000/01, the level of aeronautical charges would require rising by almost 20% (CCUK, 2002,
para. 2.62).
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usually carry more passengers who may spend more on non-aeronautical goods or services, while
short-haul (domestic) flights and smaller aircraft would be discouraged. The utilisation of capacity
may be improved subsequently,but contradictions to national regulations and international conventions
may also arise. For example, ICAO (2001) has advked airports adopting the principles of costrelatedness, transparency and non-discrimination in setting aeronautical charges. Such a pricing
method that directly links contributions to nonaeronautical revenue with the payment of aeronautical
charges would probably breach cost-related and nodiscriminatory principles.
The conventional argument, often asserted by airlines, is that airlines should be entitled to lower
aeronautical charges because they carry passengers who contribute to non-aeronautical sales.
According to PC (2002), this assertion can be challenged on the basis that successful exploitation of
non-aeronautical activities is not entirely due to the contribution of passengers, but more importantly, is
mainly as a result of the airport’s efforts in planning and developing non-aeronautical business.
Neither airlines nor passengers have shared in any risks of or the responsibilities for operating non
aeronautical services, and therefore should not have any intrinsic rights over non-aeronautical profits
(CAA, 2001, p. m).instead, other entities, inciuding concessionaires who develop z ~ pioiiioie
d
the
creation of such profits, have more rights to share in non-aeronautical profits through perhaps
accommodatingrentals or concession fees.
If demand complementarity is the reason argued for the single till, whether or not the airport should
share these profits with airlines will be addressed adequately by the market itself (PC, 2002, p. 376). In
addition, airports have incentives to encourage additional traffic and passengers (either by lowering
prices or through another means) in order to increases their non-aeronautical (and overall) profits to the
extent such complementarities exist. They are at superior positions to decide whether or not to crosssubsidise and who should be the beneficiaries of such cross-subsidisation. It may, therefore, not appear
necessary to regulate the airport by the single-till principle to ensure that airports engage in such
behaviour.
3.2 Implementation arguments

The implementation of either approach involves a number challenges for the regulator. These include
the difficulties, the additional costs and the risks of regulatory failure in applying either approach.
These implementing issues are closely related to the regulatory scope. The regulatory scope of the dual
till is intuitively smaller than that of the single till, but the burden of implementing the dual till would
not necessarily lessen due to the problem inherent in allocating common costs between aeronautical
(regulated) and non-aeronautical (unregulated) services (CAA, 2000; CCUK, 2002; NECG, 2000). For
example, air conditioning and seating areas within the terminal are often used for both aeronautical and
non-aeronautical purposes. In separating this sort of common costs, a degree of arbitrary judgement
would be inevitable. The single till, similarly, is associated with a level of administrative burden that
the regulator is required to have knowledge and possess forecasts on the non-aeronautical business.
The risk of regulatory failure is as a consequence of the level of information asymmetry existing
between the airport and the regulator. Since the regulator is dependant on the airport operator for
information, it is difficult to extract all the required information, particularly in the area of non
aeronautical activities. The likelihood of the regulatory failure is greater under a single till than under a
dual till, because more detailed information about non- aeronautical operation is required under a single
till. To a lesser extent, a!!ocating COIIL?OI? costs (or revenues) also requires information on the non
aeronautical business. Therefore, the dual till also involves risks of regulatory errors.
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There is no pragmatic studies on analysing the monetary costs that the regulator, the airport operator
and airport users need to spend on investigating, providing information, forecasting, preparing
documents etc. In the long term, no significant difference in the implementing costs between the two
approaches will be resulted, because the tool and experience of forecasting nonaeronautical business
will become mature and the guidelines of allocating common costs will be established. The
implementation arguments might have influence on selecting the regulatory approach in the short term
but would not be the main consideration from a longterm perspective.
3.3 Economic eficiency eflect arguments

The major difference in the outcome between both approaches is that the level of aeronautical charges
be varied. Roughly speaking, a switch from a single till to a dual till would result in a @/p1)x100% increase in aeronautical charges, where p is the ratio of aeronautical revenue to total revenue
and q is the proportion of aeronautical cost to total cost of the airport under a single till (see Appendix
for derivations). The larger the value of q/p (or the larger difference between q and p ) , the higher the
aeronautical charges under a dual till (than under a single till) and the larger the impact on economic
efficiency effects. If the level of aeronautical charges decided by a dual till does not depart
substantially fiom that set by a single till, there will be little intellectual mileage in debating which
approach is superior. As nonaeronautical Evenue grows substantially, q/p will become larger. The
required increases in aeronautical charges under a dual till as opposed to a single till therefore become
considerable.
will

There are difficulties associated with deriving practical estimates of the implications of adopting each
approach on allocative, dynamic and productive efficiencies. There are several reasons for this. First,
price-cap regulation in which both approaches are built, cannot simultaneously achieve all forms of
efficiencies because there are often trade-offs between these efficiencies. Second, both approaches
determine price caps on aeronautical charges with reference to the airport’s cost plus a target rate of
return. This is akin to cost-based regulation. Adopting either approach may lead to cost-padding or
AverchJohnson effects (PC, 2002, p. 282).3 Thirdly, in specifying an optimal plan for investment, in
estimating demand elasticities associated with the use of aeronautical services and in determining an
efficient level of airport costs, there is a requirement for a sufficient level of quantitative information,
but it is difficult to acquire in practice. Lu and Pagliari (2003) argue that the dual-till approach causes
less distortion than the single-till approach in dynamic efficiency, because the dual till can bring more
perceived benefits to airports and therefore incentivise those airports with severe excess demand to
invest new capacity earlier. Their model shows that the dual till is preferable in respect of allocative
efficiency where demand is approaching or over capacity, while the single till is desirable where excess
capacity exists. CAA (2000, para. 3.40) has similar arguments but emphasise various empirical
questions that need to be resolved to reach a firm concksion. The effect of both approaches on
economic efficiency is also dependent on other factors, such as planning permission for capacity
expansion and environmental or space constraints. It is, therefore, difficult to precisely evaluate the
magnitude of each approach’s impact on economic efficiency.
In theory, a duaLtill approach potentially generates better economic efficiency outcomes for congested
airports, while a single till performs better at uncongested airports. In practice, however, due to the
inability to derive a quantitative approximation of economic efficiency, debate on the effect of the
single till versus the dual till on economic efficiencyis unlikely to reach a definitive conclusion.
The single till that use non-aeronautical profit to lower aeronautical charges could weaken the airport’s incentive to
minimise non-aeronautical cost, as opposed to the dual till that the benefits of saving non-aeronautical cost could be
retained by the airport itself.
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3.4 Policy considerations arguments

The decision on which pricing regime to adopt can also be influenced by broader political factors. First,
the regulator may consider encouraging additional traffic and stimulating local and national economy
by keeping aeronautical charges at lower levels. A single till thus becomes its preference. Besides,
setting charges at a low level can mitigate airport users’ burden, encourage competition between
airlines and further reduce airfare^,^ and result in politically preferable levels of return being earned by
the regulated airport. Second, the government may decide to adopt a particular regulatory approach
prior to privatisation of the airport in order to maximise sale proceeds. The Australian government’s
decision on moving to the dual till for Sydney Purport was regarded as one case (CCUK, 2002, para.
2.72). Thirdly, the distributional effect has played a critical part. If airlines pass increased charges (as
a result of adopting the dual till) onto passengers, passengers might have to bear higher airfares, and
thus rents would be transferred from passengers via airlines to the airport shareholders. These rent
transfers may not be socially or politically acceptable. Finally, price-cap regulation (implying one
specific approach adopted) may - h i t competition between akpurz. 0% exzx~qjkis ?*laiichester
Airport in the UK where is currently under price-cap regulation, while its competitors (Liverpool and
LeedsBradford Airports) are not. CAA (2003b, para. 2.6) states that ‘the case for moving to a dual till
in future would be substantially stronger ... if it became clear that increasing competition in practice to
Manchester seemed more likely to best achieve the CAA’s statutory objectives than tightly binding
price cap regulation’. This illustrates that the adoption of one specific approach may base on the
consideration of encouragingcompetition between airports.
4. Determining criteria adopted by regulators to decide the regulatory approach

The single-till approach is still widely applied across the world, although some countries have adopted
the other approach. For example, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC,
2001b) in 2001 accepted Sydney Airport’s proposal to adopt a duaLtill approach. The UK CAA
(2002b) has ever recommended a dual-till approach to the Competition Commission (CCUK). In the
US, a study in 1998 revealed that the dual till was applied by 41% of the US large airports (Graham,
2001, p. 119). The Hamburg Airport is also regulated on the basis of the duak till principle.
In formulating their final determinations on which model to adopt, recent experience indicates that
regulators have tended to incorporate a wider range of non-economic considerations rather than basing
their judgements on a rational appraisal of the advantages or disadvantages of single-till apd dual-till
approaches. Some of these noneconomic factors are discussed in the following sub -sections
4.I Regulator conservatism

The UK C U (2003a, para. 1.6) states that its statutory objectives are to promote economic efficiency
and users interest and to impose minimum restrictions on regulated airports, as well as to take into
account international obligations. The fact that the CAA (2002a, para. 17.5-17.7) recommended a

However, Starkie (1998, p. 112) argues that the fact that landing charges at congested airports are less than the marketclearing price (and sometimes the cost of supply) does not mean that air travellers necessarily enjoy cheaper airfares.
Instead, airlines usually tend to charge what the market will bear and earn excess profits. The economic rent is hence
transferred from the airport to airlines.
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revised regulatoly cost base’ to replace the single till generally reflects the dual till’s potential
superiority in economic efficiency and the CAA’sintention to fulfil its statutory objectives. However,
CCUK (2002) in providing advice to the CAA, concludes: (i) no evidence shows that the dual till
would perform significantly better than the single till in terms of dynamic efficiency or in the timing
and level of capital investment; (ii) improvements in allocative efficiency as a result of adopting the
dual till are limited; (iii) the benefits of applying the dual till are offset by increases in average airfares;
and (iv) a substantial transfer of income from airlines (andor passengers) to airports can potentially
undermine regulatory credibility and create regulatory uncertainty. Following an extensive
consultation process, the CAA (2002b, para. 2.3-2.7) finally decided to abandon its original
recommendation of the dual till and retained the single till by excusing that it lacked the necessary
support for change from the CCUK and airport users. Nonetheless, the CAA stated that it ‘considers
that while the case for moving to a dual till approach is not sufficiently strong at present ..., it should
not rule out for the future should the balance of arguments and evidence change.’ This is an indication
of conservatism on the part of the regulator in that the main reason for retaining the single-till was not
based on the merits of the regulatory approach itself, but that it could not present strong quantitative
evidence to prove that a dual-till approach is preferable to a single-till. It also implies that the regulator
would prefer maintaining a single till rather than making changes that might arise opponents’
arguments and cause risks of regulatory failure.
4.2 Tendency in culture of economic regulation to minimise increases in charges andprojts earned by
regulated airports

As argued in Section 3.3, if moving from a single till to a dual till, the level of aeronautical charges
would probably rise (q/p - 1)x100% This shows that the magnitude of such an increase depends on
the cost and revenue structure of the airport. For example, according to the UK CAA’sseparation rule
of aeronautical and nonaeronautical .assets, in 2000/01 Heathrow Purport earned a 7.3% return on
aeronautical assets (and 11.6% on norraeronautical assets) with a 9.5% return on total assets (CCUK,
2002, Table 2.5). If a dual till was adopted, assuming aeronautical activities should earn a 9.5% return
@.e.Heathrow’s actual overall return), the aeronautical revenue requires an increase of less than 7.6%
and the overall return across all airport activities would rise less than 1.1%. If the allowable return on
aeronautical assets were 8.6% (i.e. BAA London Purports’ overall return), aeronautical charges would
only need to increase less than 4.5% and the overall return would rise only 0.6%. The effect of such a
7.6% (or 4.5%) increase in aeronautical charges on airfares is up to f0.40 only, even thought all
increases in charges are passed by airlines onto passengers. Therefore, the CCUK’sargument that a
duaktill approach would raise airfares is indeed correct, but its effect, at least for Heathrow Purport, is
unlikely to be significant. The CCUK’sposition may in fact be based on a culture prevalent within
economic regulatory institutions in the UK, which has tended to focus on minimising increases in
regulated charges and by implication in the level of returns. For example, the Monopolies and Mergers
Commission (replaced by the CCCX in April 1999) stated in the 1996 BAA review that ‘to abandon
the single-till approach and to base charges on costs of supplying airport facilitieswould allow BAA to
make very large profits on its commercial activities, since we do not have the power to introduce any
windfall tax on such profits’ (CAA,2000, para. 2.24). If a higher-thaBacceptance (overall) return
(which is likely to be induced by a dual till) is really the concern, the regulator may impose a lower
permissible return on regulated services, a more rigorous requirement of service quality and/or
additional obligations on capacity expansion in order to drive the excess returns away. However, the
final decision revealed that the UK regulators chose to maintain the single till.
5

That is, a dual till with a widened regulatory scope as opposed to a ‘pure’ dual till that includes aeronautical services only,
or alternatively it can be deemed as a single till with a narrowed regulatory scope as opposed to a ‘pure’ single till that
encompassesall airport services.
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4.3 Other motivations

In privatising airports, the national government, as shareholder and regulator, may consider adopting a
dual-till regime prior to the sale in order to optimise proceeds. For example, in 2000 Sydney Airport

proposed to move towards a dual-till system that entailed a 130% increase m aeronautical charges. The
ACCC (2001b) in its adjudication in May 2001 agreed a 97% increase (partly because of the adoption
of a dual till) for Sydney. No doubt, such an allowable increase in charges, doubled with the removal
of direct regulation in July 2002, has resulted in a higher sales proceeds. The Australian government
received A$5.6 billion for Sydney Anport compared to the A$4-A$5 billion analysts had predicted.6
The CCUK (2002, para. 2.72-2.73) observes that the cases for applying the dual till in Australia and
Europe are partly because of providing assistance to privatisation (or in tum, maximising the sales
proceeds of privatisation). However, these motivations for adopting dual-till regulation needs not
always apply. In the United States, for example, adoption of the dual-till regime (compensatory
method) is due to the unique operational circumstances of airports where airlines often either own or
lease passenger terminais. Under these circunis’mces, aiibes aie thc rccii;ient: sf nc,?-aerc~~utica!
revenue and hence airports, in order to break even financially, must recover aeronautical cost from
aeronautical charges.
The use by airlines of considerable lobbying muscle by powerfid airline industry organisations such as
IATA’ can also have the effect of exerting considerable pressure on regulators. Extensive consultation
periods also provide opportunities for airlines to present their opinions and lobby for a favourable
outcome.* These are the factors sometimes affecting regulators.
5. Alternative approaches to the full application of the duaktill and single-till approaches

Recognising the deficiencies of the single-till approach @articularly for congested airports), some
economists have advocated reforming the regulatory approach (CAA, 2002a; Starkie and Yarrow,
2000). However, the main obstacle to switch the regulatory approach from the single till to the full
application of the dual till (i.e. costs of all aeronautical services are required to be recovered by
aeronautical charges at once) is the probable high increases in aeronautical charges and the subsequent
opposition from users. In order to earn political and user acceptance, five alternatives to the full
application of the dual till and single till have been considered. Table 1 briefly compares their features.
Table 1
The features of five alternatives compared to the full application of the dual-till approach
Alternatives

Re-valuating
aeronautical
assets

Redefining
Applying the dual Adjusting the
regulated services till to new
allocation of
investments only common costs

Allowing users to
secure a stake in
the airport

Under the single-till
or dual-till approach

Dual

Dual

Single

Dual

See note

Less

More

More

Same

Same

Value of regulatory
asset base (RAB)

Air Transport Intelligence (ATI) news, ‘Australia sells Sydney Airport for AS5.58 billion,’ 25 June 2002.
?

For exampie, IATA has several times preserrted theii opposition to the dua! till in the cases of reviewing Sydney Airport’s
aeronautical charges and BAA London Airports’ price caps.
For example, airlines at least had four oppoxtunities to present their views in regard to the regulatory approach in the last
review of price caps on BAA London and Manchester Airports.
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Required aeronautical
revenue to recover
Less
aeronautical cost

Less

Less

Less

Same

Level of aeronautical
charges

Lower

Lower

Lower

Same

Lower

Note: If non-aeronautical services were separated from the airport and operated by an independent company, the airport
would no longer operate nonaeronautical services and then the selection between the single till and dual till would
not be an critical issue.

5.1 Re-valuating the airport’s aeronautical assets toward their market values

The market value of an asset is often at variance from its book (accounting) value. As aeronautical
activities are usually less profitable or even loss-making, the market value of these assets is lower than
the book value. Hence, a discount on the book value of aeronautical assets can be imposed.
Aeronautical assets are therefore valued on the basis of their profitability rather than historical costs.
As their book value has been discounted (i.e. value of RAB has been reduced), the required
aeronautical revenue to recover aeronautical cost of capital, if the dual till is adopted, is less than that if
the book value had been used. Devaluating RAB may be more acceptable to users as this can lead to a
lower increase in charges. However, the CCUK (2002, para. 2.201) argues that the effect of this
approach to deriving a lower dual-till price is broadly to replicate the pattern of charges of the single till.
5.2 Re-defining the scope of regulated services

The conventional approach to airport regulation involves defining the scope bf those activities to be
regulated to include aeronautical charges. If one of the objectives of regulation is to prevent the abuse
of market power by the airport, then it therefore seems more appropriate that economic regulation
should extend or encompass those activities in which it is able to exercise market power.
The UK CAA (2002a, AnnelcRRCB allocations) defines those activities associated with airport
market power as being necessary for the operation of airline but unable to be economically supplied,
produced at another airport or outside the airport perimeter. The UK CAA definition extends the scope
of regulation beyond the traditionally defined aeronautical assets to encompass check-in desks, aircraft
refuelling facilities, aircraft maintenance facilities and access for providing catering services. These so
called ‘nonaeronautical monopolistic-bottleneck’ services are usually more profitable than
aeronautical activities.
If the dual till is adopted (and non-aeronautical monopolistic-bottleneck are included with aeronautical
services in the same till), profits generated by nonaeronautical monopolistic-bottleneck services may
offset potentially high increases in aeronautical charges that would have occurred if the conventional
definition of the scope of xegulated services had been adopted. For example, in Australia, the ACCC
(2001a) recommended that the scope of regulated services should be extended so that around A$20
million of annual car-parking and other aeronautical-related revenue would be transferred to reduce
‘stand-alone’, cost-based, aeronautical charges (PC, 2002, p. 374).9
5.3 Applying the dual-till approach to new investments only

9

However, in April 2001, the Australian government directed the ACCC (2001b) to implement a ‘pure’ dual till (Le. only
fundamental aeronautical services were taken into account, without consideration of aeronautical-related services) at
Sydney Airport (Direction No.22).
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Applying the dual till to new capacity investments can better incentivise regulated airports to expand
capacity because the airport at least can fully recover its costs of new capacity from aeronautical
charges. This is in contrast to situations where a single till is continued and only partial costs of new
capacity can be recovered from aeronautical charges. In the long run, all aeronautical assets will
gradually be replaced by new investments and the dual till will eventually be applied across all
aeronautical services. This mechanism can spread out the sharp charge increases caused by a sudden
switch to full application of a dual till. Major airports in Australia had adopted t h ~ salternative for the
first five years of posbprivatisation period (PC, 2002). New capacity investments, however, may also
account for a substantial share of RAB and could induce a considerable increase in aeronautical
charges. To a lesser extent, there also appears to be some degree of arbitrary allocation of new
investments' assets between aeronautical and nor+aeronautical resources. Users of existing facilities
will probably cross-subsidise others using new facilities, if the airport cannot separate the former group
of users from the latter.
5.4 Adjusting the allocation of common costs

In applying the duaktill approach, guidelines are needed in order to allocate costs and revenues
between regulated and nomregulated tills. Opponents of dual-till pricing have argued that a degree of
discretionary or arbitrary judgement is needed in allocating common costs between both tills.
Furthermore, the required effort and time involved in allocating costs between both tills raises the costs
of economic regulation. However, by adjusting the allocation of common costs between both tills, i.e.
allocating additional common costs to nomregulated activities, may offset the required increase in
regulated charges that would have been implemented without changes to the allocation of common
costs. However, the effectiveness of this alternative would be limited, since the extent to tune the
allocation of common costs could be very small.
5.5 Allowing airport users to secure a$nancial stake in the airport

One mode of compensating airlines for paying higher charges induced by a dual till is to allow airlines
to secure a financial stake in the management of alrport nomaeronautical activities. Airlines can
therefore enjoy the profits and share the risks of operating nomaeronautical facilities. In the US,
Australia and New Zealand, for example, some airlines own and operate passenger terminals (Starkie,
2001, p. 132) where the most nonaeronautical profits are generated. One possible deficiency in this
arrangement is that entry access may be blocked, in particular for new entrants. lo However, in these
cases, it would be incumbent on the govemment under national competition and fair trading laws to
ensure that access is not denied. Another deficiency is that those airlines operating terminals may not
develop nonaeronautical business to its full potential. This is because first, conflicts of interest could
arise in terms of the conflicting space needs of the airline and the retail concessions, and second, the
airline may not possess the required skills and knowledge to full exploit nomaeronautical revenue.
Starkie (2001) suggests another arrangement, which is to demerge the airport's nomaeronautical
business into a separate company. It is then established as a joint venture between the airport and
airlines. This type of joint venture would maintain existing incentives for the airport to increase
aeronautical output and provide incumbent airlines with similar incentives. The airport can reap more
revenue from higher aeronautical charges that will be allowed under a dual till. Airlines can enjoy the
benefits of operating nomaeronautical facilities. Higher aeronautical charges at congested airports
codd encourage !zrger aircraft and lead to an increase in the average number of passengers per aircraft
"For example, those airlines that own and operate their own terminals can constrain other airlines from using these
terminals. This may create obstacles to new entrants obtaining access to the airport.
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movement (because higher landing charges might lead larger aircraft to operate more cost-efficiently as
landing charges can be shared by more passengers). Because of this effect, more passengers would be
brought into and use the airport, nonaeronautical turnover would increase, and ultimately both parties
could share the increased nonaeronautical profits. It could be a net overall gain to the airport after
allowing for the lump s u m transfer of enough equity to compensate the airlines for any increase in
aeronautical charges. If the airport ownership rule is constrained, such as in Australia where the
airline's ownership of the airport is limited up to 5% (PC, 2002, p. XIX), an obstacle to the above
arrangements will be created.
6. Future prospects

Worldwide airline passenger numbers have more than doubled over the past twenty years, while the
expansion of runway, stand and/or terminal capacity has not kept pace with the growth in demand for
slots, leading to capacity shortages (DotEcon, 2001, pp. 1 and 5). It is thus urged that airport pricing
should move toward efficient capacity management and enhance incentives to expand capacity. Zhang
and Zhang (2003) develop a multi-period model which allows capacity being expanded by discrete
units in order to derive the optimal timing of expansion-the time when the perceived benefits (e.g. the
gain in operating profits) of additional capacity just outweigh the cost of capital for the expansion. As
an airport's overall return is likely to be higher under the dual till, the timing of capacity expansion
would be earlier under the dual till than under the single till. In incentivising capacity expansion in
time and providing correct pricing signals for incremental capacity, a move to the dual till is
recommended before excess demand becomes severe. The longer the single till is maintained at
congested airports, the more excess demand grows and the less effectiveness of moving to the dual till.
This is because demand inelasticity will become significant and price mechanism will weaken as
excess demand grows.
In order to urge capacity expansion, the CAA (2003a) has incorporated both the air traffc movement
incentive condition for Heathrow Auport" and the triggers condition to prompt capital expenditure for
Heathrow and Gatwick Auports into the price-cap formulas since April 2003. This shows that

incentives for airports to expand capacity can also be provided through particular arrangements on
price caps, rather than relying just on adopting the dual till. Further attempts to develop superior
alternatives to both approaches, avoiding disputes on the singe till versus dual till, are foreseeable.
The proposal that allows the airport immediately receiving benefits of expanding capacity is also
emerged. It is argued that new slots created by the airport could be auctioned and the proceeds could
accrue to the airport. Incentives for the airport b expand capacity will be enhanced, particularly for
those airports now facing severe excess demand. However, who owns the property rights to slots has
not been clarified and is therefore subject to a considerable degree of legal uncertainty and ambiguity.
Present EC regulation also prohibits the sale of slots. It is still questionable whether the airport should
enjoy the scarcity rents (beyond the building costs of new capacity), especially where capacity is
limited by planning and environmental constraints and the scarcity value of new capacity will be
significantly higher than the accounting costs. To put this proposal in place also requires reforming the
slot allocation mechanism and establishing the secondary slot trading market.
The duaLtill approach (perhaps a modified version) can be a transient arrangement for deregulation.
The Australian case provides one example for this, though the effectiveness is unclear (Forsyth, 2003, p.
11

However, this air traffic related movement incentive at Heathrow would not implement until the introduction of an
aerodrome congestion term as part of the remedy to the adverse fmding by the CCUK on service quality (CAA, 2003%
para. 9.1).
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34). If a sudden switch from the single-till regulation to deregulation is undesirable, a temporary move
to the dual-till regulation can be an option.

7. Concluding remarks

The decision of the regulatory approach, between the single till and the dual till, is a mix of diversified
arguments, reasons and considerations. This issue is mainly due to the phenomenon that the regulatory
approach is usually unspecified in the airport economic regulation acts. In order to achieve lower
aeronautical charges and W i s e regulated airports’ excess return, regulators tend to apply the singletill approach, which might inadequately extend the regulatory scope into nonaeronautical business
(which are generally falling outside the current definition of regulated services). It is thus
recommended that the regulatory approach, smgle-till or duaktill, should explicitly be specified in the
relevant legislation or, at least, the conditions of adopting any approach should be specified, rather than
decided by the regulator’s discretion.
Demand for aeronautical services is m e CY^ of deiived dcmazc! h r n zir!ines’ demmd fcr pmviding
air travel services to passengers. To derive ideal regulatory outcomes, it is essential to empirically
derive approximations of demand elasticity for access to an airport. For those airports with substantial
excess demand, a dual till might potentially result in better outcomes in relation to economic efficiency
but its effectiveness would be limited if price inelasticity is significant. Under such circumstances, a
possible solution is further toward market-clearing pricing. There is scope of further research in these
areas.
Appendix

First of all, if the single-till approach is adopted and the airport sets its aeronautical charges at the
maximum level determined by the regulator, the airport will just break even on providing all airport
services (including reasonable returns) as Equation (1). The aeronautical deficits and nonaeronautical
profits are then shown in Equations (2) and (3)
IC‘ =TRs -TCs = (R: -Ci)+(Ri - C i ) = 0
(1)
where R,” = Revenue of aeronautical services under the singlatill approach;
R i = Revenue of norraeronautical services under the singlatill approach;
C,”= Cost of aeronautical services under the single-till approach;
C i = Cost of nonaeronautical services under the single-tillapproach;
l R s =Ri+Ri;and
TCs = C i + C i .

where p

R i / l R ;and
q = C;/TCs.
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=

s
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4
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(3)

If switching to the dual till, aeronautical revenue, RAD, will require recovering aeronautical cost, C
A
D,
assuming that aeronautical demand is significantly enough for the airport to earn such revenue and that
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aeronautical cost under the dual till is the same as that under single till (this implies that the consumed
quantity of aeronautical services under the dual till is equal to that under the single tilI)l2. This is
indicated as Equation (4). Aeronautical revenue and charges, therefore, have to rise by (q/p- 1)x100%
if moving from the single till to the dual till. This is shown in Equation (5). The larger the value of q/p
(or the larger difference between q and p ) , the higher the aeronautical charges under the dual till (than
under the single till).
R ~ = C : = C i = q T C s = q T ~ (? a:=OandC,D=C,S)
(4)
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ABSTRACT
A ording to theoreti a1 predi tions, the application of peak-load pricing to utilities
usually results in higher levels of welfare and is recommended on this basis. In what
concerns airports, this pricing system is adopted by some of EU airports, in order to
alleviate congestion by means of demand shifting, while others charge according to
aircrafts’ weigh. This paper provides an insight on the effects on welfare of both pricing
systems. Within the framework of a vertical differentiation model, and using a two-stage
game with two airlines and one airport, I find that peak-load pricing actually decreases

consumer surplus and welfare, but is the preferred system for the airport and for the low
quality firm.These results are opposite to previous ones, and some particular features of the
model, and of the airports’ particular case, account for this difference.
D

Keywords: airports, peak-load pricing, welfare.

1. Introduction: The application of different price systems and the purpose of
the paper
Most EU airports charge airlines for landing and taking-off facilities mainly
according to the weigh of the aircraft, so that larger aircrafts pay more than small ones. In
particular, these prices don’t change with the season or the time of the day’.
On the contrary, other airports in the EU charge different tariffs according to the

time of the day, or to the season, with higher charges in peak hours. This peak-load pricing,
which is very often applied in other industries, is used in airports like Heathrow, Gatwick,
and Dublin, among others.
The purpose of this paper is to find which price system is better, namely in terms of
welfare and consumers’ (passengers’) surplus. With a simple model using alternatively both
pricing systems, I try to check if the arguments for higher peak-hour pricing are sustainable
within the context of airports.
Policy implications of the choice between the two systems of charging facilities are,
in my, opinion, quite relevant. As it is known, grandfathering rights still persist in the UE.
These rights mean that any airline that uses a slot at least in 80% of the times in one season
is entitled to use it for the next season. In busy airports, namely in those that are
congestion4 at certain times of the day, the best timetables are kept by incumbent airlines.
These flights offer a better quality because timetables are more suitable for passengers, as
they may, for instance, attend to a meeting somewhere in Europe, leaving in the morning
and coming back on the same day, and don’t have to stay overnight (with the consequent
expenses in accommodation), or as they don’t have to fly at a too early or too late hour.

1. Most of these airports have noise charges, whch are higher during night time. But, even at this time,
charges vary mainly according to the aircraft noise characteristics, as classified by ICAO.Besides, night

surplus applies only between around 22:OO and 5:59, which is quite different from peak-off hours. For
instance, at Dublin airport, peak-off time, during summer months,extends from 0O:OO to 05:59, from 08:OO to
08:59, from 1500 to 16:29, and from 21:30 to 23:59.

2

Therefore, new entrants, when they candidate for a slot near the airport coordinator, will probably get the worst times of the day, and hence, will have a smaller
demand. Else, if they aim to increase their demands, they must push down prices, and, of
course, profits.
Because of grandfathering, flights from and to the same airport become
differentiated products, with different qualities, depending on their timetable. Price
competition is relaxed, with consequent damages for passengers. Anyway, this would be
necessary at busy airports, even if the airlines exchange places, and if the best slot would be
offered to the new entrant. But grandfathering rights assure that the incumbent airline keeps
the best flights. If airport charges aren’t differentiated by the time of the day, airport costs

are equal for both airlines and new entrants are penalised on the supply side. Rather, the
new entrants may be benefited if off-peak prices are smaller.
Consequently, there are important implications of peak-load pricing on competition
grounds: the flights’ price differential may become larger, shifting the demand fiom peakload to peak-off flights, and the new entrants may be in better terms in what concerns
demand and costs, when comparing with a simple weigh-based pricing scheme.
In this context, how much are consumers and welfare affected, and by which
means? This is the main question of this paper. Other questions, as the redistribution of
profits among the three firms, and the effects on demand are also relevant here.
The paper is developed as follows. In section 2, I make a very brief survey of the
main conclusions of peak-load price theory, and of other models and general
recommendations of this policy. Some evidence on both pricing systems in EU airports is
shown in section 3, in order to gather the dimension of the question. In section 4, the main
features and assumptions of the model are presented, while the cases of equal and of
I

differentiated prices are developed through sections 5 and 6. Finally, in section 6, I
comment and interpret the results of the model, and compare them to previous works, as

t

referred in section 2.

3

2. Theory and practices of airport tariffs

The theory of peak load pricing was mainly developed by Boiteux, though it is

armed that the analysis of the problem goes back to 1926, with the studies of Bye (Crew,
Fernando and Kleindorfer, 1995). Evidences fiom some industries, like electricity and
telecommunications, showed that consumers used these goods more intensively at some
hours of the day, while in other times consumption levels became low. This brings a
problem of excess capacity. Marginal cost is higher: at peak-load times, as it includes a
capacity marginal cost, and lower at peak-off times, where only variable costs are added for
an extra unit of consumption.
From the point of view of welfare, prices should reflect these differences on
marginal costs, and be higher at peak-load hours (Tirole and Laffont, 1999). At lower
demand periods, there’s an excess of capacity, and keeping it leads to inefficiency, which
has a cost, and pricing should mitigate this inefficiency (Crew, Fernando and Kleindorfer,
1995). These considerations establish the basis for setting different prices at different hours
of the day.

This price scheme became very usual in industries like electricity and
telecommunications.
Official recommendations towards applying peak-load pricing to airports were quite
strong through the seventies and the eighties, but seem to have been progressively losing its
importance (Starkie, 2001). In fact, recent documents issued by the EU Commission don’t
refer the matter, though they are quite concerned with other subjects the effects of whch
approach the objectives of peak-load pricing, such as the problems of grandfathering and
slots’ trading.
However, the Commission recommends that airports should not discriminate their
charges, though allowing for differences in prices, as long as criteria are objective and nondiscriminatory (European Commission, 2000). Apparently, the criteria used for peak-load
and peak-off doesn’t discriminate among airlines. But, with the grandfathering rights of the
first comers, the picture seems to change. Anyway, this practice is, of course, allowed in
EU airports.
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Recently, and as the problem of airport congestion has become more serious, many
opinions advise again this system in order to avoid, or at least mitigate, congestion
problems like delays and queuing. Gurantz (2001) states that peak-load pricing would lead
to fewer delays, and more efficiency. Higher prices would split passengers towards peak-

off time, and this would lead to a better allocation of flights. As reported by Reuter (2001),
Brueckner supports the system, based exactly on the same considerations of higher flight
tickets, and consequent shift of airlines and passengers to peak-off hours. These
considerations are common to other utilities’ basis for using this price system.
Opinions against this system are less frequent. Among them, it is worth referring
the US-CAWA (2001) advice, as it becomes important in the context of this paper. They
state that peak-of pricing has anti-democratic consequences to peopie who can’t aEord
flying during peak daily hours. Additionally, the demand shift means that more passengers
will have to wait longer for connecting flights, spending more time at airports, and more
money on h e t e k
Models testing both pricing systems for welfare purposes are scarce, as far as I
know. In a recent work, Daniel (2001) uses evidence from Minneapolis- St Paul airport to
simulate the effects of congestion pricing in welfare. He finds that overall net surplus
increases with t h ~ ssystem, for the three patterns of demand elasticity he uses. The
simulations are made using costs that include those derived fkom layover time, queuing
delays and the probability of losing connection flights in hub airports. Net surplus mainly
increases by the reduction in these costs.
Crew, Fernando and Kleindorfer (1995) provide an interesting observation when
noting that, in what regards airports, peak-load prices haven’t the expected effects on
demand shifting because of slots’ grandfathering. They argue that the impact of this pricing
system on demand (and, consequently, on demand shifts) is quite small while this right
prevails, and that only overall reforms on slot trading may provide a basis for applying
efficiently any congestion pricing policy.
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3. Some evidence

In order to seize the importance of this problem in the European Union, namely
about the magnitude of price differentials under both systems, I t i e d to check with some
airports2 about their pricing system and about the fares they charge airlines. Prices for four
UE airports are displayed in Table 1 . Frankfurt, Orly and CDG practice only a MTOW
price, which differs with the weigh (and size) of aircrafts. Dublin also applies this system,
but differentiates much less among aircrafts, and adds peak-load prices, which are 300%
higher than those of peak-off hours. This margin is near the ones existing in other busy
airports. For instance, in Heathrow peak fees exceed off peak ones by 230%, while in
Gatwick this difference goes up to 300% (Ewers, 2001).

I chose five aircrafts of different sizes. To find the number of passengers by aircraft

I used Lufthansa average patterns, with a 100% occupation rate. Prices include movements
(take-off or landing), aircraft handling, parking (up to one hour), and noise charges. The
first two charges are the most important ones. At Frankfurt airport, they represent 92% of
the total price, while noise charges account only for 7% for a Boeing 747, and 3% for an
Airbus 340. Passenger fees are excluded, as they aren’t related to the weigh of aircrafts.
At Frankfurt and at Paris’ Orly and CDG airport fees are clearly differentiated with
the weigh of the aircraft. Average deviations are, respectively, of 2.4 and 3.4, much higher
than the same value for Dublin (1.4 peak and 0.5 off-peak). Dublin airport practices a
strong differentiation between standard and peak-off times, but exhibits a low level of
MTOW differentials. Besides, peak-off prices are very small, probably reflecting very low
(or almost zero) marginal costs of landing and taking off.

2. I contacted several airports, including Portuguese ones, asking about their system of charging. The airports
of Orly and CDG, and of Frankfurt, answered my questions, while tariffs for Dublin airport can directly be

found in internet. Some of the inquired airports didn’t reply, and in this case are London airports, that charge
peak-load prices.
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Table 1: Prices per passenger at some airports, in euros

Frankfurt Airport
Boeing 747-400
Airbus A340-200
Airbus A319
Boeing 737-500
Canadair CRJ 700
IAverage Deviation

495
793
292
295
1.4
2.4

I

I
Boeing 747-400
Airbus A340-200
Airbus A319
Boeing 737-500
Canadair CRJ 700
Average Deviation

Orly and CDG

894
10,6
494
493
2.3
-3.4

1

DublinAirport
Standard Off Peak
399
193
590
197
291
099
290
094
1,9
096
1,4
095

I

Standard/
Off-peak
299
299
293
497
394
i

I

4. The model

In the second stage, I use a duopoly model in a vertical differentiation setting. The
two firms are the incumbent, who sells the hghest quality (denoted by the subscript “2”),
and the new entrant, supplying the lower quality (denoted by subscript “1”). This new
entrant is supposed to have entered successfully in the industry, and, so, any game of entry
is ruled out. The product is a flight with the same departing and arriving point, and taking
place on the same day. Both airlines sell the same flight, though at different times of the
day, the incumbent at peak hours (which accounts for its better quality), and the new
entrant at off-peak hours. Due to quality differentiation, the prices of the flights are, of
course, different.
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Contrarily to the usual hypothesis of vertical differentiation models, quality is an
exogenous variable, as the airlines can’t change it. So, there is a set quality for peak time
flights, which consists on the comfort passengers are entitled to, in the terms described
above, if they buy these flights. I denote this quality by “a”, and I set the worse quality
equal to the unit, so that “a” is a measure of the quality differential, a>l.
Airlines are supposed to use aircrafts with the same weigh and the same size, so that
there aren’t differences due to MTOW charging.
Besides the two airlines, there is the airport, which I suppose to be a private firm.
The discussion of this hypothesis is done below. I denote the airport variables by the
subscript “A”.
The two airlines bear only the costs that airports charge for movements, luggage
handling, parking, etc. This is a rather simplifymg hypothesis. Indeed, these costs are very
small when compared to other flying costs. These latter may be variable or fixed. As for
variable costs, there is no problem in ignoring them, as the prices may be understood as
price-cost margins, which is usual in vertical differentiation models. The exclusion of fixed
costs hasn’t much importance, too. Indeed, these costs don’t account for the solutions of the
Bertrand game in the second stage, and, so, for the airport demand and fees determination
in the first stage. The introduction of other costs would only change airlines’ profits.
Anyway, the reasons for including only airports’ tariffs in airlines’ costs are (i) to
simplifL the model and make results comparable and understandable, and (ii) because the
model focuses precisely on these costs, and the price the airport charges to airlines is an
endogenous variable of the game.

I also exclude fees directly charged to passengers, as they aren’t part of airlines’
costs, but are directly paid to airports.

As for demands, they are determined in a Gabszewicz-Thisse vertical differentiation
setting, using the formulation of Motta (1993)3, which makes it easier to compute the
values of variables. So, there is a number of potential consumers (passengers), uniformly
distributed according their marginal willingness to pay for quality, which is represented by

v, and v is set between the limits of “0” and “1”.
3. Calculus was developed in SW3, and may be obtained by request to the author.
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Denoting flight prices by pl and p2, respectively for the lower and the higher quality
flights, the demands for flights will be:

y1= (pz-apl) / (a-1) and y ~ (a-l+pl-p2)
=
/ (a-1)
Demands are interdependent, as products are considered as differentiated. Besides,
they are derived demands. As will be noted and developed in the last section of the paper,
these demand functions differ much from the ones used in other works on congestion
prices.

As for the airport, I suppose that it charges a price P, measured as a price per
passenger, for the use of its facilities. Besides these revenues, it also gets those originated
by retail and restaurant activities, car rental, exchange, etc. These activities are very
important, and couldn’t be ignored. For example, in Heathrow and Gatwick, they account
for about 60% of all airport revenues.

I normalize each passenger’s expenses on retail and restaurants to the unit, and then
these expenses become equal to the number of passengers, y1+y2. I use a short run
approach, as it seems to be more convenient. In fact, an airport’s expansion is a very slow
process, on account of technical, environmental, political, and other issues. Therefore, and
for simplicity, the airport bears only a fixed cost, C.

I suppose that airports maximise profits, whlch means considering the airport as a
unregulated private firm. Here, it is important to mention that some EU airports are
privately owned, such as Heathrow, Gatwick, Stanstead, Fiumicino, in loo%, and Vienna,
Copenhagen, Dusseldorf, among others, in more than 50%, some are locally owned, while
others are state owned. For these latter, welfare (instead of profits) maximisation would be
more adequate.
In order to capture the welfare effects of airport fees’ differentiation, I apply the
model to two cases. In the first one, prices aren’t differentiated. In the second one, the fees
airlines pay are different according to the time of the day.
The game is developed in two stages. In the second stage, airlines choose their
flights prices, depending on the fixed quality and on the airport prices for using landing and
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taking off facilities. Thus, we get their demands for using the airport. In the first stage, the
airport determines its facilities’ prices, using these demands.

5. The case of equal prices
llus case applies to airports that charge movements, parking and handling of
passengers and luggage, according to the so-called MTOW, the weigh of the aircraft. This
is the case of Frankfurt, OrlyKDG, Fiumicino, and many others.

In this situation, the airport charges the same price by passenger, P, in every
movement, to similar aircrafts, whatever may be the time of the day and/or of the year.
With y1 and y2 as defined above, and being the airport’s fees the only costs, the
airlines’ profits, n1 and I&, respectively for the new entrant and the incumbent, are:

Ill = @I-P) (pz-apl) / (a-1) and I&

= @2-P)(a-l+pl-p2) /

(a-1)

In the second stage, both airlines maximise profits, in a Bertrand game. Reaction
functions are upwards sloping, as expected, and have the expressions:

p1= @t+aP)/ta and pz=(a-l+pl+P)/2
Solving these reaction functions there result expressions of Ill, I&, p1, p2, y1 and y2,
all depending only on P and on a.
The airport’s profits are:

The first term accounts for the revenues charged to airlines, and the second one for
revenues of retail activities.

In the first stage, the airport maximises its profits, choosing the value of P,which
turns out to be:
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P= (a-l)/2(2a+l)
With this value of P, solutions for the other variables are computed, and they are
shown in Table 1.

To account for welfare effects, consumer surplus, CS, and welfare, W, must also be
computed. Consumer surplus will be4:

As for welfare, I use a standard measure, which is the sum of consumer surplus, the
airlines profits and the airports’ profits.

6. Differentiated pricing
In this section, I adjust the previous model in order to include higher charges for
peak hours and lower prices in off-peak time.

As above, I suppose that the new entrant has the lower quality flight, and the
incumbent airline has the high quality one. But now the airport charges P2 to the
incumbent, and PI to the new entrant, P2>P1.
The airlines’ profits become now:

The process is the same than in the precedent section. In the second stage the
airlines maximise their profits on prices, from where result the airport’s derived demands.
The expression of l&

is now:

4. See Mom (1993).
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In the first stage, the airport maximises its profits on PI and P2, resulting:

P1 = O andPz= (a-1)/2
The value of PI is apparently surprising. Why should the airport charge nothing (or
almost nothmg) in peak-off hours? But, after all, in these hours, there are no alternatives for
using the equipments, which are fixed, so marginal cost is zero. The airport, though
unregulated, chooses to price at short run marginal cost. Besides, by charging a very low
(zero) fare to the new entrant airline, the airport gets more revenues from retail and other

activities, which are usually higher than revenues from airport landing/ taking-off facilities.
Notice that this evidence is present in the model’s results. The price of retail activities was
normalised to the unit. In the precedent section, the equilibrium value for P is smaller than
one. And, in this case P 2 4 for any a<3, or for a certain limit of product differentiation.
Profits, prices and welfare were computed as explained above, and the comparison
of results is displayed in Table 2.

7. Comments on results and concluding remarks
As it can be seen in Table 2, in the context of this model, peak-load pricing has a
negative effect on consumer surplus and on welfare. Tlus result is opposite to theory’s
predictions and to the ones of other models presented before.
Let’s first see how a change from an equal price to a differentiated price system
affects the three firms’ strategies, leading to a lower level of welfare.

In the second stage, with different prices, the incumbent expects to lower its profits,
as it bears higher costs, and inversely for the new entrant. Then, the first airline charges
passengers higher prices for its flights, as it can’t differentiate them more. Quality is fixed,

so strategies based on an adjustment of the quality differential aren’t practicable. Prices are
the only variables airlines can manipulate. The best reply by the new entrant is to keep its
price. Though costs are lower, its rival has raised its price, so, and as the reaction function
is upwards sloping, p1 may remain the same.

In the first stage, the airport anticipates the airlines’ adjustments towards a general
price raise, and it will expect a lower demand, which might diminish its revenues. As costs
are fixed, its strategy can only be based on revenues.

Table 2: Solutions for equal and differentiated pricing

equal prices (E)

different prices (D)

comparison

y’Yl+Y2

(5a+1)/2(4a-l)

(5a+1)/2(4a-1)

-73-

P1

3(a-1)/2(4a-l)

3(a-1)/2(4a-l)

PIE=PID

P2

a(8a’-a-7)/2(2a+1)(4a-l)

3a(a-1)/(4a-l)

PzE<PzD

I
P

(a-1)/2(2a+l)

P1

0

p2

(a-1)/2

nAE<nAD

nlE<nlD
a(a+2)(8a2+3a+1)(8a3-5az-2a-

n
2

(2a+1)(2az-a-1)/4 (4a-1)’

n’%I,D

a(4az+25a+7)/8(4a-1)’

CSE>CSD

((28a3+11laz-27a-4)/

WE>wD

1)/4(2a+1)’(4a-l)’

cs

a(64a4+84a3+117a’+50a+9)/
8(2a+1)’(4a-l)’

W

((192a5+460a4+355a3+18a2-49a-

4)/8(2a+1)’(4a-l)’)-C
I

I

8(4a-l)’)-C
I

But a lower demand affects the airport on two kinds of revenues, those from aircraft
landing and other facilities, and those from retail and restaurant activities.
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To lessen losses in retail and restaurant revenues, the airport prefers to lower P1 to a
very small value (in fact, P1=0), which is somehow compensated by the increase in landing
and taking-off facilities’ revenues derived fiom the incumbent airline, as the new

P2 is

higher than the previous P. Hence, with the same demand as before, and as the rise in the
price it charges the incumbent isn’t offset by the decrease ofP1, the airport gets now higher
profits.

The new entrant’s demand increases, allowing it to keep its price, while the
incumbent’s demand decreases. With a higher demand and lower costs, the new entrant
experiments an increase in profits. The situation is inverse for the incumbent and

n2

diminishes.
The number of passengers is the same, as the choice between buying, or not, a
flight, depends only on a and p1, and this latter hasn’t changed. But y1 grows, while y2
decreases. There is an effect of redirecting passengers (and flights) to peak-off hours, as
theory predicts. This effect is quite obvious. What is new in this model is the fact that the
airport anticipates this shfi in its demand and adjusts the level of its prices in order to
increase profits.
As a consequence of this strategy, this effect on demand is negatively reflected in
consumer surplus. Consumers lose quality, as more of them have to fly at less suitable
hours. This loss of quality and the rise in p2 account for a lower level of consumer surplus
with differentiated prices. Welfare becomes also lower, as the decreases in CS and in II,
aren’t offset by the increases in n, and n,.

Then, the main conclusion of th~spaper is that, according to the results of this
model, airport’s prices differentiation hasn’t all the expected effects that theory suggests. In
fact, only the airport and the new entrant are better off with it. It was expected that the new
entrant would see its demand and profits rise, and its costs decrease, and this happens in the
context of the model. Apparently, the benefits for the new entrant should spread to
consumers. But this is not so, as average quality is smaller, and more passengers have to
take less suitable flights (and maybe to spend more money in hotels and other items).
Besides, the incumbent airline adjusts by increasing its prices, but with a smaller demand
and higher costs, experiments a decrease in profits. Higher prices for the best flights may
alleviate congestion, but they also account for a lower consumer surplus.
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Now I shall present a few points, which, in my opinion, are pertinent to explain the
differences between my results and those of previous works. These differences are mainly
due to the assumptions I use. Some of them may be simplifjlng hypothesis, but others are
taken so that the model may capture some important features of the airports’ case.
(i) An important assumption of my model is the number of firms involved in the
game, as well as the role they play. In most of the works on peak-load prices’ effects, there
is a firm and a large number of consumers to whom the price system is imposed. But, when
applying this price system to airport tariffs, on the demand side there are airlines and not
directly consumers. And, unlikely consumers, airlines have their strategies. Besides, the
airport plays an active role, and doesn’t behave merely like a passively regulated firm.
(ii) The absence of regulation makes anofner difference. F%iie cuiigesiioii piices
theory is built with the aim of regulating, this model assumes a private and non-regulated
airport. The assumption may be somehow strong. Though many EU airports are private,
and many more will probably be in the future, it is true that they are regulated, even if
regulation may be questionable (Barbot, 2003). The introduction of price caps, or of other
.

regulation methods, might provide interesting insights. Anyway, the model may be useful
in the sense that de-regulation of utilities is an important question nowadays. And, in a
game where the airport chooses the price system, regardless of regulation constraints, it
would no doubt opt for peak-load prices.
(iii) Demand patterns play a crucial role on welfare results. Most works are based
on the independence of demands. Williamson (1966) suggests that relaxing this hypothesis
might provide a possible extension of his analysis, though graphic treatment would become
unfeasible. I believe that using interdependent demands, both for flights and for airport
facilities, is an interesting feature of a model for the airports’ case. Besides, some more
consistency is added, because, instead of using any ad hoc demand functions, they are
derived in the context of vertical differentiation theory.
(iv) The next question is concerned with where we should introduce quality. In the
model I present, welfare depends on quality, and quality is based on the benefits of flying at
more suitable timetables. Then, when more passengers fly at peak-load periods, welfare
becomes higher. This is quite different fiom Daniel (2001)’s model, where welfare is
accounted mainly by delay and queuing time. This is a crucial point, and, by means of
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different assumptions on quality, it is natural that results don’t match. But my quality
approach is the reason why the results of the paper quite agree with US-CAWA(2001)’s
statement, referred in section 3. Indeed, US-CAWA refers to the loss of consumer surplus,
in the part that is accounted by the loss of quality for peak-off hours’ passengers. Then, the
question is where to place passenger’s quality, on the comfort of flying at suitable times, or
on the conveniences of not having to wait. A model that would include both features is an
interesting challenge.
(v) The role of grandfathering was stressed in the above-mentioned remark by
Crew, Fernando and Kleindoder (1995). They argue that grandfathering prevents demand
shifting and that, as long as this practice prevails, the effects of congestion prices in airports
are countervailed by it. I consider grandfathering in the model, as the incumbent airline has
the best quality. But it could as well be the new entrant to have the higher quality slot, and
results wouldn’t differ. It really doesn’t matter “who’s who”, or who sells the best quality
good. Besides, in my model, demand effectively shifts, though total demand remains the
same. If we would relax the grandfathering hypothesis, the game might be quite different,
and, of course, interesting, but it had to involve slot trading, and quality costs of acquiring
the best slots.
(vi) Finally, a few remarks on cost functions. In what concerns the airlines’ costs,
vertical differentiation models usually include quality costs, which increase with the level
of quality. In the present model, these costs are neglected. In fact, quality here means flying
at better hours, and the higher quality good becomes available not because the airline
invests in quality, but because it has the best slots by means of grandfathering rights. These
rights are costless, so there’s no reason to include quality costs. But they may become
opportunity costs, as the airline is entitled to keep the slot as long as it uses in at least 80%.

This may mean some losses in peak-off seasons, obviously compensated by profits in peakload seasons (otherwise, it wouldn’t keep the slot). Then, the losses could be quality costs.
Auports’ costs are also simplified when considering only fixed costs. This is done in order

to make the model easier to work with, but labour costs of luggage handling, air control,
refuelling, and others, are probably a significant part of total costs.
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Introduction
The world’s airlines are continually challenged to deal effectively with uncertainty in the
transport sector and the inevitable downturns faced by any business. These cyclical
swings are exaggerated by the periodic need to replace older equipment with more modern aircraft. Financial innovations provide a certain number of solutions to the problem of
matching transport capacity to the fluctuations of demand.
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provides a clear method
for estimating the financial cost of investing in equipment such aircraft, an average of the
cost of borrowing, or debt, and cost of invested funds, or equity. The Weighted-Average
Cost of Capital (WACC) has been used in investment appraisal for over twenty years,
and more recently. has been applied to corporate financial management, in techniques
such as Economic vaiue-added (EVA).

The techniques used to value the financial viability of investments - from basic profitability, to Return on Investment, Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return are taught
to hundreds of thousands of business students around the world every year. Many
books and software tools are available to assist companies in valuing investments.
Clearly, financial valuation has reached a mature stage of balancing theoretical correctness with practical usability.

-

So, what is the state of practice? Clearly there are positive points (many managers are
familiar with the techniques), but on the other hand a certain lack of clarity in definitions
can be detrimental to their proper use. .In our work in the aviation industry, we find that
there is considerable frustration with the limits of the theoretical responses to practical
issues surrounding implementation.

The objective of this paper is to stimulate discussion, research and debate about potential innovations for practitioners in the aviation field. The scope of the paper - like the airline industry itself is global, which means that we attempt to point up solutions for airlines in developing as well as mature economies.

-

Sources of airline capital and corporate valuation
In many countries, airlines have historically been viewed at least partially as an infrastructure investment, required to promote economic development and growth. This im
plies that for many governments, airline financing can be viewed as part of the state’s
overall infrastructure financing. Further, because of the strategic and military background of aviation, many of the world’s airlines were initially financed using state funds.
In this historical perspective, the cost of financing investment in aircraft is the government’s own cost of financing.

A government’s cost of financing will depend on:
0

the willingness (or obligation!) of taxpayers to provide interest-free financing

0

the interest rate on public debt.

The latter will be determined by investors’ assessment of the state’s creditworthiness, often based on work by rating agencies such as Moody’s Investor Service, Fitch, and Standard and Poor’s.
The notion that aircraft investment is state-funded is of course heresy in the current view
of airlines as generators of economic wealth. Financiers correctly point out that the relatively low cost of government financing can encourage dramatic over-investment, when
the airline is competing against profit-oriented airlines in the international arena. However, the fact of the matter is that a huge amount of airline equity remains in the hands of
governments around the world. The following graph shows that among the world’s alliance members , the state is the largest shareholder in 45% of the airlines surveyed by
Airline Business.
~
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On the other hand, most of the world’s airlines today seek to make increased use of capital market financing. The wave of privatisation is reaching into every part of the globe.
China Eastern and China Southern in Asia, and ACES and LAN Chile in South America
are just a few examples of airlines partially or fully privatised in the last 20 years. The
most dramatic wave of privatisation has been in Western Europe, where Air France, British Airways, Iberia and Lufthansa have raised large amounts of private equity, Of these
four leading companies, only Air France remains majority state-owned. In addition, startup airlines are finding private capital where no state funds are available. Notable examples are India’s Sahara and Jet, not to mention such roaring newcomers as easyJet and
Ryanair in Europe, and JetBlue in the United States.
This unmistakable trend toward the use of private capital points up clearly the need for
financial valuation of the companies, as well as a solid and transparent financial justification for the large investments needed to support growth and profitability in the future.

Investment valuation tools for airlines
Analysts and academics agree that cash-based measures provide the soundest indicator
of investment viability, if for no other reason than the fact that investors are putting up
cash, and demand a cash return from the project. That said, the fundamental tool used
to compare aircraft in terms of economic performance remains Direct Operating Cost
(DOC), which reflects a P&L approach, including non-cash items such as aircraft depreciation.
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Airlines and aircraft manufacturers use absolute and relative DOC figures to compare aircraft in economic terms. While extremely useful for comparing the characteristics of today's aircraft, DOC must be complemented by time-sensitive measures of economic viability for managers:
0

it is a static measure, ignoring the risky evolution of economic conditions as well
as the time value of money.

0

it combines cash and noncash items, making valuation difficult

0

0

it assumes that the aircraft investment is fixed from order to retirement of the aircraft, ignoring the flexibility offered by conversion options and operating leases
it places the emphasis on cost rather than focussing on the revenue-generating
potential of a given unit (seat-kilometre or trip)

Using NPV for investment valuation
To correctly value a long-term investment, firms must first estimate cash flows in three
clearly defined categories, consistent with cash-flow statements and corporate finance
theory.
The three commonly accepted cash-flow categories are
0

Operating cash flows arising from the use of the equipment

0

Investing cash flows, the purchase and eventual disposal of the equipment

0

Financing cash flows directly related to acquiring the equipment

The publication of cash-flow statements in this format by airlines is relatively recent. For

example, British Airways first began publishing a complete cash-flow statement in the
mid-nineties, but by now, analysts are familiar with these categories.
The financial theory taught in business schools and presented in corporate finance texts
requires that the Operating and Investing cash flows be discounted at the company's
overall cost of financing usually defined as the Weighted-Average Cost of Capital
(WACC) - to calculate the Net Present Value (NPV).

-

The financing cash-flows must be left out of the discount calculation for very good reasons:
0
0

WACC already includes a charge to the project for the debt financing
discounting financing cash flows at WACC would incorrectly show value creation
by borrowing at the lower debt rate and "lending" the proceeds to the project at
the higher WACC rate
management is forced to focus on the investment and operation, rather than the
way the aircraft are financed

This method, widely taught and at least partially understood in industry, poses serious
problems for analysis of aircraft investments where increasingly, there are critical interactions between investment and financing decisions.

Practical Problem 7: Estimating the cost of capital (WACC)
WACC is as its name suggests, the average cost of debt and equity capital financing,
weighted by the relative market values of debt and equity in the firm's target capital structure.
The cost of debt is more or less transparent thanks to the financial press. For private
carriers, credit ratings or shadow ratings and information published in financial journals
provide at least rough guidelines to borrowing costs. For state-owned airlines, the government borrowing rate plus a margin for the specific credit risk of the airline can be used
as a proxy.
Cost of equity is another matter. Many state-owned airlines are simply unaware that
there is a cost to equity, considering that their 'company" is a public service, funded by
tax revenue and general government borrowing. Closely held private airlines also demonstrate a lack of transparency regarding the cost of equity, though presumably the airline's management is quite well aware of the returns their shareholders expect.
Even in more mature markets such as Western Europe, Japan and the U.S., estimating
cost of equity is difficult. Turner and Morrell (2002) clearly show that estimates of systematic risk and cost of equity vary among different sources, and in any case are volatile
over time.

Practical Problem 2: operating lease vs. purchase analysis
Lease rentals include a charge for the aircraft depreciation, another reflecting the cost of
financing the aircraft, and a profit margin for the lessor. If the rentals are included in the
cash flow the rule of leaving out financing flows if violated, and if they are excluded the
cost of the aircraft is ignored.
This problem complicates the necessary task of comparing leasing with purchasing.
While there are many theoretical discussions of lease valuation, these are too often
bound up with complex tax formulations and couched in language practitioners don't understand. There are surprisingly few practical solutions proposed by the literature.

Practical Problem 3: Pretax vs. after-tax analysis
Copeland et al. (2000) compare pre-tax and after-tax analysis, and conclude that “it is
virtually impossible to perform a real-world discounted cash-flow analysis using the pretax approach.” In leasing vs. purchasing analysis, tax considerations can be very important
After-tax analysis can be somewhat complex, due to the diversity and ambiguity of tax
codes, and the fact that tax is often based on accrual accounting rather than cash-flow.
In practice, financial managers often require that analysis be done pre-tax
One notable effect is to increase the project discount rate, providing a practical sort of
financial cushion against the risks of the project. The increase is due to the taxdeductibility of interest payments: the after-tax borrowing cost is the pre-tax interest rate
times (l-Tc), where Tc is the effective tax rate on corporate profits.

Practical Problem 4: Bottomline returns to investors
Airline management justifiably wants to know the net cash flows that will accrue to the
shareholders, including the leverage benefits offered by debt financing. There is a strong
tendency to discount ALL the cash flows.
Financial theoreticians have resisted this approach, ever since the classic Modigliani and
Miller Propositions I & 11, which postulate that returns on investments in companies are
independent of the way the firm is financed, since shareholders can duplicate any debt
financing for themselves. Proposition 11 softens this stance by recognising the benefit of
interest tax deductions, but the bias against including financing cash-flow remains. Thus,
classic NPV analysis ignores this measure, but in practice, the investment modelling
done for project finance provides some insight.

Practical Problem 5: Dealing with uncertainty in the cash flows
This is the greatest problem of all, starkly illustrated by many airlines’ current struggle to
maintain profitability and cash reserves h the face of a dramatic downturn in air traffic
following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and most recently, the SARS epidemic. The current situation is the
most dramatic example of the shocks - such as the Gulf War - and cyclical downturns such as the 1970’s oil shocks - that periodically turn the airiine world upside-down.
A common “solution” is to artificially raise the discount rate to compensate for the risks of
the project. This is modelling equivalent of attempting to “insure away the problem.” It
begs the question of the key management responsibility to manage risk, and ignores the
potential upside if market conditions are good.
In the rest of this paper, we will propose a comprehensive set of solutions to problems 2
& 4, and especially this critical problem of uncertainty in investment analysis, both within
the NPV framework, and using Real Options valuation.

Solutions within the NPV Framework
To clearly and comprehensively approach these issues, it is critical to have a sharp understanding of the elements under analysis. On the financial side, managers must estimate cost of debt and cost of equity using the tools available, however imperfect they
may be.

Second, it is critical to clearly distinguish between, operating, investing, and financing
cash flows. Recent advances in financial reporting requirements (yes, there have been
some advances!) help to clarify these distinctions. Once a company has clarified these
definitions, a comprehensive approach is possible.
Finally, it is important to see that the results are significant! In this section we will discuss the alternative methods proposed, and provide a mathematical example of the results. Throughout the paper, we will be looking at operating an A320 family aircraft over
a densely travelled 600 rim sector. Revenue and costs used are those costs typically encountered in the European travel environment, which couples a dense and competitive
transport network with high operating costs, notably labour and navigation/landing/
handling fees. The example is stylised, and not intended to represent any particular aircraft operation.

Estimating the cost of capital
If we look broadly at the global airline industry, airlines in Europe, the U.S., Japan, with
their extensive access to stock market financing, are the exception rather than the rule.
Their listed shares provide highly transparent historic returns, which can be used to estimate cost of equity with the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or other techniques.
An excellent recent example of financial transparency and discipline in applying the concepts to airlines is Lufthansa. The airline has published its estimated WACC, which is
used to complement the traditional DOC analysis, which of course it continues to perform
in evaluating aircraft.
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Because of the volatility of both borrowing and equity costs, there is a strong temptation
to compensate for risk by artificially increasing the discount rate used in the analysis,
thus making the project more dificult to justify. This approach has the serious disadvantage of 'funnelling" all the risk through the discount rate, and also reduces the value of
the analysis itself: a fundamental task of management is to deal with risk effectively
rather than "insuring it away" by using an artificially high cost of capital.
We suggest that a better approach to uncertainty is use a moderate cost of capital, either
using market measures such as Lufthansa has done, or alternatively, using broad, longterm regional benchmarks such as those identified in Dimson, Marsh and Staunton
(2002). We then can capture cash-flow volatility using Monte Carlo simulation, calculate
Expected NPV and the probability of success, and extend the investment analysis using

Operating lease vs. Purchase analysis
Operating leasing has undeniable benefits for operators of aircraft, offering a level of fleet
flexibility and residual value risk reduction unobtainable when purchasing. Growing far
beyond their origins as a "cheap" - or more accurately, low cash-out - solution to aircraft
finance, operating leases are the financing vehicle of choice for around one quarter of all
new large civil aircraft delivered today, extensively used today by the world's largest air'ines. Companies use operating leases for flexibility, when adopting a new aircraft type,
)r as part of an aircraft type exit strategy, as shown below..

1,194 Operating
leased jets in service in
North America

Singapore Airlines operates 15
B747-400 on operating lease
4-10 years, fixed-payment
2-year extension OPTIONS
Full subleasing rights

British Airways

38x 737 classics
15x 319/320, 1Ox extendible leases

A correct discounted cash flow (DCF or NPV) analysis of leasing vs. purchasing should
at lease estimate and include the COST of the flexibility benefits, when compared to debt
financing. The classic pitfall in NPV is including and comparing the operating lease cash
flows, and comparing the result against the purchase cash flows. This problem is discussed from a theoretical standpoint in Myers (1974), Myers, Dill, Bautista (1976), Copeland and Weston (1982), and applied to aviation in Stonier (1998).
Viewed graphically, the differences are apparent.

Purchase vs. operating lease cash flows
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When the cash flows are discounted at the WACC, the result is inevitably favourable to
leasing, and places undue emphasis on residual values.
This is conceptually incorrect for two reasons:
The cost of purchasing or leasing an aircraft should be compared to the benefits
of operating the aircraft, not to one another
Lease payments include both investing and financing cash flows, as well as a risk
premium for the lessor.
Leasing is fundamentally a financing vehicle, and should be compared with the costs of
borrowing or taking on a finance lease (also known as a capital lease).
To correctly estimate the cost of leasing, we recommend using a variant of the welldocumented Adjusted Present Value concept. Under APV, cash flows of different risk
classes are discounted at the discount rates that reflect the risk class of the cash flows.
This method is discussed from a theoretical standpoint in Myers (1974), Myers, Dill,
Bautista (1976), Copeland and Weston (1982), Copeland et al., 2000. Our experience
suggests that it has yet to be fully understood and adopted in industry practice.
Implementing the method is straightforward, as summarised in the following table.

I Financing

Cost of debt

Cost of equity

I
I

cash
flows: I
loadfinance
lease Leasing cash flows
advances and repayments
of interest and principle

I

1

Operating cash flows
Purchase and re-sale of the Operating cash flows
aircraft

This approach has two major advantages:
clarifying that the risks of owning & operating aircraft are borne by the equity investors
directly comparing the financing alternatives, and showing the cost of the flexibility inherent in leasing
This is a major step beyond classic APV, where only the tax deductions on interest payments are discounted at the cost of debt, capturing leverage benefits. We suggest that
just as WACC has been thoroughly accepted in spite of its theoretical pitfalls and the difficulty in estimating cost of equity, this variant of APV should be examined and adopted
to compare leasing versus purchasing in an NPV framework.
When it comes time to finance deliveries, aircraft finance specialists recommend that operators discount the term sheets offered by different financiers to determine the best offer. Our approach to investment analysis using APV simply extends this tactical approach to long-term strategic investment analysis.
A final practical problem in comparing leasing and purchasing concerns the investment
horizon. Operating leases are generally less than ten years in length, and are often
three, five, or seven years, with or without options to extend. To properly compare leasing and purchasing over a longer term, it is necessary to assume that a lease is renewed

over the investment horizons. Methods used to re-price the lease after the primary period range from simply assuming that the lease rate will remain fixed, to modelling the
variation in lease rates as a function of aircraft values.
As the graph below illustrates, the differences in valuation are clearly significant. First,
APV results in a lower overall evaluation because the operating cash flows are discounted using the higher equity rate. Second, the purchase scenario APV is $2.4m
higher than operating lease, reflecting the cost of the residual value risk transfer to the
lessor.
A320 lease

A320 purchase
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Bottomline returns to investors
In the classic theoretical and management literature, the investment and financing decisions are kept strictly separate. On the other hand, airline stakeholders need to understand the overall costs and benefits of investing.
For this purpose, the Equity NPV concept commonly used in project finance builds on the
notion of clearly distinguishing the cost of debt, and the cos? of equity. All project cash
flows - investing, operating, and financing - are discounted at the cost of equity.

The resulting value shows the result of the investment from the shareholders’ point of
view, including the leverage benefits from debt financing, and obviating the distinction
between leasing and purchasing.
Since tax is a very important consideration for investors, this analysis requires an aftertax approach. As with APV, the differences in valuation are substantial, and the underlying assumptions and implications need to be clearly understood by managers.
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Comparing the methods
Each method answers a different, critical question.
0

NPV measures the fundamental return on the investment, assuming the project is
financed using the firm’s overall capital resources at a target debt and equity mix.
APV clearly separates cash flows into different risk classes, and measures the
cost of residual value risk transfer to the operating lessor.

0

Equity NPV shows the bottomline returns to the investors, including the leverage
benefits of the financing.

Investment Planning and Uncertainty
Now we come to the greatest challenge for airlines today, which can make the difference
between success, and failure: dealing with unexpected shocks in the environment, large
or small. Two of the most prominent trends over the last 15 years in aircraft investment
planning have been reductions in manufacture lead-times which increase airline flexibility
to convert from one aircraft type to another before delivery, and the increased use of operating leasing by airlines of all sizes and locations.
Both innovations help airlines cope with the uncertainties they face in operating aircraft.
Financial theory provides new means to value these benefits, which can then be incorporated directly into the cost of the financing overall on a strategic basis, rather than dealby-deal or delivery-bydelivery.
As we have seen, simple NPV analysis fails to take into account both the highly uncertain economic environment airlines face, and the flexibility offered by conversion options
and operating leasing. The APV concept discussed above is really a measure of the cost
of leasing - and hence the transfer of value to the lessor - rather than an estimate of the
flexibility benefits to the operator of the aircraft.
We propose two complementary approaches that take advantage of the potential flexibility of the NPV approach to better understand investment dynamics on the one hand, and
the application of Real Options Analysis (ROA) to better understand the value of flexibility to aircraft operators on the other.

Dealing with uncertainty in the cash flows: the Expected NPV concept
As we have seen, the NPV methodology can be adapted to address many difficult questions in airline investment planning. It is well documented and widely taught, and has the
advantage of being relatively easy to explain and intuitive. On the other hand, practitioners suffer from a tendency to inflate the discount rate artificially, to “insure” against risk.
We propose to capture the risk of airline cash flows in a different way, by extending the
concept to an Expected NP ”, similar to the familiar statistical concept of Expected Value,
where outcomes are weighted by probabilities.
To do this we use Monte Carlo analysis, a well-proven statistical technique which has
earned a key place in airline investment planning.
The Monte Carlo simulation is built on a cash flow model, which calculates NPV. Uncertainties in the operating environment are estimated using probability distributions. Good
examples in aviation include fuel prices, traffic growth & yields, and cash operating costs.
These estimates may be derived from historical data, management judgement, or a combination of the two.

The NPV model is then run hundreds or thousands of times. For each trial, a discrete
value is assigned to each input variable according to the assigned probability distribution.
An outcome (NPV) is generated, and added to the data set.
The output of the analysis is a range of possible NPVs, including an Expected NPV (the
mean outcome). In addition, standard measures of dispersion around the mean are calculated. A probability of a positive NPV can then be readily calculated, changing the focus of the analysis and management discussion.

-

Taking a very well known - and volatile example from aviation, the histogram below
shows the pattern of fuel prices in the 1990s.
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In classic NPV, we assume that input prices will be reliably predictable, which is more
comfortable. In Expected NPV, we recognise that there is significant uncertainty in prediction.
There are at least two major benefits to using Monte Carlo analysis to complement
in investment analysis:
0

0

DCF

It forces management to estimate and manage input risks, rather than insure
them away.
One of the key outputs is an estimate of the probability of success, given the results of the trials

Not surprisingly, these benefits create corollary challenges: management is indeed 6rectly confronted with the need to quantify and manage uncertainty, and to accept that
the decision to invest is made knowing that there is a readily calculable uncertainty of
success.
This is particularly uncomfortable for management cultures that do not readily accept uncertainty. In fact, the framework of analysis is shifted to a risk management approach,
which is inherently less comfortable than the "yes-or-no" outcome of NPV analysis.

Using Real Options to value flexibility
Clearly, the NPV approach to investment planning is useful as part of the analysis, but in
many ways it fails to value the flexibility offered by lessors and manufacturers, and by extension, the cost of giving up flexibility when using constraining financing or ownership
structures such as leveraged leases (tax leases).
As we have seen, one common practice in using NPV is to raise the discount rate in order
to compensate for risk. The effect of this is illustrated in the following graph.
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NPV taken alone will incorrectly estimate value creation in a volatile environment, which
can be misleading on the upside as well as the downside. Real Options Analysis (ROA)
builds on €xpected NPV, providing new insights into the value of flexibility: APV measures the financial cost of flexibility, whereas Real Options measures the value of flexibility
in investment planning.

Review of real options methodology
Options pricing theory was introduced by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes in 1973, and
has been used since then to price financial options on shares, commodities, currencies,
and interest rates. Real Options applies this basic framework to the pricing of options on
real assets, such as aircraft. These can be Call options such as purchase options and
aircraft family conversion options, or Put options such as extendible operating leases or
residual value guarantees.

-

Options pricing is a curious blend of intuitively correct even obvious - value drivers,
rather abstruse mathematics, and very large assumptions about the similitude of real assets and financial assets.
Fundamentally, the value of an option increases with
volatility in the economic cycle and demand for air transport
uncertainty in competitor responses
variability in input prices: fuel, labour, financing ...
time to expiry of the option, eg., delivery of the aircraft or end of the extendible
lease
the interest cost of borrowing

and decreases with...
0
the price of the option
0
the implementation cost of exercising the option
The theory and practice of real options valuation is extensively discussed in Copeland
(2001), Mun (2002). Stonier (1999, 2001) goes the furthest in applying the concept to
aircraft option valuation.
The basic methodological tool is the binomial lattice, which builds a set of potential outcomes to the project using the output from our Expected NPV under Monte Carlo. Key
inputs to build the lattice are the standard deviation of returns given uncertainty, and the
number of "steps" or branches in the binomial lattice. Hence, Real Options can be
viewed as an extension and improvement on Expected NPV, itself a great advance beyond simple, deterministic NPV.
The binomial lattice is a convenient way to represent the uncertainty present in a 4/namic market like air transport, as the graphic below demonstrates. Around the straight
line Expected NPV, upside and downside potential are present in inis more reaiisiic view
of the potential for value creation.
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Notwithstanding certain methodological barriers, Real Options provides insight into the
costs and value of intangibles like aircraft family conversion options, and operating
leases. It is a method that quantifies and prices the intuitive advantages of "looking before you leap."

Using ROA to value an aircraft family conversion option
To demonstrate the technique, we will use the example of a family conversion option,
known in the options jargon as a "switching option." Manufacturers of aircraft offer airlines the possibility to convert between members of an aircraft family before delivery,

given a firm order. In our example we will value the option to switch from and A320 with
150 seats, to an A321 with 175 seats.
Intuitively, we realise that the A321 investment acquires value if airline traffic and yield
conditions are favourable. Since these two variables are highly unpredictable, options
pricing takes us beyond the intuition to the understanding that the option to choose itself
has considerable value for airlines, whether traffic and yields increase or decrease.
To value the option, we set up a cash-flow model, with one scenario for the A320, and
another for the A321. Each aircraft has its particular capacity for passengers and cargo,
and its trip cost structure as a basic input. In the model, we simulate the operating environment: traffic demand, spill factor, revenue yields, and fuel costs are among the key
inputs.
Next, we associate probability distributions with the key uncertain inputs to the model. In
our stylised example, we will simulate uncertainty in basic demand for seats, and fuel
prices. Seat demand is set using a most likely demand for 150 seats, with downside potential of demand for only 110 and upside up to165 zero overall traffic growth is assumed in our simplified example. Fuel price uncertainty is simulated using the historical
analysis presented above.
Running the Monte Carlo simulation, we discover that the A320 returns carry (for example) a 6% standard deviation, and A321 returns carry a 7% standard deviation. This is
intuitively correct, since a larger shell size will carry more upside potential, but more risk
as well.
The standard deviations are used to build a binomial lattice of possible NPVs. At each
node of the lattice, the model compares the NPV of acquiring and operating the A320
with that of the A321. If we choose to exercise the A321 option, an assumed switching
cost of $500,000 is incurred for spares, training and other Entry into Service (EIS) costs
for the new type. The NPV of the A321 must therefore exceed the A320 NPV by more
than this $.5m cost, or we will stay with our original order of the A320. In our five-step
example with sigmas of 6%/7%, the lattice of decisions based on our assumptions is represented below.
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In nine of the simulated potential states of nature in which conditions in the air transport
market are relatively good, we will exercise the option to convert to the A321. If conditions are consistently bad over the period the option remains open, there are 12 outcomes under which we will stay with the A320.
To value the option at contract signature, we must reason backward from the deadline to
exercise the option in the future, to today. At deadline, we will maximise our benefit
(NPV) by choosing the A320 or the A321. At each preceding node in the lattice, we will
either exercise the option to convert to the A321, or we will keep the option open. The
option value at each node as we move backward to today is thus the maximum of the
A321 NPV less the switching cost and the expected value of the subsequent nodes, discounted back at the risk-free rate to compensate for the time value of money.

The value of the flexibility during the option period (the option price) is the single value at
the root of the lattice, minus the NPV that we expect from the aircraft. In our example, the
value is nearly $125,000. This is a measure of the value inherent in flexibility offered to the
airline, consistent with valuation methods used throughout the world, and built on wellestablished statistical and mathematical theory.

Methodological challenges of Expected NPV and Real Options Analysis
Mean reversion and autocorrelations in cash flows can create erroneous results in both Expected NPV and ROA valuations. In a cyclical industry, many inputs tend to correct themselves over the cycle, reverting to a long-term trend or average. Mean reversion in aviation
markets is discussed in Stonier (1999). Further, there may be correlations between the behaviour of input variables. A notable example is the relationship between aircraft market
values and operating lease rates. The validity of postulating correlations between input
variables needs to be further examined, and clear limits determined.
Estimating the project volatility is another question mark for practitioners. In one method,
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comparing them with listed firms, a rather tenuous proposition, and it is unusable in less
open securities markets, where share prices are not readily available. In another, the volatility of projects with significant negative cash flows in extended periods cannot be calculated accurately, due to the impossibility of calculating a natural logarithm of a negative
number. Five potential methods are dissected in Mun (2002). We use the logarithmic present value approach in our modelling, and have found no significant practical difficulties.
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Both NPV and ROA are subject to the assumption of a constant discount rate throughout
the project. Turner .and Morrell (2002) and others have pointed out that discount rate estimates are variable, and clearly, companies' costs of capital vary over time. This is an excellent example of volatility in the market, and yet, the value is left constant in NPV. In
ROA, a constant rate is used to calculate project volatility in the logarithmic present value
method. No completely satisfactory solution to this problem is available.
Time vs. steps in the binomial lattice is another practical challenge. The outcome of the iattice is a set of states of nature, all expressed in NPV. The number of terminal nodes in the
lattice depends on the number of steps used in the analysis, which is not the same as the
time to expiry of the option. On the other hand, the nodes of the lattice are discounted back
to determine the option value, implying that the potential NPVs become known in the future.
Understanding the relationship between the steps and nodes on the one hand, and the time
and decision points between contract and expiry on the other, is rather arduous for practitioners. Unlike the fundamental options value drivers, it is not at all intuitive.

Financial evaluation is an important part of airline fleet planning, but it is just one part of a
very complex strategic process. Airline managers do not have infinite time to dedicate to
learning how to value options. Mastery of the advanced stochastic methods used is rare
enough outside Operations Research departments of universities. Additionally, the ability to
explain the concepts in an efficient, intuitive way is not given to all the mathematical experts. We believe that this "knowledge gap," between expertise and explanatory ability
needs to be closed, through co-operative research between learning institutions and airlines.
There are large imperfections in any valuation method, but we suggest that in managing
iarge risks in investment decisions, an imperfect answer to management and shareholders
is better than no answer.

Conclusion
We propose in this paper the notion that the NPV technique offers the potential for flexibility
beyond its classic interpretation. Our proposed extension of Adjusted Present Value (APV)
provides insight into lease vs. purchase decisions unavailable through classic NPV analysis.
Equity NPV demonstrates the overall returns of the project from a shareholder perspective.
In order to benefit from these techniques, managers need very clear definitions of the elements of analysis - costs of debt and equity, cash-flow categories - in order to exploit the
potential of the method.
APV is very useful in today’s environment, as it measures the cost of flexibility in a concrete
and consistent way. Real Options Analysis complements this analysis, by measuring the
potential value of options. Practitioner can reason in terms of uncertain outcomes, in addition to measuring financial costs, yielding a complete picture of the investment dynamics.
The methods - in particular ROA - require further research 8 elucidation before they will be
widely applied in practice. Financial theoreticians must also keep in mind that financial
evaluation is only part of the extraordinarily complex evaluation of today’s aircraft by airlines
around the world.
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